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James Schlesinger

THE EAGLE AND THE BEAR: Ruminations on Forty Years Of Superpower Relations

The linkup of American and Soviet forces at Torgau on the Elbe in April 1945 may be taken as the event symbolizing a new era in international relations—one largely dominated by the central relationship between two great powers, later known as the superpowers. The meeting at Torgau meant the splitting of Germany, the preeminent European power for three-quarters of a century. Germany's division was to be both a fixture of the postwar era and, additionally, a continuing source of unease. Also, the event dramatically initiated what was to become *die Wacht an der Elbe*, an American protection against the power of the East of what was to become a democratic Germany—and behind Germany an abiding American commitment to the security of Western Europe. Despite the misjudgments in the immediate aftermath of the war, the lessons of two world wars had been insinuated into American foreign policy. Finally, in the way of symbolism, perhaps the brief exchange of fire between Soviet and American forces on the Elbe provided an early harbinger of the tensions that were ultimately to emerge.

To be sure, the war had not entirely run its course. Yet within a matter of weeks Hitler was dead and Germany had surrendered unconditionally. Roosevelt, too, who through America's immense power had become the dominant leader of the West, was gone. The war against Japan was yet to be completed, but because of the bomb, it turned out to be almost a sideshow. The Soviet motive for joining the war against Japan was more akin to that of Mussolini in 1940—to participate in the spoils as the war was concluded—than it was to the spirit of the grand coalition.

James Schlesinger is Counselor, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, and Senior Adviser to Shearson Lehman Brothers Inc. He has been Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and Director of Central Intelligence.

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The American desire was to fulfill the promise of Wilsonian idealism, of the Four Freedoms, of collective security and of the peaceful resolution of disputes through new international institutions. Russian goals were to establish a firm communist base in Europe, to create a *cordon sanitaire* against Western power, and unquestionably to obtain a position of authority in postwar deliberations at least equivalent to that of Tsar Alexander in 1815.

II

Yet the tone of the relationship had already changed. Potsdam was quite different from Yalta. Only Stalin continued in power. The new American President was figuratively as well as literally from Missouri. He did not, indeed could not, share Roosevelt's expectation of enticing Stalin and the Soviet Union into a harmonious postwar structure. By the Potsdam meeting in July, America had passed beyond its wartime dream of long-term international collaboration with the Russians to a new and skeptical study of actual Soviet conduct.

Churchill, too, was gone. Perhaps the great symbolic Western leader in the wartime period, he had been replaced by Clement Attlee. And Britain, one of the Big Three, commenced a long-term decline from the prestige of the wartime period, lacking the resources and perhaps the will to maintain its place with its immensely powerful, continent-spanning allies. Britain's long-term decline was symptomatic of the radically altered position of Europe. Europe's Great Powers were destined never to recover to the extent then anticipated. They would remain dependent upon the United States for protection. Post World War II Europe would be altogether different from post World War I Europe. Whatever its inclinations, America could not go home again.

Nonetheless, it tried. Therein lies a great irony of the postwar period. In these latter days of discussions of the prospects for mutual disarmament or arms control through negotiations, it is forgotten that in 1945 the United States sought no mutual concessions or guarantees from the Soviet Union. No protests could then be made about the intransigence of the American position. The United States simply and unilaterally disarmed. The country gave way to the impulse to "bring the boys home." The pace of demobilization can only be described as pell-mell. The draft was ended. Military units were heedlessly broken up. By 1947, aside from a handful of atomic weapons, U.S. military

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power had been largely dismantled. In a reborn quest for "normalcy," President Truman had terminated Lend-Lease within a few days of the war's end. America sought normalcy. Disarmament had occurred—without negotiations.

The irony, of course, is that it was the Soviet Union that brought America's precipitate withdrawal to an end—and thereby forfeited a heaven-sent opportunity. Whether it was Stalin's brooding genius, his innate Georgian suspicion or deep paranoia, it was he who brought the United States back to a sense of its international responsibilities. The gradual elimination of dissent in Eastern Europe, culminating in the defenestration of Masaryk and the Czech coup in 1948, was accompanied by pressures against Greece and Turkey and by the Berlin blockade. Truman rose to the challenge. America reversed course: there was the Greek-Turkish aid program, the Marshall Plan and the Berlin airlift. Moreover, by 1947 the draft was restored and the United States began a modest rebuilding of its military forces, to be greatly augmented after the invasion of Korea in June 1950.

The Russians had committed a colossal blunder. They had failed to understand—and to exploit—the rhythms of the American democracy. Imbued as they were with their own interpretation of America's geopolitical necessities, the Russians failed to grasp that the Americans simply did not think the same way. The Americans had not read Lenin or Clausewitz or Machiavelli. The themes of realpolitik remain contrary to the spirit of the American democracy. But the Russians did not know that. The paradox was that the Soviet understanding of America's geopolitical requirements was closer to the mark than was the American understanding. In a profound sense it was Soviet misreading of the United States that induced America to accept its role in the central strategic relationship of the last 40 years.

The Soviets' extraordinary misinterpretation of the American character and American style poses a question which deserves careful examination and may provide a long-term and perhaps tragic theme for superpower relations. Are the moods of the superpowers, reflecting both longer-term and more recent experiences as well as their internal political dynamics, so out-of-phase with one another that they preclude simultaneity in seeking a modus vivendi? That question has become increasingly pressing, as the visible American willingness to reach a long-term accommodation during the 1970s was

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aborted as a consequence of the Soviets' deep-seated impulses never to flag in the quest for marginal advantages. By the end of the 1970s, the Soviets had managed to dispel much of the American goodwill (and a fair amount of naïveté as well). The American anger continued, indeed expanded, during the 1980s—at just the point that the Soviets might have been prepared to accept a longer-term accommodation. These contrapuntal fluctuations in mood may turn out to be the most permanent feature of these 40 years of superpower relations.

III

By the end of the 1940s the general outlines of American policy had been set. They reflected a determination to protect the democracies of Western Europe and Japan, but additionally (and somewhat adventitiously) picking up responsibility for other states around the Soviet periphery, such as Greece, Turkey and Iran. Conceptually, policy rested upon a strategy of containment, reflecting the seminal views of George Kennan. But containment came to imply far heavier emphases on military measures and less on political measures than Kennan personally would have liked (a concern that has increasingly come to preoccupy him as these four decades have progressed). Moreover, containment—at base a pragmatic strategy—came within the ordinary exigencies of American life to bear those very features of moralism and legalism that Kennan himself had feared and decried as the characteristics of American foreign policy.

These characteristics certainly came to the fore during what may be called the Dulles phase of the Eisenhower presidency. They were reflected in a certain preachiness and in the crusading rhetoric that Americans tend to find so attractive. But they were also reflected in the U.S. sulkiness at the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina, in the U.S. refusal to accept the results of that conference, in the unwillingness of Secretary Dulles to accept the proffered hand of Zhou Enlai—and in the frozen diplomatic relations with "Red China," which were to have such baleful effects in Southeast Asia in the 1960s, and which continued until Nixon unfroze them in the early 1970s. The moralistic-legalistic approach to foreign policy was to reach another high point, after that realpolitik of the Nixon-Kissinger years, during the Carter years. Perhaps the most revealing episode in placing legality above geopolitical reality came in late 1979 with the vehement, and in some ways extraordinary,

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reaction to the movement of Soviet forces across the international boundary into Afghanistan. In reality, the geopolitical damage had been done a year and a half earlier with the overthrow of the Daoud regime and the establishment of Moscow's protégé regime in Kabul.

The emphasis upon the *military* aspect of containment intensified during the 1950s. That emphasis, of course, had been reinforced by Korea and the sudden revelation that fewer nations could realistically be placed "outside the American defense perimeter." President Truman had seized the opportunity to ease a domestic political problem by establishing a quarantine in the Straits of Formosa during the war itself. But after the armistice the policy actually expanded—into the military containment of "Red China." One result was the immensely high domestic political effect of the militarily inconsequential struggle over the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. Indeed, the tendency to equate military strategy with foreign policy reached its apogee with the doctrine of massive retaliation and its later corollary that we would respond by fighting wars "at times and in places of our own choosing."

America's military advantages were immense during the 1950s. Our dominant position in strategic nuclear capabilities meant quite simply that the United States could essentially flatten the Soviet Union, with only the most limited Soviet ability to retaliate against the continental United States. This dominant position in nuclear forces lured the United States into what was to become an excessive reliance on nuclear weapons. It was enshrined in the doctrine of massive retaliation, which, however great the reservations of intellectuals, remained workable—as long as the United States retained strategic dominance. But it was unsustainable in the long run.

America's inherently transitory advantages in nuclear weapons seduced the United States and its Western allies into almost total dependency on the threat of nuclear retaliation. In 1954 the United States adopted the New Look, emphasizing nuclear forces and reduced spending—and allowed its land and tactical air capabilities to remain weak. The NATO alliance abandoned the Lisbon force goals of 1950 and thereby solidified the habit of leaning on the nuclear crutch. For the short run there might be certitude, but in the longer run it implied for the West an uncertain trumpet, the biblical phrase that Maxwell Taylor used to indicate our eventual vulnerability.

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Needless to say, the problem of conventional military weakness has continued to haunt the Western alliance.

Yet the Soviets themselves must have been continuously haunted throughout the 1950s and later by their unquestioned inferiority in terms of intercontinental strike forces. No doubt the shift in alliance strategy to immediate use of nuclear weapons brought pause to the Soviets regarding the advantages that might be wrung from their immense conventional establishment. But that immense conventional establishment in turn caused perplexity and concern in the West. Given the almost disarmed state of Western Europe, what gain could the Soviets derive from maintaining a World War II-sized army of 165 divisions?

Those in the West inclined to provide rationales—or rationalizations—for Soviet behavior hypothesized that thus holding Europe hostage provided the Soviets with *their deterrent* against the Americans. The threat of a massive attack that could overrun Western Europe, so the hypothesis ran, would deter the Americans from exploiting their overwhelming advantages in nuclear forces. But fear of that immense Soviet force, augmented by other Warsaw Pact capabilities, led to a general rearmament by the West and to the further expansion of American nuclear forces.

Whether the rationale attributed to the Soviets by Western analysts did play any serious role in Soviet thinking is still unknown. It was plausible. It fit the circumstances. It may even have been true. It should be noted, nonetheless, that even as the Soviets developed an intercontinental counterdeterrent to offset American capabilities, the Soviet Union maintained and *expanded* its military forces arrayed against Western Europe. In itself that should raise a question in the minds of those inclined to provide rationalizations for the structure of Soviet forces. Even if the old rationale had once played a role in determining the size of Soviet military forces, quite clearly a new explanation was now required.

The military dominance that the United States achieved during the 1950s could not be permanently sustained—and cannot be recovered. As late as 1956, during the Hungarian uprising, the Soviets were obliged carefully to consider possible American military reactions—even within their own satellite empire. By contrast, in 1968 in Czechoslovakia and even more clearly in Poland in the early 1980s, the relative Soviet position had so improved that they needed to give little attention to the

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possibility of American intervention. In 1956, also, Khrushchev could indulge in his bluster during the Suez incident about raining rockets down on London and Paris—only *after* it had become clear that the United States was separating itself from its allies. Under any other circumstances the Soviets could not risk provoking the United States, given its military edge.

Eisenhower himself was far more inclined than Dulles to practice an open and flexible diplomacy toward the Soviet Union. That ultimately resulted in the atmosphere of détente, enshrined in the spirit of Camp David from the late 1950s, as well as in secondary manifestations such as Khrushchev's heralded journey to Roswell Garst's Iowa farm and his visit to Hollywood. It also resulted in the Atoms for Peace proposal—including, rather farsightedly, the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in which the United States and the Soviet Union have effectively worked together.

Perhaps most notable, though inevitably abortive, was the "Open Skies" proposal. That proposal was a prelude to the numerous U-2 reconnaissance flights over the Soviet Union and to the shoot-down in 1960 that blew up the Paris summit and dispelled the spirit of détente. Until Gary Powers' flight, the Soviets had been forced to watch helplessly while American planes overflew their territory. Then their SA-2 antiaircraft missile ended that period of frustration and technological envy. But it heightened Soviet respect for and fear of American technology, further reinforced during the 1960s by the speed of the deployment of our Minuteman force and by the clear-cut superiority of the U.S. technology embodied in the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system as compared to the Soviet Galosh system. Such Soviet experience has bred a sense of technical inferiority vis-à-vis the United States that borders on a psychosis. The succession of the Open Skies proposal by the flight of the U-2 may help explain the apparently excessive Soviet reaction to President Reagan's Star Wars proposal. Given that earlier, humiliating experience, the Soviets will no doubt be wondering: what might these technological wizards now have up their sleeves?

IV

The arrival of the Kennedy Administration, in light of the campaign assertions regarding the missile gap and in the aftermath of the blow-up of the Paris summit, brought significant changes. The ignominious failure of the Bay of Pigs operation,

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the bullying of the young President by Khrushchev at the Vienna summit, the renewed Berlin crisis and the Cuban missile confrontation all contributed to the grim mood within an Administration dedicated to going anywhere, paying any price, et cetera, to preserve freedom. Late in 1961, new reconnaissance techniques revealed that the missile gap was in fact a myth and that the strategic advantage continued to rest with the United States. But that disclosure alleviated only slightly the tension felt during the Cuban missile crisis the next year.

After the Cuban missile crisis, the mood in the Administration changed. It became both less grim and less wedded to its original missionary zeal. The Administration's interest in arms control was stimulated. The Limited Test Ban Treaty was signed in 1963—with the intention that it be the first fruit of a much lengthier arms control process. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, who during the early years of the Administration had proposed counterforce strategies, city avoidance, civil defense and damage limitation, turned increasingly away from such concepts after 1963 and began to elaborate the strategy of mutual assured destruction. In the last year of the Kennedy Administration and throughout the Johnson Administration, the U.S. strategic force posture came to be guided by a belief in arms restraint—which it was presumed would be emulated by the Soviets. It became an article of faith that the Soviets would terminate their intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) deployment at 1,000 missiles, as we had, if indeed they chose to deploy that many. (They did not, in fact, stop until 1,618.)

From the first, the Kennedy Administration had shared General Taylor's skepticism regarding reliance on the threat of nuclear retaliation. It substantially increased funding for conventional forces—and explicitly repudiated the New Look strategy inherited from the Eisenhower Administration. A new administration, reflecting both the campaign rhetoric regarding "suicide or surrender" and Secretary McNamara's strong convictions, was determined to provide a conventional deterrent in Europe that would by itself preclude Soviet conventional attack. It also sought to establish a firebreak *prior* to any use of nuclear weapons.

Sound as Secretary McNamara's logic might have been regarding the buildup of conventional forces, it signally failed to recognize the psychology of our allies. The allies were wedded to reliance on nuclear retaliation. The proposed buildup of

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conventional capabilities was both resented and opposed because it would supposedly weaken deterrence and would thus invite attack by the superior Soviet conventional forces. Given their experiences, the allies had no desire "to refight World War II." They portrayed as the only alternatives either the agony of a conventional war or continuing peace through nuclear deterrence. The Administration failed to help its own case—by its rhetoric about the nuclear firebreak, by its expressed abhorrence of any reliance on a nuclear strategy, and by its emphasis on building up conventional forces as a *substitute* for nuclear response. It thus made very slow headway in its attempt to move away from reliance on immediate nuclear retaliation. Ultimately, it required both the departure of France from the integrated military structure and the passage of seven years before the alliance adopted the strategy of flexible response in 1967.

By 1965, however, the Johnson Administration's attention had begun to shift elsewhere, and at an accelerating pace. The war in Vietnam became the preoccupation of the Administration and the focus of an increasingly rancorous domestic debate. Gradually NATO became a secondary issue. It was increasingly neglected, as the government's attention turned toward Southeast Asia.

Two things should be especially noted about the pre-Nixon Vietnam years. First, the Administration's rationale was primarily directed not at the Soviet Union, but at "Red China." Much, indeed far too much, was made of Lin Biao's rather obscure prose about ultimately seizing the cities by initially controlling the countryside. This was interpreted as a direct threat to encircle the industrial world through control of Third World countries such as Vietnam. President Johnson proceeded around the rim of Asia proclaiming the need to defeat this malevolent strategy before we faced "a billion Chinese armed with nuclear weapons." Indeed, the decision in 1967 to deploy the Sentinel ABM system, featuring a thin area defense of the continental United States, was directed primarily at a prospective Chinese nuclear threat.

However far-fetched such reasoning may appear in retrospect, in this period the Soviets were increasingly viewed as a restraining influence within the communist world—who shared the American aspiration for some degree of international stability. Compared to Mao, the Soviets were viewed as relatively benign.

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In the early years of Vietnam, it was widely believed (a view that I found preposterous) that the Soviets were deeply concerned that Vietnam might get out of hand, and therefore were our partners in seeking a settlement of the issue. The possibility that the Soviets might positively enjoy watching the Americans stewing in their own juice was rejected out of hand. That the Soviets would immensely benefit from the refocusing of American attention on the supposed Chinese threat, and from the diversion of American resources away from Western Europe and the competition in strategic forces, was a reality all too rarely examined in Washington. Surely the Soviets would eagerly help extricate the American bacon from the Vietnamese fire. Given these preoccupations and these beliefs, it is hardly surprising that the conviction took hold that the Soviets also shared American objectives with respect to arms control. It was an article of faith that the Soviets sought *only* to match American strategic capability; their buildup would cease as they approached American force levels. That the Soviets do not think like American liberals has been a lesson very slowly learned.

The upshot was a growing faith in the inevitability of arms control and in the effectiveness of the arms control process. Collaboration on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (where superpower interests coincided) furthered such hopes. At the Glassboro summit in 1967, the Americans attempted to persuade Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin of the legitimacy of these views. Simultaneously they attempted to dissuade the Soviets from deploying strategic defenses—for that would result simply in the accelerated deployment of strategic offensive forces. Though they failed to move Kosygin on that occasion, they continued to believe that the logical force of their arguments would ultimately persuade the Soviets.

All these hopes, however, were suddenly dashed by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. That invasion, which to less Utopian observers of Soviet conduct appeared inevitable in the circumstances, rather surprisingly caught the Administration by surprise. As in 1960, an external event had interrupted the arms control process. The American reaction to what in Soviet eyes should have been accepted as a fortuitous, if not irrelevant, event—later repeated in Angola and even more markedly in Afghanistan—makes sustained and unvarying participation in bilateral arms negotiations impossible for the American democracy.

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V

Expectations regarding a new and more congenial relationship with the Soviet Union reached a peak during the Nixon years—and then faded. Nixon himself was unusual among American presidents in that he came to office with a consuming interest in, and well-formulated views about, foreign policy. The principal achievements of his Administration lay in that arena. Nor were these achievements preponderantly in relations with the Soviet Union. Perhaps the pinnacle was the new and pragmatic relationship with the People's Republic of China, which only a Republican president could have initiated. By opening the door to triangular diplomacy, it markedly affected superpower relations. Overall it has provided sizable benefits in terms of international stability. The withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam and the Paris Agreements, though they provided something less than "peace with honor," permitted the United States to devote its energies finally to far more significant issues. With Henry Kissinger's careful prodding, a degree of stability and even some progress was achieved in the Middle East.

Nixon's style in foreign affairs was wholly pragmatic. It may even be inquired whether an approach so cold-blooded, and therefore so uncongenial to the American temperament, did not contribute to the various waves of ideology that followed the Nixon years. The central feature of Nixon's approach to the Soviet Union was the quest for "an era of negotiations, not of confrontation." Given Soviet foreign policy objectives and the Soviet style, that would require a degree of emotional detachment on the part of the American people that was not long sustainable. Almost inevitably the Polands and Afghanistans lead to confrontation, even if the Angolas and Nicaraguas do not.

But in 1969 all that lay in the future. Putting Czechoslovakia firmly behind us, the new Administration revived the strategic arms negotiations, which were to become the centerpiece of U.S.-Soviet relations. Nixon was not one to proceed to the bargaining table without the wherewithal for bargaining. The Administration proceeded toward the first-stage deployment of the Safeguard ABM system (which unlike the Sentinel system was intended primarily to defend the missile fields). That decision was to have a highly felicitous impact on the negotiations. The Administration also decided on the rapid MIRVing

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(equipping with multiple independently targetable warheads) of both the Minuteman and Poseidon forces, with a beneficial effect on the bargaining process in the short term, but with a far less satisfactory long-term result. As soon as the United States initiated ABM deployment, Soviet willingness to bargain rose. The Soviets wanted no limitations on strategic offensive weapons, but they were notably eager to head off a major ABM deployment. Nixon took the position that there would be no ABM treaty—unless there was also limitation on strategic offensive arms. The Soviets yielded, though the constraints imposed were quite limited. The culmination lay in the Moscow agreements of May 1972.

For those agreements to have achieved the purpose of stabilizing the central U.S.-Soviet relationship, the Soviets would have had to accept them in the larger spirit that the Americans intended. As in 1945, Americans were ready for an end to confrontation. But the Soviet craving to press for every advantage not specifically precluded by the agreements once again dissipated the vast goodwill generated among Americans.

For the limitation on offensive forces to have contributed to arms stability, the Soviets would have had to refrain from exploiting through new technology the possibilities allowed under the agreement. But starting immediately *after* the signing of the Moscow agreements in mid-May 1972, there was a veritable explosion of Soviet R&D activity on all of the new generation of missiles. Apparently the Soviets had deliberately held up such activity—until the American signature was dry on the agreements. As director of Central Intelligence, I reported this immense Soviet R&D activity and its disturbing implication to the National Security Council early in 1973. If the Soviets were to marry the huge throw-weight advantages that they retained under the agreement with the new technologies in missile guidance and MIRVing, the result would be an American disadvantage in counterforce that we could not tolerate.

For the next two and a half years—and far beyond—the question of how to rescind Soviet throw-weight advantages became central to our Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT). In June of 1974 President Nixon carried to the Soviet Union a proposal to establish a firm limit on MIRVed missile throw-weight. The erosions of Watergate and the characteristics of Soviet bargaining led to its rejection. Nonetheless, it would

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have been in the Soviets' long-term interest to have accepted that proposal.

But for the time being the superpower relationship was characterized by an effusion of goodwill. Brezhnev's American tour in 1973—ten-gallon hats and all—was even more successful, if less ebullient, than Khrushchev's. Countless delegations spanned the oceans negotiating scientific and cultural exchange agreements on trade and technology, and the like. From the standpoint of the Soviet Union it was a rewarding period. But the Soviets could not leave well enough alone. They proceeded to poison the goose that laid the golden eggs.

It should perhaps be emphasized that for the Soviets the fault lay not in deception but in subconscious impulse. On the American side there was illusion—an exaggeration of the underlying meaning of détente. For the Soviets, détente represented simply an updated variant of Leninist peaceful coexistence: an absence of direct military conflict between the major powers. It certainly did not mean an end to international conflict. Indeed, the Soviets repeatedly stated that "détente requires an intensification of the ideological struggle." If there was deception, it was self-deception on the American side. Given the mood of the times, too many Americans insisted on reading more into détente than the Soviets intended.

Most dramatically was this the case in the Third World. The Soviets had, of course, paid some lip service to abandoning the search for marginal advantage—as in the "Basic Principles" of U.S.-Soviet relations. But such grand declarations, however satisfying, were not much of an inhibition when good opportunities presented themselves. In American eyes an early blow against détente occurred in 1973 with the Yom Kippur War. Soviet attempts to stimulate and to exploit that war were startling to many Americans. The culmination was the Brezhnev letter to Nixon threatening to move Soviet forces into the region and urging, in effect, a Soviet-American condominium over the Middle East. It resulted in the alert of America's military forces and, ultimately, a slow ebbing of the crisis. But the atmosphere of détente never thereafter fully recovered.

While the Americans might not have known what the intensification of the ideological conflict implied in 1972, within a few years they were more enlightened. The Soviets had been quite clear regarding their obligation to continue to support wars of national liberation. Whether or not the Arab-Israeli conflict could qualify under this rubric, adventures in Africa

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or Southeast Asia clearly did. The intervention of Cuban troops in Angola in 1975 was a further blow to détente—and an indirect blow even to arms control negotiations. But the Soviets had intended no armistice in Third World rivalries. If the Americans were disappointed, it was because they had expected more of the Soviets than the Soviets believed they had promised.

Kissinger grittily attempted to keep the arms control negotiations going. At Vladivostok, President Ford in 1974 achieved a potentially useful cap on strategic offensive arms through joint acceptance of equal aggregates of 2,400 missile launchers and heavy bombers. But its potential was never realized. Moreover, during the political campaign in 1976 President Ford felt obliged to drop the word "détente" from his vocabulary.

The evolution of NATO relations during the Nixon-Ford years needs to be recounted. As the American-Soviet rapprochement grew, the European reaction was rather ambivalent. Needless to say, Europeans were generally pleased with the reduced threat of war. Yet, particularly on the European right, there was widespread apprehension that an American-Soviet condominium was being established over the body of Europe. The American style in negotiations, which the Europeans found to be excessively secretive and short on consultation, added to the suspicion.

The upshot came in the somewhat ludicrous quarrels about the "Year of Europe" that Henry Kissinger announced at the beginning of 1973. The Europeans, with their somewhat heightened sensitivities, took this to be condescending. Some tied the notion to a Soviet-American condominium to settle Europe—without further consultation. Resentment was widespread, fanned for its own special reasons by the French government. Yet the suspicion was unwarranted. What Kissinger desired—and desired most fervently—was more firmly to institutionalize the Atlantic relationship before the generation of Americans who recalled the postwar period passed away.

However worthwhile the effort, it was abortive. Soviet-American rapprochement seriously weakened the bonds of the alliance. Europeans felt the need for American protection less keenly, and their suspicion that the superpowers were plotting things behind their backs was increased. Problems within the alliance were intensified after the fall of 1973 because of basic disagreements regarding the handling of the Arab-Israeli war and its aftermath.

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A few words should be said about military matters within NATO, for military developments tended somewhat to alleviate the political tensions within the alliance. With the end of the war in Southeast Asia, I was determined, as incoming secretary of defense, to refocus America's military commitment upon the European security issues that had been so neglected during the war years. I devoted considerable effort to defeating the Mansfield Amendment. Its failure came as a pleasant surprise to the Europeans, who had anticipated a drawdown of American forces. Also, the doctrine governing the use of America's strategic forces was altered to emphasize selective strikes. This would permit avoidance of the targeting of cities, which would provide the Soviets with a powerful incentive to avoid striking Western cities. By making an American nuclear response more credible, these changes served to recouple America's strategic forces to the security of Western Europe.

New emphasis was also placed on the conventional deterrent. This was, of course, made possible by the rebuilding and the ultimate reinforcement of America's ground and tactical air forces in Europe. But it also required a change in doctrinal emphasis. I had benefited from the doctrinal misfortunes of my predecessor, Secretary McNamara. I consequently coined the term "NATO triad." Its underlying analytical concept was that the triad's three legs—conventional, strategic and tactical nuclear—were *mutually reinforcing*. Thus the strengthening of conventional capabilities would, for example, augment the deterrent effect of tactical nuclear forces. I stressed that conventional forces were not intended to be a *substitute* for nuclear deterrence, but to strengthen it. With these changes in emphasis, European doctrinal objections to the strengthening of conventional forces were significantly diminished. Outside of France, the obstacle to the building of the conventional deterrent became primarily budgetary rather than doctrinal.

VI

In retrospect, the election of 1976 constituted a watershed in American foreign policy. It brought to an end an extended period of pragmatism, and launched a new period of the moralism-legalism that has long marked the American style in foreign policy. In the first phase, liberal moralism surged to the fore; in the second phase, conservative moralism.

After a few years in office both the Carter and Reagan Administrations moderated their policies and rhetoric, but

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compared to their predecessors the degree of ideological zeal remained notable. Not only was there a renewed note of oscillating moralizing, but American foreign policy also was characterized by substantial swings and by inconsistencies—foreigners called it unpredictable. It was perhaps more disturbing to our allies and dependents than it was to our opponents. This poses a deeper-seated question that should be examined before we bring the story of postwar superpower relations down to the present time.

Winston Churchill had limned one Western view of the Soviet Union in his pithy description: "a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma." Despite the mists of secrecy that still surround Soviet policymaking, that view has now become somewhat obsolescent. The passage of almost half a century has provided sufficient experience to make Soviet policy almost predictable. There is persistency, perhaps even consistency—and remarkably few sharp turns.

Can the same be said of U.S. attitudes and U.S. policy? Hardly so. The American mood is subject to much wider swings and, to a lesser degree, so is American policy. More than the highly structured societies of Europe with their established governing classes, the American democracy is governed by public opinion with all its vicissitudes. Moreover, changes in the party in power (unthinkable in the Soviet Union) may bring sharp swings in policy. It was the Americans who went home in 1945, and then reversed policy later in the 1940s. It was the Americans who shifted from the idealism of world organization to military containment. It was the Americans who so eagerly and innocently embraced détente—as the end to the "misunderstandings" in Soviet-American tensions. The Soviet view of détente was far less inflated, merely a somewhat modernized version of Lenin's "peaceful coexistence." It was the Americans again who, a few years later, could grossly overstate the military power of the Soviet Union and the strength of its so-called geopolitical momentum.

Over the intervening years, President Truman could assert mistakenly: "I like old Joe, but he is a prisoner of the Politburo." President Carter could state that so secondary (and predictable) an action as the Soviet move into Afghanistan had fundamentally altered his view of the Soviets. President Reagan could talk feelingly of "the empire of evil" and then embrace arms control. The early days of the Carter Administration and of the Reagan Administration provide a spectacular contrast

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in both the style and the substance of foreign policy. Was this great power—the great protecting power of the West—one that could recognize its *permanent* interests?

By contrast the Soviets seem staid, almost stodgy: solid (if somewhat brutal) men who persistently follow an established formula. The Soviets pride themselves on being realists—indeed, scientific materialists. With the exception of Nikita Khrushchev (who was precipitately removed for his "adventurism" and "harebrained schemes"), Soviet leaders come over as rather stolid Leninists, guided primarily by their prudence and by their respect for the correlation of forces. They are rather different from the frequently mercurial and incurably romantic Americans. To go back to Churchill's aphorism: which of the superpowers is the enigma?

In another guise, the same issue was eloquently framed by Alexis de Tocqueville almost a century and a half ago:

> It is especially in the conduct of their foreign relations that democracies appear to me decidedly inferior to other governments. . . . A democracy can only with great difficulty regulate the details of an important undertaking, persevere in a fixed design, and work out its execution in spite of serious obstacles. It cannot combine its measures with secrecy or await their consequences with patience.

In the first 30 years of the postwar era, the American democracy quite demonstrably rose to de Tocqueville's challenge. In the last decade, doubt has arisen over whether the United States, given a proclivity to sudden shifts in policy, can permanently match the steadier pressures of Soviet policy, despite its far greater inherent strength. No longer are the international responsibilities of the United States confined to the relatively easy domain of the North American continent. As one moves closer to the sources of Soviet power—along the periphery of the Soviet Union—the requirement for perceived and acknowledged steadiness in the exercise of power becomes more demanding.

Today American policy must be more than synchronized with the moods of the American public. Leaders of smaller and less powerful states close to the Soviet Union must, above all, see a predictability in the basic course of American policy. While somewhat less necessary, since occasional unpredictability has its uses, our principal opponent should also be able to discern an underlying predictability most of the time. Given

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the greater volatility of American opinion in recent years, is the American democracy up to the task?

The Watergate episode may merely have accelerated a tendency that was already visible in the 1960s. In presidential politics it brought to the fore outsiders with no experience in Washington or in foreign policy, who proceeded to campaign against federal institutions and against Washington as a symbol. It may have been good politics; it was poor governance. Nowhere has this been clearer than in foreign affairs.

Instead of "managing the Soviet relationship," we are now more inclined to sermonize the Soviets on various subjects on which they appear unpersuadable—human rights, Star Wars, even Leninism itself. Sermonizing the Russians is an activity that one earlier president, Dwight Eisenhower, explicitly declared to be unproductive. Moreover, sermonizing provides a most awkward posture from which to work out a modus vivendi.

Foreign policy has become far more personalized, less institutional. A president guided by his personal vision is assumed to be in tune with the feelings of the people—the most appropriate guide to foreign policy. The judgments of any "establishment" count for far less. Commitments of earlier chief executives are not necessarily binding. And if one chief executive can pay scant regard to the commitments of his predecessors, so may the Congress disregard the commitments of the incumbent.

No doubt this represents a foreign policy that in some sense is more democratic, less hegemonial. But it is not consistent with the way that great powers are expected to conduct foreign relations—with steadiness and predictability. The United States has become a more inward-looking, self-oriented nation. The new American style has led to consternation as much among our friends as our foes. But the more basic question is whether such a style can sustain the American position over the long run.

President Carter brought to the Oval Office immense energy, idealism, an open mind and moral conviction. Certain accomplishments of his Administration—the Camp David accord between Egypt and Israel almost in its entirety and the Panama Canal Treaty to a lesser degree—were products of Jimmy Carter's special brand of moral fervor. (Whether it was politically prudent to accept the risks to the prestige of the American presidency embodied in the quest for Camp David

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is a different question.) Carter was, of course, building on the Nixon legacy in the normalization of relations with China as well as in the Middle Eastern peace process, but he added his own special touch. With the exception of China, all involved lesser powers. All were issues that could yield to enthusiasm and moral fervor. In the world of power politics—notably our relations with the Soviet Union and our European allies—the results of the Carter Administration were far less auspicious.

Carter early launched his old effort to lead the Soviet Union into the paths of righteousness through his human rights campaign. That was not, as the Soviets may have thought, a cynical propagandistic attempt to place the Soviet Union on the defensive. Rather it reflected a profound moral conviction. With respect to arms control, Carter immediately abandoned the Vladivostok accord and called for deep reductions—which would most immediately affect the Soviet ICBM force. This too reflected a conviction that his predecessors had not really tried hard enough to obtain arms reductions, and that the Soviets would be prepared to respond to his call. Both developments were rather bewildering to the Soviets. The Soviets work best when their opposite numbers, like themselves, are steady and predictable. Within a year the human rights campaign had been somewhat toned down and the SALT negotiations had been put back in the traditional mold. But considerable damage had been done in tearing up the accepted patterns of international relations.

In his relations with Europe, Carter early committed a capital blunder from which he never wholly recovered: the decision *not* to produce neutron weapons. It was a wholly personal decision, taken against the advice of all his agencies and in the face of prior understandings with the allies that had been worked out by his own underlings. In part it reflected his moral aversion to a new category of nuclear weapons; in part it reflected his irritation with his allies for their unwillingness to take the heat with him on a deployment decision. This last in itself reflected a lack of familiarity with the historic style of decision-making within the alliance. To be sure, Helmut Schmidt both distorted and exploited the events for his own domestic purposes. Yet, throughout the balance of the Carter presidency, Europeans continually worried about the strength and the reliability of the United States.

A string of actions—the cancellation of the B-1 bomber, the squeeze on defense spending, the sudden reduction in ship

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construction funds, the aborted attempt to remove our ground forces from Korea, the continuation of negative comments on the Central Intelligence Agency—all reinforced the conviction that the Carter Administration was soft on defense. A series of setbacks—starting in the Horn of Africa, Yemen and Afghanistan, culminating ultimately in the disaster that was the fall of the Shah, followed by the seizure of the embassy and the hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan—created for the Carter Administration a perception of weakness that could not be dispelled. This had two immediate effects.

It led first to a slowly gathering storm on the American right, which ultimately came to view the developing world scene in apocalyptic terms. The vulnerabilities of our strategic forces were greatly exaggerated (which was subsequently to affect attitudes on the SALT II issue). The overall weakness of American and Western military strength was repeatedly stressed. By contrast, Soviet military strength was substantially overstated. Moreover, a portrait was drawn of a worldwide Soviet geopolitical offensive, which was alleged to be gathering momentum steadily. Indeed the very events, like Afghanistan, that in 1980 were taken as shrewd Soviet political moves in the quest for world domination, just a few years later were treated as serious Soviet setbacks.

But the public mood had been established. By the time the SALT II Treaty actually reached the Senate in 1979, there was an uphill fight for ratification—which would have occurred even in the absence of the invasion of Afghanistan in December. Unavoidable provisions of the treaty, which had been built into the respective strategic postures of the two sides, were treated as a source of American weakness or even a sellout. By this time the Carter Administration had scant credit to draw on in terms of its posture on defense and Soviet policy. That the Reagan Administration would adhere to the provisions of this fatally flawed treaty for at least five years confirms that its deficiencies were exaggerated at the time. Yet, overall, the episode leaves one with a single clear conclusion: only a president who enjoys a reputation for being strong on defense can be successful in obtaining Senate ratification of an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union.

VII

The Reagan Administration, it has frequently been observed, has no *specific* foreign policy monuments to its name.

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It does have one generic accomplishment, a vital one: it has restored America's international prestige and the perception of American power. In foreign policy, that is immensely important—and can compensate for a significant number of blunders elsewhere. Elsewhere, the Administration has had some modest achievements in Central America and in chastening the likes of Qaddafi, a serious defeat in Lebanon, and some success in easing tensions with our European allies, though these were tensions initially brought on by the Administration itself.

Like the Carter Administration, the Reagan Administration has been highly personalized—almost anti-institutional. In its early years, much of its foreign policy was set by the President's instincts, rhetoric and ideological convictions, that included a proclivity to blurt out half-remembered truths from *Reader's Digest*. Thus, it was early revealed that the Soviet leaders had been authorized to "lie, cheat and steal" to further their policy goals. Also disclosed was something called "the Ten Commandments according to Nikolai Lenin." The President was inclined to believe that his predecessors had failed to convey to the Soviets how tough America was and thereby to force them to abandon their base designs—just as Jimmy Carter had felt his predecessors had failed vigorously to pursue arms control. Moreover, the Administration's initial predilection was to believe that America had regularly been defrauded in arms limitation negotiations, and that any negotiations would have to be postponed until such time as America's military posture was restored. The net effect was to throw our relations with the Soviet Union during the first three years of the Administration into a chill as deep as the late 1940s.

These attitudes led to a rapid growth of alarm in Europe—and the Administration's reputation sank almost to the level of the Carter Administration's. It was partially rescued by an excellent, if belated, speech by the President in November 1981 on intermediate-range nuclear force negotiations. But early and indiscreet comments about nuclear war—and the tensions surrounding the prospective deployment of the Pershing II missile (ironically promised by the Carter Administration to reassure the Europeans that America was not vacillating)—created steady problems for the United States. The President's inclination to view the Soviet Union as the source of all evil in the world also led to a last-minute effort to preclude construction of the Soviet natural gas pipeline, including the imposition

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of extraterritorial sanctions. The President had been warned against such an effort by his professionals, but those warnings were disregarded. In a sense it was the equivalent of Carter's plowing ahead in his neutron bomb decision. Eventually the Administration was obliged to back off.

The President's inclination to view all difficulties in terms of the East-West conflict, with a touch of Armageddon thrown in, has led to some exaggerated rhetoric. In Lebanon it was stated that the entire American strategic position in the Middle East would crumble if Syria's Assad and his Soviet sponsors had their way. It was followed by a precipitate withdrawal of American forces, and an even more precipitate dropping of the subject. In Central America, the importance of Nicaragua has similarly been overstated. While the Sandinista regime is a geopolitical nuisance which we wish would either disappear or moderate its behavior, it can scarcely be described as a major threat to the republic. It remains an impoverished country, almost like an Albania situated in the Western hemisphere. On strategic and pragmatic grounds we may reasonably seek to neutralize it as a potential base. But it ought not to be inflated into a substantial threat to our existence. And the rhetorical treatment of our henchmen in the region as the moral equivalents of James Madison and George Washington does seem a bit excessive.

The story of U.S.-Soviet relations during the first three Reagan years has been told sufficiently frequently that it need not be repeated here. Suffice it to say that the result was a chill that stirred Soviet paranoia and frightened our allies. That the Administration paid so small a price reflected the good luck of three succession crises in the Kremlin.

By 1984, the Administration had altered its original stance. The worldwide Soviet geopolitical momentum had become a thing of the past. Indeed, the Soviet Union might actually be "an economic basket case." Despite basically unchanged force ratios, the Administration, which at first had exaggerated Soviet military power, was now downplaying it. The window of vulnerability was forgotten. Moreover, the tone of public comment from Washington was reversed. Thus, the Administration was in a position to exploit such Soviet blunders as the heavy hand in Europe and the walkouts from Geneva, to say nothing of such adventitious developments as the shootdown of the Korean airliner. The President had also become seized with the desirability of arms control. His apparent eagerness com-

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bined with Soviet clumsiness helped turn international opinion in U.S. favor.

Whether for substantive or political motives, the single most important ingredient in U.S.-Soviet relations has now become the negotiations over strategic defense. The President's original speech in March 1983 touched a sensitive nerve in light of Soviet experiences with Open Skies and the U-2, and the ABM negotiations with the Nixon Administration. Touching a sensitive nerve is not without utility; it certainly got the Soviets' attention. The Star Wars proposal was, however, another of those uncalculated ventures in personal diplomacy. Without any preparation, indeed without any realization, it attacked the prior foundation of the basic arms relationship. Our allies suddenly learned that deterrence, on which security had rested, was to be replaced. Britain and France learned that their independent nuclear forces, into which they had poured a considerable portion of the national treasure, were to be rendered obsolete. We were all to learn rather suddenly that deterrence was "immoral" and "flawed." Such phrases seemed to have been borrowed from the Catholic bishops. While there may be considerable satisfaction in dishing the left by stealing its clothes, it hardly seems necessary to undermine the foundation on which Western security must rest for the foreseeable future.

An extraordinary measure of American capital is now being invested in generating support for Star Wars among our allies. All of this is being done in the name of a research program that its strongest proponents regard as far-out and a very high risk. In an R&D effort, the normal behavior is to allow the technical uncertainties to be resolved before one reaches conclusions about force structures or strategy. In this case, the results are being announced in advance: a revolutionary change in strategic doctrine and the strategic relationships between the superpowers.

Not only our allies were caught by surprise. Even the Department of Defense was unprepared. The President had been moved not by the advice of the technical experts within his Administration, but by some elderly outside advisers. Until the President's address, the Department of Defense had steadily been expressing skepticism (to put it mildly) regarding spaceborne defenses. The Department was then obliged to wheel about in order to support the commander in chief. Suddenly altering the presuppositions on which international relations

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are based—with scarcely any technical or policy advice and without any advance warning—is not the way for the leading Western nation to maintain a reputation for steadiness.

The superpowers have returned once again to Geneva. For the Soviet Union that provides unqualified benefits. In a negative sense, much of the unwanted baggage of recent years has been left behind: the shootdown of the KAL airliner, the walkouts from Geneva, the possible involvement in the attempt on the pope's life, the three succession crises with the concomitant weakness and blundering. In a positive sense, the Soviet Union is well situated to achieve either its substantive goals or its political and propaganda objectives. On substance, the Soviets would clearly like to impose constraints on American technology for strategic defense. If anything stirs Soviet paranoia it is American technology and its possible implications. Consequently, the Soviets will be prepared to pay a price to obtain such constraints—and to avoid reopening the strategic arms competition.

The President has said, however, that Star Wars technology will not be negotiated. In that event, the Soviets are even better situated to exploit the abiding differences between the United States and its allies—especially the continuing, if not growing, allied concern about any Star Wars deployment. The structure of the negotiations, with separate tables for intermediate-range nuclear forces and strategic defense, lends itself to such Soviet exploitation. The Soviets are already saying to the Europeans that substantial concessions can be obtained on the weapons that threaten Europe, but the Americans are blocking that outcome by their obstinacy over Star Wars.

At Geneva we shall be reading a sermon to the Soviets to which they are unprepared to listen. That sermon propounds the supposed mutual advantages of strategic defense that the Soviets specifically rejected. It is based upon a "strategic concept" that in fact is less a *strategic* concept than it is a rationalization for the President's vision. The concept in itself is fundamentally flawed. According to the concept, when strategic defenses are deployed a so-called second phase will ensue. But the prospect of deployment of strategic defense in that second phase precludes attainment of the first phase, the radical reduction of offensive arms. This is because the prospective deployment of strategic defenses increases the premium on missile throw-weight and on offensive forces generally—to overwhelm any prospective defense. The Americans are now

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prepared not only to read to the Soviets a sermon to which they will not listen, but one that is internally inconsistent.

In Geneva we must prepare for an extended period of siege warfare—with the Soviets well positioned to exploit differences between our allies and ourselves. The United States has suddenly—and without thinking the consequences through in advance—altered the foundations on which East-West relations have rested. That raises anew the question posed by de Tocqueville in the 1840s—whether a democracy can adequately persevere in a fixed design or await the consequences of its measures with patience.

What then of superpower relations in the future? No one can rely on the early disappearance of the ideological tensions and the arms competition that have characterized the last 40 years. If liberty is to survive outside the Western hemisphere, outside North America, the special role of the United States cannot be significantly altered. Will the United States be able to sustain its unique responsibilities during the decades ahead? The portents are somewhat worrisome. What is required of a great power is stability of policy combined with steadiness in execution.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the national mood was one of self-criticism bordering on masochism. In the 1980s the national mood has become one of self-congratulation to the point of narcissism. If one is forced to choose, perhaps the latter is preferable. But no more than masochism can narcissism be a proper foundation for the steadiness and stability demanded of the leader of the West.

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Albert Wohlstetter

BETWEEN AN UNFREE WORLD AND NONE: INCREASING OUR CHOICES

Would nuclear war endanger civilization or even the human species? Does that possibility require us to subordinate all considerations of freedom to survival and to dismiss any possibility of responding justly to a nuclear attack—or at least without committing suicide? The question has a familiar ring to anyone whose memory stretches back as far as 1958 to the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, and the famous controversy between the philosophers Bertrand Russell and Sidney Hook over whether it was better to be "Red or Dead."

The question, at any rate, is not dead. It is implicit in nightmare visions like "The Day After" that continue to flood our television and movie screens, and it appears in even more gruesome form in the cold and dark post-nuclear world described by some scientists. The horrors revealed by science can exceed, it seems, those of science fiction: the sense of one meeting, in 1983, was that there may not be any world after nuclear war. As biologist Anne Ehrlich summarized it:

> In the northern target regions, it is unlikely that more than a tiny fraction of the original population could survive the first few months after a nuclear war of appreciable scale. . . . Nuclear war would render all but uninhabitable the only known habitable planet in the universe. Nothing of value to anyone alive today is likely to survive such a catastrophe—and least of all, the ideologies that supposedly motivated it. The virtues of freedom—or communism—pale when survival is not an available option and there may be no future generations to whom it can be bequeathed.[1]

[1] Anne Ehrlich, "Nuclear Winter," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist*, April 1984, p. 145.

Albert Wohlstetter is President of the European American Institute for Security Research and director of research at Pan Heuristics. The author is deeply indebted to his colleagues Richard Brody, Gregory Jones, Paul Kozemchak, Stephen Prowse and Arthur Steiner. This article is based in part on a paper presented at a conference on "Nuclear Weapons and the Nature of Politics" held by the John M. Olin School of International Politics at the University of Chicago.

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This particular meeting was based in good part on a draft study by the scientists Richard Turco, Brian Toon, Thomas Ackerman, James Pollack and Carl Sagan (now generally called "TTAPS," an acronym of the authors' last names).[2] Though they have greatly overstated the scientific consensus, TTAPS does have prestigious support. It extended the results of an international study in 1982 sponsored by the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences (published in its magazine, *Ambio*) which indicated that smoke from fires ignited by a nuclear war might bring about a world of "twilight at noon."[3] It seems to be confirmed by the conclusion of our own National Academy of Sciences at the end of 1984 (NAS 85) that there is a "clear possibility" a major nuclear exchange would obscure the sun for an extended period and bring on freezing temperatures with catastrophic long-term effects in the northern hemisphere. To this formidable international array of scientists Admiral Noel Gayler, former deputy director of the Joint Strategic Targeting and Planning Staff, has added some American military authority. Such massive scenarios, he has said, are "quite reasonable":

> Whatever our rhetoric or theirs, in a general nuclear war cities will be struck, and they will burn. Will not at least some of the smaller cities be spared? Not likely.[4]

The idea that any major nuclear conflict would mean the destruction by each side of the other's cities dominates the European and American political establishment, including the press. And apparently the concern goes beyond that of major nuclear attacks or responses. In fact, TTAPS has estimated that even a "*small*" nuclear war burning 100 cities might trigger a global climatic disaster. And the editors of *The New York Times* have taken that to mean that *any* nuclear conflict on an appreciable scale would leave no survivors. The *Times* concludes that, so long as there are "those in the United States or the Soviet Union who believe there is any point in ever risking nuclear war, defining degrees of destruction is not an empty exercise."[5]

[2] The basic paper went through several drafts in 1983 before publication in *Science*, December 23, 1983, pp. 1283–1292.

[3] Paul Crutzen, J.W. Birks, "The Atmosphere after a Nuclear War: Twilight at Noon," *Ambio*, 1982, Vol. 11, Nos. 2–3, pp. 114–125.

[4] Statement of Admiral Noel Gayler before the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress, "Consequences of Nuclear War," July 11, 1984.

[5] "The Winter after the Bomb," *The New York Times*, November 6, 1983.

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Like most of our political establishment for the last 20 years, the *Times* firmly believes that "deterrence works because it is based on horror"; and apparently the less restraint and the more horror the better. Hence the enthusiasm for the latest flurry of calculations and TV spectaculars on the nuclear apocalypse which indicate that the horror would be total; and hence the drift of the Western establishment toward threatening to use, but resolving never actually to use, nuclear weapons, first or second, early or late. "Deterrence Only" means giving up if deterrence fails; it assumes, as some make explicit, that to acquire weapons in order to be able to respond to such attacks discriminately is wrong and hopeless, but that even "under communist rule . . . as long as life exists, there is hope. A nuclear holocaust would wipe out that hope."[6]

It appears then that we may be faced with a choice between darkness at noon in the political sense of Koestler or darkness at noon in the literal sense.

II

Recent calculations of the possible global effects of a nuclear war are not the first. They are only the latest in a long line, though they may be the grimmest since the early 1940s.

The possibility of a total nuclear cataclysm came up even before the formal start in August 1942 of the Manhattan Project. Two months earlier, Edward Teller had expressed concern that the enormous heat he had calculated would build up in an atomic bomb might be enough to "melt" the Coulomb barrier between light nuclei. Robert Oppenheimer suggested that, if so, a single explosion of an A-bomb might ignite and destroy the atmosphere of the entire planet. A detailed theoretical investigation of the basic theory of thermonuclear reactions disposed of this appalling possibility before Trinity, the first test. It showed that there was virtually no danger that the test would set the atmosphere on fire. Definitive theoretical work on this point must have been quite a relief.

Nonetheless, in the immediate aftermath of Hiroshima, Manhattan Project scientists talked in apocalyptic terms of the alternatives as being "One World or None."[7] They argued

[6] John Cardinal Krol, hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 96th Congress, First Session, September 14, 1979; and "The Churches and Nuclear War" in *Origins*, Vol. 9, No. 15, September 27, 1979.

[7] Dexter Master and Katherine Way, eds., *One World or None; a Report to the Public on the Full Meaning of the Atomic Bomb*, New York: McGraw Hill, 1946.

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typically and without equivocation that "if war breaks out, atomic bombs will be used and they will surely destroy our civilization." It was this catastrophic early prospect of "no world" that lent urgency to the pursuit of "one world." Literally hundreds of other statements by Manhattan Project scientists issued shortly after Hiroshima were very similar. Though few conjured up a disastrous global change in climate, Edward Teller did caution that "it was not even impossible to imagine that the effects of an atomic war fought with greatly perfected weapons and pushed by utmost determination will endanger the survival of man."[8]

A basic assumption of that period was that in an atomic war both the attacker and his victim would aim their atomic bombs primarily or exclusively against the other's cities. Scientists asserted typically that "atomic bombs are weapons used only against large cities and industrial centers."[9] This was a natural, though mistaken, inference from the circumstances in which the first two A-bombs were used and from the experience of strategic bombing in World War II when thousands of nonnuclear weapons were delivered in single raids, some of which destroyed more civilians than the Hiroshima or Nagasaki bombs.

The alternative of "no world," then, contemplated a war that began with the destruction of the major cities of one side, followed a few hours later by the destruction of the cities on the attacker's side. This is the way an atomic war appeared in the writings of the eminent scientists associated with the Metallurgical Laboratory (Met Lab) at the University of Chicago. Met Lab scientists, like James Franck and Leo Szilard, recognized that if the attacker expected his own cities to be destroyed only a few hours later than his victim's, this might act as a deterrent to attacking the victim's cities. However, they did not give much weight to the stability of such a deterrent. They thought that nuclear war was sure to break out through some irrational or unauthorized act or accident, "sooner or later." This lent great urgency to making drastic changes in the international system.

Events soon indicated that "one world" was not a realistic alternative. The Soviets turned down the Baruch-Acheson-

[8] Edward Teller, "How Dangerous Are Atomic Weapons?" *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist*, January 1947, p. 36.

[9] "The Atomic Scientists Speak Up," *Life*, October 29, 1945, p. 46.

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Lilienthal plan for international control of atomic energy at the end of 1946. A series of crises followed over Berlin, Czechoslovakia and other key points, culminating in the first Soviet explosion of a nuclear weapon in August 1949. In the course of these crises, and later in debating the hydrogen bomb, the major Manhattan Project scientists began to reexamine their insistence that unless there was one world there would be none at all. They reviewed the possibilities for limiting the catastrophic effects of a nuclear war and devoted about a decade to the intense pursuit of programs of defense that might preserve Western civilization. These efforts included programs for the large-scale use of small tactical nuclear weapons in Europe rather than large strategic warheads (Project Vista at California Institute of Technology); for the fleet defense of the sea lines of communication (Project Hartwell at Massachusetts Institute of Technology); for extensive shelters and other "passive" civil defense measures in the United States (Project Charles and its sequels, leading to the Gaither report); for the interception of Soviet bombers on their way to target and other measures of "active defense" of the continental United States (The Lincoln Summer Study, Project Lincoln at MIT and others).

A consensus of such studies, embodied in a 1953 report by the Panel of Consultants on Disarmament of the Department of State entitled "Armaments and American Policy," was that our preoccupation with a major offensive capacity against the Soviet Union should be, but was not, matched by any corresponding concern for defending the United States against a Soviet atomic attack.[10] The report concluded that the interception of a high percentage (though not all) of enemy bombers on their way to the United States was feasible and important. Civil defense measures could further contain the damage done by those Soviet bombers that got through the defense. Defenses would improve the position of the United States by reducing the damage the Russians could do on any one given date, and by making it more difficult and expensive for the Soviets to achieve a specified result. Defenses would help develop a healthy (but not yet excessive) sense of the dangers of the atom.

[10] See "Report by the Panel of Consultants of the Department of State to the Secretary of State," for the report entitled "Armaments and American Policy," in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–54, Vol. II, National Security Affairs*, Part 2, Department of State Publication 9392, pp. 1056–1091. Referred to hereafter as Consultant Report 1953.

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Such a continental defense would help the United States in negotiating for the regulation of atomic weapons. It could not be read by the Soviets as an aggressive move. And, while geography made such a defense of Europe less practicable, given the state of the art then current, "if the United States can maintain some immunity to a knockout, the American connection may yet serve to protect the Western Europeans and so to quiet their fears."[11] Moreover, research and development were likely to yield still more impressive gains, and might eventually give increased hope for the air defense of Europe.

In brief then, the consensus in 1953 of the major figures of the Manhattan Project, such as Robert Oppenheimer and Hans Bethe, not only reversed their 1945 views, but contrasts even more with almost every stereotype of the Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) dogma which has dominated our elites, including our scientists, in the decades after the Cuban missile crisis.

Such views on the vital importance of limiting the catastrophe of a nuclear war strongly influenced high officials in the Truman as well as the Eisenhower Administrations, as National Security Council documents of that time show. Indeed, the belief in the importance of assuring the survival of civil society in a nuclear war was a basic tenet of elite opinion outside the government, as common in *The New York Times* and the rest of the media as its opposite is today. The present notion that we should avoid any element of defense or restraint in offense and should try to assure mutual destruction is the anomaly—a comparatively recent and perverse innovation. It was *not*, as is widely assumed, the basis for the second-strike theory of stable deterrence from the beginning.[12]

In the intense emotions generated by the dispute over the H-bomb, both the majority faction of the scientists who opposed it and the important minority who favored the H-bomb tended to caricature each other's views: one side accused the other of being for offense only, and in turn was said to be for defense only. The Panel of Consultants to the State Department rejected the argument that giving attention to continental

[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 1083–1084.

[12] Rand Reports R244S, *Selection of Strategic Base Systems*, March 1953, and R266, *Selection and Use of Strategic Air Bases*, by A. Wohlstetter, F. Hoffman, R.J. Lutz and H.S. Rowen (April 1954) June 1962, especially pp. 15–21, Santa Monica: Rand Corporation.

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defense was dangerous because "such a change would require a lessening of our attention to the development of our strategic air capability"; the panel said this argument was "based on the mistaken notion that we must have one or the other and cannot have both."[13] The offense favored by scientists like Hans Bethe would "fit the weapon to the target and . . . attempt the best accuracy . . . to avoid unnecessary destruction."[14]

It was the Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) tests and the Sputnik in 1957 which brought to an end this decade of effort by the Manhattan Project physicists to limit the catastrophic effects of nuclear war. The views they then adopted, reversing their position 180 degrees, paralleled a reversal in the views of the U.S. Navy and followed the development of similar European views which rationalized the spread of small nuclear forces to be aimed exclusively at population centers. These views helped shape the declaratory policy of Mutual Assured Destruction adopted with substantial incoherence by the U.S. government five or six years later. They have persisted as the prospects for discriminating military from civilian targets changed drastically for the better. The average yield of the nuclear weapons we might "fit to targets" was 15 times larger in 1957 than in 1982, and "the best accuracy" we expected then has seen revolutionary improvement. It is ironic that for about a decade, when discrimination among targets was most difficult, major figures of the Manhattan Project called for it most intensely, and now that it is more possible than ever, many oppose it.

III

Early in this period of emphasis on defending and sparing civilians rather than killing them, the decision to go ahead with the H-bomb briefly generated a new and rather different discussion of a global catastrophe leaving no survivors. For some, the possibility of an ultimate nuclear catastrophe came up in a more ambiguous and, in fact, more ambivalent form: it appeared that one might actually want to rig the possibility of a total nuclear catastrophe on purpose. Opponents of the H-bomb opposed it because of its enormous expected yields which

[13] Consultant Report 1953, *op. cit.*, p. 1085.

[14] Testimony of Dr. Hans Bethe, April 19, 1954, at the Atomic Energy Commission Personnel Security Board Hearing, *In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer*, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971, p. 329.

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made it possible for one warhead to destroy an entire large city, and which made it seem useful only for that purpose. Multi-megaton weapons seemed bad enough for the direct harm they might do, but Hans Bethe in 1950 raised the possibility that carbon-14 from exploding H-bombs might poison the air for 5,000 years and so make life impossible.

Bethe's calculations did not satisfy Leo Szilard because "it would take a very large number of bombs before life would be in danger from ordinary H-bombs." Szilard had something else in mind:

> What I had in mind is this: the H-bomb, as it would be made, would not cause greater radioactivity than that which is due to the carbon; but it is very easy to arrange an H-bomb, *on purpose* [my emphasis], so that it should produce very dangerous radioactivity.[15]

Szilard did not estimate how many megatons of TNT equivalent yield the total number of H-bombs exploded might require in order to produce enough cobalt-60. (My colleague, Gregory Jones, has estimated roughly that it might come to 100,000 megatons—much more than all the megatons in the world's nuclear arsenals and, therefore, not really very cheap.) I have stressed Szilard's phrase "on purpose" because his concern was very different from the first scare about the A-bomb burning up the atmosphere, and very different from Bethe's concern about the H-bombs. Szilard was considering rigging the bomb deliberately so as to make it possible to end life on earth with a moderate number of H-bombs. Szilard said that his Doomsday Machine (to anticipate Herman Kahn's name for a similar conceptual device) had a practical utility and was likely to be adopted by both the superpowers:

> You may ask . . . who would want to kill everybody on earth? Let us suppose that we have a war and let us suppose that we are on the point of winning the war against Russia. . . . The Russians and others can say: 'You come no farther. You do not invade Europe, and you do not drop ordinary atom bombs on us, or else we will detonate our H-bombs and kill everybody.'
> Faced with such a threat, I do not think that we could go forward.[16]

Asked whether any nation would really be willing to kill all

[15] "The Facts about the Hydrogen Bomb," The University of Chicago Round Table, *The H-Bomb*, New York: Didier, 1950, p. 113.
[16] *Ibid.*, p. 114.

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people on earth rather than suffer defeat, and specifically whether we would be willing to do it, Szilard answered:

> I do not know whether we would be willing to do it, and I do not know whether the Russians would be willing to do it. But I think that we may *threaten* to do it, and I think that the Russians might *threaten* to do it. And who will take the risk then not to take that threat seriously?[17]

Always a pioneer, Szilard in this response clearly foreshadowed the argument that was to become common among proponents of Mutual Assured Destruction, that we could threaten mutual destruction and even the end of the world (even though we would be unwilling to execute the threats), and that the threat would be enough for purposes of deterrence. This was the line of argument that eventually culminated in the "Deterrence Only" school of strategic thought.

When Herman Kahn invented a conceptual device he called the Doomsday Machine in 1960, he intended it as a reduction to absurdity of the view—increasingly popular in the academy after Sputnik—that targeting population was the cheapest and best way to deter nuclear attack. However, as was frequently the case with Szilard, it was not easy to tell whether *his* modest 1950 proposal for destroying everybody inexpensively was not also tongue-in-cheek. Szilard pointed out that his Doomsday Machine would make it cheaper to kill everybody in the world rather than only in enemy territory. The global apocalypse, in short, would come at bargain prices.

Here again, Szilard was ahead of his time. The perverse arguments that began to pop up in academia after 1958 for avoiding military targets and focusing on cities took the implausible line that threats against military targets led to exponential increases in spending on both sides, since military targets could be more cheaply multiplied than cities. Targeting cities, therefore, was the only way to escape an arms race.

IV

Today many theorists of global disaster seem unable to decide whether threatening cities and assuring mutual destruction is an evil or a good thing. Carl Sagan, for example, at one point in his recent essay on the implications for policy of nuclear winter, seems to express my own concerns about apocalyptic

[17] *Ibid.*

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threats: "To the extent that these are not credible, they undermine deterrence; to the extent that they are credible, they set in motion events that tend toward apocalyptic conclusions." Sagan, however, rejects weapons like "burrowing low-yield warheads," even though they would be much less likely to cause a climatic disaster, as "provocative"; "they are the perfect post-TTAPS first-strike weapon."[18]

The jargon about "provocation" and "first strike" casually misuses the second-strike theory of deterrence. No single performance characteristic of a weapon, whether precision or warhead yield or speed of delivery, establishes whether a nuclear force has the capability for credibly performing a second strike, or a preclusive first strike, or both, or neither. In this context, such casual labels are merely code words for preferring large-yield warheads that do enormous collateral harm. Both low-yield, deep penetrating warheads and large-yield warheads exploding at the surface of the earth can destroy underground military targets. The difference is that the small penetrating warhead will do much less collateral harm, perhaps two orders of magnitude less.

In the intellectual confusion of contemporary MAD doctrine, it is the reduced risk of collateral damage, local and global, that is regarded as evil. And in spite of a welcome bow in the direction of abandoning apocalyptic threats, the basic thrust of many nuclear winter theorists is exactly the opposite of the earlier rejection of large H-bombs because of the enormous collateral harm they might do. The thrust, as foreshadowed by Szilard, is toward rigging things to make sure the harm would be global. On the other hand, the possibility of a global climatic disaster has recently made even some supporters of MAD threats doubtful about strikes against population centers. Now even they contemplate the need to avoid cities—or at least some cities.

But on the whole, theorists of nuclear winter, like supporters of MAD in general, continue to oppose the development of more discriminately effective offense and defense weapons or any preparations to respond to attack in ways that would confine destruction to military targets. That has influenced their choice of cases to investigate in ways that cloud their conclusions even more than the numerous uncertainties about

[18] Carl Sagan, "Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1983/84, pp. 284, 280.

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the density of fuel near specific targets and the like in models of nuclear winter. They have selected cases calculated to create enormous collateral damage both local and global.

The many uncertainties that shroud nuclear winter come in several distinct kinds. The first has to do with whether, when and how an attacker, such as a Soviet planner, might choose to use nuclear weapons, and how many and what types of weapons he would use. He might choose to attack in the summer when concentrations of fuel are dry and most easily ignited and when his own crops are in their growing season and therefore likely to be affected most drastically. He may include in his initial attack many targets like steel mills that have no time urgency since they could not affect the course of a war for months or even a year, and do this even though their rapid initial destruction along with urgent targets would greatly increase the amount of smoke generated in an interval short enough to make nuclear winter effects far more likely.

He might decide to attack cities and other targets with high densities of fuel, such as oil refineries outside cities, and he may explode high-yield weapons at altitudes that would maximize the thermal pulse over combustible areas and so send smoke in huge quantities into the atmosphere. He may blindly barrage mobile or concealed military targets with little military but large environmental effect. And he may use multi-megaton weapons at or near the surface of the earth in ways that would maximize the chance of sending submicron dust in large quantities into the stratosphere.

On the other hand—far more likely—a Soviet planner might use nuclear weapons to accomplish some military purpose in the course of a war, and do it in a way that takes account of the fact that destruction extraneous to that purpose could cause a nuclear winter and make that military purpose idle. He could try to avoid these self-defeating effects. If he is involved, for example, in a conventional war on the critical northern or southeastern flanks of NATO, or in the Persian Gulf or in the center of NATO, and has suffered unexpected reverses, he might use nuclear weapons against selected targets whose destruction or paralysis could turn the tide of battle. He could do this perhaps by destroying or putting out of action, for the duration of the battle or the war, most aircraft and the maintenance facilities on main operating bases, munition stockpiles, defense radar and communications and the like; and he could block reinforcements from inside or outside the theater. Moreover,

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he could do this in a way that would least interfere with the movements of his own military forces and his other military efforts, and would also confine the generation of smoke or dust to levels well below the diffuse zone of uncertainty for severe global effects. Most precautionary measures taken to prevent harm locally to his military effort would also be useful in staying well below that zone.

A second sort of uncertainty concerns how the victim of an attack, such as NATO, might respond. If a Soviet attacker had used nuclear weapons with effects largely confined to military targets in a local theater of war, and if NATO had prepared no response except for devastating cities and risking a nuclear winter, it might not respond at all. Or, conceivably, it might respond in a way deliberately to assure mutual destruction and, incidentally, the ruin of the hemisphere. Or, far more likely, it would follow the Soviet attacker in restricting itself to measures that stopped key military operations but kept things from getting out of hand and destroying the planet.

There is the other case, in which the Soviets had launched an attack generating enough smoke and dust to have a substantial probability of bringing on severe global effects; NATO might then respond by generating still more smoke and dust and increasing the likelihood of even more severe effects and danger to the species. This would differ from the "tit-for-tat" response in the stereotype of mutual escalation. It would be tat-for-tat, NATO bombing itself in response to Soviet bombing of NATO. Or—again more likely—it might choose a form of response that would serve a military purpose but did not substantially further increase the probability of a ruin that would encompass the West as well as the East. Here too, boomerang effects may influence choice.

A third type of uncertainty has to do not with choice but with matters of fact. Some of these have been deplorably neglected but should yield to further empirical study, such as the density of fuel at various locations; related issues as to how the fuel would burn and generate various kinds of smoke and soot in varied circumstances may be harder to resolve.

All these first three sorts of uncertainty, those that involve the choices of the two sides and those that have to do with the local concentrations of fuel of various sorts, have to do with the amount of smoke and submicron dust which would be generated and lofted into the troposphere and stratosphere during a nuclear conflict.

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A fourth sort of uncertainty—one which will be under investigation for many years—is more complex than the third category. It has to do with how the smoke and dust are likely to be transported vertically and horizontally in the troposphere and stratosphere, how clouds of smoke particles might form and be reduced by rain-out, how much solar radiation would reach the earth through the smoke clouds, and how much infrared radiation would escape and the resulting light and heat at the earth's surface. The first-generation models of the atmosphere after a nuclear war were designed by experts on planetary atmospheres. They were more appropriate for studying nuclear war on desert planets like Mars than on the earth, most of whose surface is ocean. Current models indicate considerably smaller, though still substantial, effects for the huge exchanges.

Finally, there are the biological effects of possible patterns of change in temperature and light at the earth's surface. Biologists and physicians have been among the most prominent prophets of a global nuclear winter. Their work on global effects, however, has focused only on cases even more extreme than the enormous baseline cases looked at by the Swedish study in *Ambio*, TTAPS and NAS 85, and so far has been supported by less evidence than the work on climatic changes.

V

Of these five types of uncertainty, the first and second—those that involve choice—have been least satisfactorily addressed. Yet they are of immense importance and can dominate the rest. The weapons and strategies that adversaries choose make quite a difference. And alternatives that can reduce smoke and dust even more dramatically have not been much explored. These first two sorts of uncertainties differ greatly from the others precisely in that they are a matter of choice. They are choices—partly independent and partly interlocking—made by the antagonists.

Nuclear winter theorists, however, tend to treat these uncertainties as if they were simply matters of chance uninfluenced by choice, like the collision of an asteroid with the earth or the impact of a comet that lofted devastating dust. Nuclear winter theorists treat antagonists as rather like asteroids and comets, or, at least so far as the application of intelligence is concerned, like the dinosaur that may have become extinct as the result of such a collision. They presume explicitly, at any rate, that the

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antagonists will make their choices of targets, methods of attack and timing without any intelligent consideration as to the likely implications of such choices for their own destruction by a nuclear winter. The NAS 85 study, for example, assumed that neither side would refrain from attacking military or economic targets located in cities in spite of the dangers of igniting their dense fuel. And, in fact, its baseline case involved explosions over 1,000 cities in proportion to their population—attacks in which each side's explosions are well designed to contribute to its own destruction.

Attacks on population, or attacks which ignore collateral harm to population, of course, have had many advocates in the Western establishment. And even more members of the establishment consider that any use of nuclear weapons will end in devastating cities on both sides even if we try to avoid it. Nuclear winter theorists cite as justification for their assumptions statements not only by some Western strategists but by a good many former high officials—defense secretaries, chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and deputy directors of the Joint Strategic Targeting and Planning Staff.

What is novel in nuclear winter theory, what makes it capable of exhibiting with a particular clarity the incoherence and implausibility of much establishment doctrine, is that it assumes that each side will use weapons to bring about its own destruction not merely as part of a process of mutual "escalation," but directly with its own weapons. The rebound of one's own weapons eliminates the middleman in self-deterrence. Even if nuclear winter should ultimately turn out to be a less substantial danger, it will nonetheless have served a useful function. Its proponents carry one step further the assumption widespread in Western elites that in a nuclear conflict neither side would persist in choosing to keep the destruction done by its own weapons within bounds short of self-destruction.

Nuclear winter theorists also make clearer some of the absurdities in the Western view of Soviet behavior. Even apart from nuclear winter, one need not suppose, as some members of our foreign policy establishment assume, that only "gallantry" or some courtly interest in Western welfare would lead the Soviets to place limits on their use of nuclear weapons. The Soviets have always had strong reasons of self-interest not only to be wary about using nuclear weapons at all, but to try, if they should feel that the risks of using them in the course of a war are less than the risks of not using them, to keep the risks

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from getting completely out of hand. It is absurd to suppose that the Soviets would totally disregard the risk of disaster to themselves. Yet that may be a canonical assumption about Soviet attacks.

Moreover, it is one thing to say that political and military leaders sometimes mindlessly take the most self-destructive course. It is quite another thing to suppose that one's adversary will always either do nothing or mindlessly attack in a way that will do himself the most harm; and it is still another thing to recommend mindlessly suicidal behavior on our side, and to rig our preparations so that we could not respond against the source of attack without killing ourselves. When strategists rely on Mutual Assured Destruction, they assume intelligence can have essentially no influence at all.

VI

Recent studies of a potential global nuclear disaster seem to generalize about the outcome of nuclear conflict—whether fought in a theater of operation in Europe or Asia; between the superpower homelands; with past, current or future weapons, of small or large yield, in modest or huge numbers; in accordance with present secret war plans or any future plans developed with the knowledge of these new global effects—and independently of whether the antagonists have prepared and try to restrict the damage done to each other or to themselves. In fact, the principal studies starting with a National Academy of Sciences report in 1975 (NAS 75) of the effect of nuclear war on the ozone, to the recent NAS 85 study on nuclear winter, take as their baseline case a conflict in which each adversary directs thousands or tens of thousands of weapons, many of very large yield, at locations and at burst altitudes calculated to do immense direct damage to the civil society of its antagonist; each thus also helps to bring on a global disaster destroying itself. The studies do not consider cases where either antagonist tries to confine damage to military targets or in any way tries to prevent damage to his own political, military or civilian resources.

The TTAPS baseline case assumed 5,000 total megatons, and 10,400 warheads with a yield between 0.1 and 10 mt. It assumed 1,000 mt would explode over urban or industrial areas, generating over 130 million tons of smoke. The remaining 4,000 mt exploding over non-urban land areas was calcu-

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lated to generate an additional 95 million tons of smoke and to loft 65 million tons of submicron dust into the stratosphere.

NAS 85 assumed 6,500 mt and 25,000 nuclear explosions (the largest number of nuclear explosions in any of the studies); 3,500 of these, with a total yield of 1,500 mt, were assumed to be detonated over the largest 1,000 cities in NATO and the Warsaw Pact, generating 150 million tons of smoke. Explosions outside of cities were calculated to generate 30 million tons of smoke and to loft about 15 million tons of submicron dust into the stratosphere.

Are these "scenarios" of nuclear winter "reasonable" as is claimed? Not really. Neither the baseline cases nor the smaller excursions are. I have never been an enthusiast for the scenarios favored by many strategists and planners. They seldom have much relevance to the uncertain evolution of sequences of events likely in real contingencies. They seem more closely related to the movies or TV dramas that have given them their name. But the cases on which nuclear winter calculations have been based make little consistent sense even as scripts for movies. They hardly describe a sequence of events at all. Rather they list a collection of simultaneous explosions by the two antagonists well-designed to bring on a global disaster. In particular, such sets of explosions seem dubious as aspects of conflicts fought under the shadow of a nuclear winter.

The baseline cases are, first of all, huge. In fact, some may be infeasibly huge even if the contestants used the entire world arsenal and cooperated to detonate as many weapons as possible. The authors of these calculations seem only intermittently aware that in the normal course of a conflict some weapons would be duds or carried on vehicles that had some mechanical or operational failure preventing them from getting off the ground; some weapons would destroy other weapons (for example, weapons in stockpiles or weapons placed in vehicles that were hit on the ground or on their way to target), or both the attacking weapon and the weapons destroyed might explode at sea where they could do damage to naval targets without any substantial global effect on climate, and so on. The chairman of the panel that produced NAS 85 has suggested that, in assuming the explosion of 25,000 nuclear weapons (about half the world's arsenal), the panel "didn't want to take an extreme position," that it wanted to leave "plenty of room on either

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side" of the estimate.[19] But it is more than doubtful that the two antagonists, even with much collaboration, using the entire world's stockpile, could arrange to explode that many nuclear warheads of the required range and distribution of yields.

Second, the explosions do seem to require a collaboration of the antagonists. Take the countersilo part of the NAS 85 baseline: the United States and the Soviet Union each explode two bursts in the megaton range at the surface of the earth near each silo of the other side in order to assure that the missiles in silos will be destroyed. But with singular lack of success—since each side launches its missiles at the other side. In fact, this example illustrates a characteristic of these odd scenarios: attacks which are nominally directed at military targets seem to do very little direct harm to their military targets, but do manage a large contribution to global disaster.

Third, even if one were to assume that it is reasonable to direct a great many large-yield weapons at highly combustible cities, the choice of targets made by the pair of superpowers acting in unison seems rather bizarre. The Swedish Academy, for example, presumes that 15 nuclear explosions with a total yield of ten megatons will occur over each one of such cities as Manila, Jakarta, Bombay, Calcutta, New Delhi, Madras, Dacca, Sydney and Hong Kong. In a war between the United States and the Soviet Union? The Swedish Academy study in fact presumed that the two superpowers together would explode 173 mt in the southern hemisphere. The World Health Organization (WHO) topped that in its 1982 study on the biological effects of nuclear war: it assumed 1,000 mt would explode in the southern hemisphere.

Fourth, these baseline scenarios involve attacks on population centers on such an enormous scale that the direct destruction done locally seems almost unimaginably large. The Swedish Academy scenario would directly kill or maim over a billion persons; WHO's scenario, over two billion. Professor Sagan makes much of the fact that these two billion casualties would be just the beginning: the global effects of smoke and soot might take care of the other half of the world's population.

Moreover, the "small" or "limited" scenarios may be even more absurd than the baseline cases. The TTAPS 100-mt exchange is the one most widely referred to as showing that any nuclear conflict, even a "limited" nuclear war, would trigger a

[19] George Carrier, CBS transcript, *Face the Nation*, December 16, 1984, p. 2.

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devastating global change in climate. The 100-mt exchange is also the basis for estimates of the "threshold" number of missiles that would trigger a drastic climatic change, and therefore the maximum number of nuclear weapons that could safely be left undestroyed and unreplaced out of the world's stock of about 50,000 nuclear weapons—if we were to be sure that no combination of powers, no matter how mindless their behavior, could bring about a nuclear winter. But TTAPS's 100-mt case, which involves one thousand 100-kiloton weapons exploding over the 100 most populated cities in NATO and the Warsaw Pact, is not "small." And it is certainly not "limited" in the relevant sense of illustrating the results of attempts to confine collateral damage to military targets.

Both sides, including whichever side may be thought of as striking first in this odd collaboration, ignore military targets—which makes this "limited" case even more absurd than the massive baseline scenarios. My colleague, Richard Brody, calculates that this 100-mt attack might cause as many as 300 million casualties directly and locally. This does not count the global effects which are worse for this 100-mt countercity attack, as TTAPS itself points out, than those of their 3,000-mt countersilo war. In fact, by changing the value of its fuel parameters, TTAPS derived about the same amount of smoke and soot (130 million tons) from this 100-mt case as from the 1,000 mt exploded over cities in its huge baseline case.

Professor Sagan has indicated the threshold suggested by the TTAPS 100-mt case in several ways: from 500 to 2,000 weapons; or one percent of the world's nuclear arsenal (about 500 weapons); or one percent of the strategic offense warheads (about 180 weapons). However, the notion of a "threshold" here is quite deceptive—and not merely because there is no fine line nor even a well-defined band of uncertainty about the number of weapons that might trigger a global disaster. More important, the location of the diffused zones separating safety and disaster would depend on whether the weapons exploded were of high yield, detonated over cities or other dense concentrations of fuel, burst at high altitude or on the surface of the earth or well beneath it, and so on. So long as one assumes that nuclear weapons will be used mindlessly or deliberately to maximize the likelihood of disastrous global effects, the number of explosions would have to be extremely small to stay below the zone of uncertainty. The threshold numbers named by Professor Sagan *are* extremely small. No enforceable arms

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agreement is ever likely to reduce the world's arsenal by the required 99 or more percent. (The superpower agreement that Sagan suggests would beat swords into plowshares by using the fissile material in bombs for nuclear electric power would actually *spread* plutonium quickly useable in bombs.[20])

Nuclear disarmament will never be 99 and 44/100 percent pure. The most extensive nuclear disarmament feasible will not permit the luxury of the mindless use of those nuclear weapons that may remain hidden. And disarmament far short of 99 percent is a long way off. Nuclear winter theorists propose such Utopian solutions because they reject the idea that an attacker could use nuclear weapons for some military purpose and yet confine the effects substantially to military targets. They do not calculate the outcome for the global environment of such a selective attack.

In fact, the critical unexamined claim made by nuclear winter theorists in drawing implications for policy is that a Soviet or other prospective attacker would deter himself without any need for a suicidal decision to respond on the part of his victim; that the attack itself would cause global harm engulfing the attacker even if the victim did not respond. If the claim were true it would fill a void at the very center of MAD doctrine.

VII

Since the dogma of Mutual Assured Destruction persists in the West, it is worth spelling out clearly what makes it hollow:

(1) If a responsible political leader, contemplating a strike in aggression, expects that he (and his political and social order or his military force or whatever he values most) will be harmed vastly more than if he does not strike, he is unlikely to strike.

(2) That is the basic theorem of the second-strike theory of deterrence, phrased as it should be in terms of comparing the risks of striking and not striking rather than in terms of "acceptable damage." Where the harm he might suffer in striking is at the extreme, we say the aggressor will not attack because he does not want to commit suicide.

(3) But it is equally true and relevant that if a sensible political leader, contemplating a strike *in response* to aggression, expects

[20] Such an agreement has been proposed once again by George Kennan and Admiral Gayler. It ignores the fact, public since 1976, that plutonium is not "denatured" by irradiation in power reactors. Such plowshares make effective swords. Albert Wohlstetter, "Spreading the Bomb without Quite Breaking the Rules," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1976–77, pp. 88–96, and Wohlstetter *et al.*, *Swords from Plowshares*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979.

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that he and his entire political and social order will suffer a vastly greater disaster than if he does not respond, he is unlikely to decide in favor of responding. That follows from the same root assumption as the second-strike theory of deterrence. Where the harm he might suffer in responding is at the extreme, we can say he will not want to commit suicide. At any rate, he will not commit suicide in order to avoid death.

(4) If the aggressor can see that his victim has no response other than suicide, and that the victim is aware of that and says so all the time, then the aggressor may expect no response. If there is no response, he will suffer no harm. He may then find that his best way out of a palpable disaster, say, during a conventional invasion, is to launch a selective nuclear attack.

Some political leaders tend now to concede that a "deterrent" that promises no response is incoherent, but they cling nonetheless to the belief that it works and that it has worked for 40 years. But it has not. In the mid-1960s when Robert McNamara introduced the threat of Mutual Assured Destruction, he also made clear that if deterrence failed, the United States would respond with an attack designed to limit the damage, not to commit suicide. The drift toward not responding and the consequent erosion of the military balance and of deterrence is a quite recent phenomenon.

When the Soviets talk primarily for Western ears, they indicate that if they ever attack they will do it massively and indiscriminately, even if it means the end of the world—either to frighten us into believing that it is futile to prepare to use nuclear weapons even in response to their use of nuclear weapons, or to lull us into believing that they would never use them. Or both. Such Soviet statements are in good part disinformation. They are a main support for the drift toward not responding, toward "Deterrence Only."

When Soviet military planners write primarily to inform each other, they may demonstrate an interest both in using force "massively," that is "decisively," to accomplish a key military purpose, and in using force selectively so as not to defeat that or any wider purpose. ("Size would reflect only the desire to achieve strategic results. [It] can be as few as several score weapons" to deliberately "reduce unwanted and unnecessary damage."[21]) The development of their military forces confirms

[21] Joseph Douglass, Jr., *A Soviet Selective Targeting Strategy Towards Europe*, Systems Planning Corporation Report, Arlington (Va.): SPC, August 1977, p. 1.

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this double interest. They are increasingly capable of selecting some targets to be immobilized or destroyed with important military effect while leaving others essentially untouched. They have been moving toward more precise, lower-yield weapons. This ability to reduce unintended harm locally lessens also the chance of bringing on a global disaster. Moreover, while the Soviets show little interest in the purely symbolic, Western-style use of nuclear weapons "to demonstrate resolve" and "to send messages" in a process of "escalation control," their force development shows a strong interest in keeping the battle under *their* control.

Any Soviet leadership which we could deter by threatening disaster would also be deterred from an unlimited strike by a prospect that the rebound from their own weapons could, by itself, without our intervention, bring disaster to the Politburo, Soviet military forces and Soviet society. Soviet leaders would obviously prefer to extend their control without having to fight at all. If they have to fight, they would prefer to risk less and to win by conventional means. If they do use nuclear weapons, they would prefer to use them in a way that would not destroy their purpose in attacking. But in any case, they want to avoid suicide and the end of life in the northern hemisphere. Members of the Politburo do not believe in the hereafter. The Utopia the true believers have sought—and the privileged rewards of the *nomenklatura*—have to be realized here on earth. But advocates of MAD, in their extremity, defy common sense. In their zeal to show that the Soviets will always nullify any defense we can construct, some scientists prophesy that if the United States were to attempt any "serious" protection of its cities, a "likely response" by the Soviet Union would be "to target its missiles so as to maximize damage to the U.S. population," even though that would "pose a serious danger of triggering a climatic catastrophe (the nuclear winter phenomenon)."[22]

Are the Soviets really possessed by so single-minded and pure a passion to kill our harmless bystanders that they would be willing to destroy themselves and any future for "communism" or for life itself in the Soviet Union? If so, they have an even better countermeasure to our ballistic missile defense. This one does not require them to penetrate our elaborate defenses at

[22] Hans Bethe, Richard Garwin, Carl Sagan *et al.*, *Space-Based Missile Defense*, Cambridge: Union of Concerned Scientists, 1984, p. 81.

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all: they could explode their warheads over their own cities in large enough numbers to bring on the death of the biosphere. Showing how hard it is for our advocates of MAD to beat Soviet efforts to make protection against Soviet attack seem hopeless, *Izvestia* recently printed a piece by Valentin Falin (former ambassador to West Germany) saying that the Soviets might very well counter our anti-ballistic missile defense in just that way: "No ABM options," Falin wrote ominously on December 14, 1984, "will change the fact that a precisely known quantity of nuclear devices detonated simultaneously on *one's own territory* would have irreversible global consequences [emphasis added]." If the Soviets were really that crazy, the prospects for arms control would be even dimmer than the skeptics believe.

Quite apart from the dangers of a nuclear winter, the Soviets have compelling incentives to use nuclear force selectively if at all. They have recognized this interest, as can be abundantly documented both from recently available materials of the Voroshilov General Staff Academy as well as from a fresh evaluation of Soviet military writings during the last 20 years.[23] Moreover, they are able to use nuclear force selectively and keep it under control, and have been greatly increasing this capability. I can only illustrate these points.

The most elementary concern the Soviets show for avoiding the indiscriminate use of nuclear weapons has to do, first, with local effects on their own military forces. They want to avoid "hindering the actions" of their "own troops,"[24] or having them "suffer heavy casualties" and "lose their combat capability," or having "their rear support area . . . suffer heavy damages" and their "communications routes . . . destroyed."[25] And in particular they are concerned about "a break in the originally outlined plans for combat actions" and "an interruption in troop control."[26]

[23] Here I owe much to recent research of Dennis M. Gormley, Douglas M. Hart, John G. Hines, Phillip Petersen and especially Notra Trulock III, among others. My own citations merely illustrate these points rather than cumulate the evidence. But they suffice to refute the prevailing claim that the Soviets have shown no interest in keeping destruction under control.

[24] Colonel S.I. Krupnov, "The Dialectics of the Development of the Methods and Forms of Armed Combat," *Methodological Problems of Military Theory and Practice*, 2nd ed., Moscow: Voenizdat, 1969, pp. 340–361.

[25] Lecture materials from the Voroshilov General Staff Academy, "Strategic Operations in a Continental Theater of Military Operations," (mid-1970s) cited in Notra Trulock's paper, "Weapons of Mass Destruction in Soviet Military Strategy," presented at the Conference on Soviet Military Strategy in Europe held in Oxfordshire, England, September 1984.

[26] Lieutenant General I.G. Zav'yalov, "The New Weapon and Military Art," *Krasnaya Zvezda* (*Red Star*), October 30, 1970, pp. 2–3, reprinted in *Selected Soviet Military Writings, 1970–75*, U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1977, pp. 206–213.

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Second, the Soviets would prefer a Soviet Western Europe intact rather than in ruins. "The objective is not to turn the large economic and industrial regions into a heap of ruins," but, among other things, "to sharply reduce the enemy capability to conduct strikes." Some "targets and regions should be left intact [to] strengthen the economic potential of our own country."[27] After World War II, the Soviets transferred whole factories from occupied lands and many German scientific and engineering cadres to the Soviet Union.

Third, Soviet military authorities have recognized the stake of both sides in exercising caution. "The accumulation of nuclear missiles," according to a contemporary statement, has "reached such extremes that their massive use could turn into catastrophic consequences for both sides."[28] This is not new; an earlier authority said that "the risk of destruction of one's own government" is so heavy that the belligerents will use other means to attain their objectives or, if not, will "limit themselves to inflicting some selective nuclear strikes on secondary objectives."[29]

Fourth, "in modern conditions, such [selective] nuclear attacks would primarily be the consequences of the expansion and development of a conventional war. . . ."[30] The conventional balance in the center of Europe is already very favorable to the Soviets. If they met unexpected reverses there, they could make up for them with a rather small number of low-yield nuclear weapons, precisely delivered and with quite confined damage. This sort of militarily decisive contribution at the margin differs greatly from the "demonstrations of resolve" that figure in the Western strategic debate.

Fifth, the conventional war leading to the use of nuclear weapons may take place in a weakly armed but critical flank of NATO, such as southeastern Turkey or its unstable neighbor Iran, and may be confined to that theater of military operations. That is not the canonical NATO scenario. But it is more likely to divide the allies and to give some the incentive and opportunity to opt out. The Soviets would risk less, and the

[27] Colonel M. Shirokov, "Military Geography at the Present Stage," *Military Thought* (*Voennaya Mysl'*), 1966, No. 11, pp. 59–61.
[28] Colonel General M.A. Gareyev, *M.V. Frunze—Voennyy Teoretik*, Moscow: Voenizdat, 1985, p. 240.
[29] General S.P. Ivanov, "Soviet Military Doctrine and Strategy," *Military Thought*, 1969, No. 5.
[30] Voroshilov lectures in Trulock, *op. cit.*

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autonomy of Europe would nonetheless be at stake. In World War II, they did not attack all their enemies at once but, successively, a weak Poland under attack also by Hitler, little Finland, the Baltic states, Bulgaria, then a Japan already beaten by the Allies. Hitler, a risk-taker, attacked the Soviets. Their military authorities do not exclude "the limited use of nuclear means in *one* or several theaters of military operations." Southeastern Turkey and the Persian Gulf are part of the Soviet southern theater.[31]

Sixth, even an intercontinental attack might be directed at disrupting the scheduled deployment from the United States of the military airlift, tactical aircraft and ground forces most urgently needed for reinforcing NATO. The essential facilities involved are few, poorly protected and distant from any large population center; disrupting them would require only a modest number of air-burst weapons of moderate yield. Yet that could alter the "correlation of forces" decisively for a Soviet combined-arms invasion of Western Europe.[32] Such an attack could generate a thousand times less smoke than the baseline nuclear winter scenarios and essentially no stratospheric dust. The Soviets are greatly improving their ability to deliver weapons at long range precisely enough to employ low-yield nuclear weapons for such a purpose. (In fact, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov has stressed that the ongoing revolution in precision at very extended ranges will permit the use of *conventional* weapons deep in an adversary's homeland for some "strategic" purposes.[33])

The same incentives that impel the Soviets to be able to use nuclear weapons selectively impel them to *keep* the use of nuclear weapons under continuing control. In fact, the notion that Soviet political leaders would casually let nuclear weapons slip out of their hands is even less plausible than the notion that they might use them indiscriminately. For the Soviets have often been as brutal as they now are in Afghanistan; they might

[31] Marshal V.D. Sokolovsky and Major-General M.I. Cherednichenko, "Military Strategy and Its Problems," *Military Thought*, 1968, No. 10 (my emphasis). The U.S. Department of Defense, in its latest 1985 edition of *Soviet Military Power*, now recognizes that in the Soviet view "a nuclear exchange could occur in a limited or large-scale manner at the tactical, operational, strategic, or intercontinental level—or all simultaneously."

[32] Lieutenant General W.E. Odom, the new director of the National Security Agency, holds that the Soviets are much more likely to think of such an attack than the countersilo exchanges that obsess Western analysts. "The Implications of Active Defense of NATO for Soviet Military Strategy," presented at the European American Institute for Security Research Workshop, November 1984.

[33] Marshal N.V. Ogarkov, interview in *Krasnaya Zvezda*, May 9, 1984.

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use nuclear weapons without much discrimination if it were a question only of compassion rather than their most elementary self-interest. Letting things get out of their political control, however, control that could decide the life or death of the party and their political order, is quite another matter. It has nothing whatsoever to recommend it in the Bolshevik canon.

The Politburo does not encourage spontaneity in the use of nuclear weapons. Nor is there any evidence that, after a few nuclear weapons were used, the Politburo would allow everyone in physical possession of them to fire at will. The Soviets will, of course, use *threats* of uncontrollability. We have seen some outstanding examples. But the threats were quickly followed by a demonstration that the Soviet political leaders had no intention of letting things get out of control.

During the Cuban missile crisis, for example, when confronted with the American threat to intercept, board and search a Russian freighter, Nikita Khrushchev asserted that this "would make talk useless" and bring into action the "forces and laws of war"; it would have "irretrievably fatal consequences."[34] However, when it became plain that President Kennedy was nonetheless proceeding to intercept Soviet freighters, Khrushchev changed his tune from ominous notes of uncontrollability to hasty reassurance that there was no occasion for the United States to act desperately. Khrushchev made clear he had no intention of deliberately responding in a massive way, of letting the laws of war take over, or of letting those romantic Cubans precipitate a nuclear conflict. Good, solid, stolid, sensible Russians were guarding the safety catches on the missiles in Cuba:

> The means which are located on Cuba now, about which you are talking and which as you say concern you, are in the hands of the Soviet officers. That is why any possibility of accidental usage of those means, which might cause harm to the United States, is excluded.[35]

After the crisis, Khrushchev made a good deal of the fact that he had "shown restraint" to save the world from imminent peril.

The Soviets clearly would want to maintain control. But could they? Arguments to the contrary proceed like arguments

[34] Quoted by Roberta and Albert Wohlstetter, *Controlling the Risks in Cuba*, Adelphi Paper, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), April 1965, p. 15.

[35] *Ibid.*, p. 8. Cf. Nathan Leites' recent major study, *Soviet Style in War.*

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about collateral damage by assuming what they are supposed to be proving. In fact, the argument reduces to an unsupported or circular assertion about collateral damage and an equally circular assertion about "pressures for escalation."[36] Collateral damage from an initial attack, it is said, would be essentially the same as from a direct attack on cities, now or in the future, no matter with what weapons or what targets. But evidence cited always seems to be based on calculations which assume the combatants do not try to reduce collateral damage.[37] They simply ignore attacks designed both to achieve a military purpose and to reduce unwanted harm. Much the same can be said of assertions about "escalation." These are usually spiced by statements that those in possession of a weapon would have to "use it or lose it." But using it could be a lot worse than losing it. On the nuclear winter theory, using a missile force indiscriminately might mean losing the hemisphere. All the enormous pressures to keep destruction within less than suicidal bounds are totally neglected.

Everything that we know about how the Soviets store and handle their nuclear weapons suggests that control is both extremely tight and well protected. For good reason. First, even more than the Western powers, the Soviets have to be concerned about the seizure of nuclear weapons by dissidents who might use them to help establish their independence from the Soviet government. The Soviets are in potentially hostile territory, not only in Eastern Europe, but in some parts of the Soviet Union. Second, the leadership is not unaware of the dangers of the "use it or lose it" syndrome. Marshal Ogarkov, to take one example, has rejected policies of "launch on warn-

[36] Raymond Aron, shortly before his recent death, observed that the formula "Better Red than Dead" is again becoming fashionable, and that once again ". . . the doctrinaires of capitulation . . . assume . . . escalation to extremes as inevitable. Once again, we find (an example of) begging the question: there is no limited nuclear war; or employment of a single nuclear weapon will suppress the taboo and open the floodgate: through the open breach will sweep in pure and unlimited violence, a homicidal and suicidal orgy. . . . why? Everyone agrees that a single nuclear weapon in Europe would spread terror: why will leaders on each side be led despite themselves to push further, to the limit?" "Suicide, Capitulation ou Riposte Limitée?" *Commentaire* (Paris), Spring 1984, p. 61.

[37] Desmond Ball, "Can Nuclear War Be Controlled?" Adelphi Paper No. 169, London: IISS, 1981, pp. 37–38. Ball refers for support to the oft-cited study by the Office of Technology Assessment for his conclusion that "even if cities were avoided, 100 nuclear detonations on key military or war-supporting facilities (such as refineries) would probably cause prompt fatalities in excess of a million people." But he is mistaken in assuming that the OTA example he refers to avoided cities. OTA explicitly assumed that no attempt was made to reduce collateral harm to population. Refineries in the heart of cities such as Los Angeles and Philadelphia were attacked.

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ing," that is, launching one's own missiles on the basis of electromagnetic signals that enemy missiles are on their way to target.[38] Third, several Soviet military writers have made clear that not only is the decision to use nuclear weapons "the exclusive prerogative of the political leadership [but] it is the political leadership . . . not the military leadership . . . who select the primary targets and the moment of the infliction on these strike targets."[39]

Finally, the Soviets have spent tens of billions of dollars over many years to elaborate a mutually reinforcing network of measures for protecting political and military command and control that include deception, concealment, dispersal, mobility in the air, on the ground and below ground, deep underground structures and active defense.[40] Their formidable system is intended to survive in nuclear war, not just in peacetime. Those who speak easily of "decapitation" might consider the problem of destroying command in a deep underground structure whose location and actual use for command has been made uncertain by such measures. Take a hypothetical case where the command was located 1,000 feet deep in a spot unknown within a radius of, say, tens of miles. A blind barrage using many thousands of weapons could harm the environment without stopping command. In an era when precision endangers known fixed locations, making location uncertain is a powerful factor in assuring survival. The Soviets are exploiting such uncertainty not only in order to maintain command and control but, increasingly, to preserve the forces commanded. They are making their ICBMs, like their theater missiles, mobile.

In fact, many supporters of the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction are aware that the Soviets have made a huge investment in protecting wartime command and control; yet they oppose any major effort by the United States to improve its capability. They say that this would be a severe "provocation" to the Soviet Union.[41] No one suggests that the Soviet program has been excessively provocative.

Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the dogma of Mutual

[38] *The New York Times*, March 17, 1983, pp. 1, 6.

[39] Colonel M.P. Skirdo, *Narod, Armiya, Polkovodets* (*The People, the Army, the Commander*), Moscow: Voenizdat, 1970, p. 121. Translated by the U.S. Air Force. Soviet Military Thought Series, No. 14. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1978.

[40] U.S. Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power 1985*, pp. 17 ff.; and the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *U.S. Military Posture FY 1985*, pp. 17–19; and Viktor Suvorov, *Inside the Soviet Army*, New York: Macmillan, 1982, pp. 153–155.

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Assured Destruction is that while it appears to be a description of a supposed fact, a state of affairs—the impossibility of discriminate attacks, the impossibility of maintaining control—it is really a policy which resists any *Western* improvements in precision and discriminateness and any *Western* attempts to keep destruction within less than suicidal bounds. Its proponents would force us to apocalyptic extremes.

VIII

Everyone sensible in the West assigns primacy to deterring nuclear war. This is clearly so even though scientists describing the effects of a global nuclear war often, as in the case of the Swedish Academy study, suggest in a now standard absurdity that U.S. decisions on defense are made in order to fight a nuclear war *rather* than to deter it.[42] The questions are how best to deter, whether that can be done without using apocalyptic threats, and whether we have to surrender freedom if deterrence fails. Nor should there be any issue about the West's need to rely less on nuclear weapons to deter a *non*-nuclear attack. Though Western leaders—especially in Europe—have resisted it, that has seemed obvious for over 25 years.

Are we more likely to deter an attack by improving our ability to answer with the destruction of military targets rather than innocent bystanders, and by keeping the conflict under gross control? Or by making any nuclear war in which the West takes part as horrible as possible even if it means ending civilization and possibly the species? I have for many years advocated the first course. But that by no means implies that I think a war, even a non-nuclear war, is likely to be fought neatly, cleanly and, in Stanley Hoffmann's phrase, "without a smudge." Even if we could completely avoid the risk of killing bystanders—which we cannot—that would hardly make war and the slaughter of soldiers tempting.

The *live* issue is whether we should be trying to increase or

[41] See, for example, John Steinbruner, "Nuclear Decapitation," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1981–82, p. 28. Desmond Ball's essay, "Can Nuclear War Be Controlled?" *op. cit.*, concludes that improvements in conventional force can better serve the purpose of improving control over our nuclear forces. But improved control of our nuclear forces has always been intended to deter or respond to Soviet selective *nuclear* attack and indeed at its abortive start in 1962 was part of a program that also called for reducing reliance on nuclear weapons and improving conventional forces. Both sorts of improvement are essential. Neither can replace the other. Both have lagged deplorably.

[42] Frank Barnaby, "The Effects of a Global Nuclear War: The Arsenals," *Ambio*, 1982, Vol. 11, Nos. 2–3, p. 78.

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to decrease our ability to discriminate between military and civilian targets, and to confine destruction to the military. There have already been revolutionary changes in precision, and therefore in the possibility of discrimination on both sides of the Iron Curtain. In spite of the enormous inertia of large military institutions and an ideology opposing precision that has dominated Western strategists for two decades, still greater improvements are under way. Nonetheless, even with these changes—past and future—some unintended harm would almost surely be done and there will always be the risk of losing control. Yet if we deliberately leave our own civilians defenseless and preclude the possibility of discrimination in responding to attack, we make a global nuclear disaster much more likely.

We should make clear that we will not respond to an attack in any way that would have a substantial chance of causing a nuclear winter. We should be prepared to use discriminating offense strategies, tactics and precise weapons with reduced yields and deliberately confined effects—such as weapons that penetrate and explode deep beneath rather than at the surface of the earth close to an underground military target; and to direct our weapons at the military rather than at bystanders—to select targets of a sort, number and location that will accomplish an important military purpose and yet contain the destruction. And we will benefit greatly if we can deploy a similarly discriminating *defense* that uses precise non-nuclear means to intercept substantial numbers of enemy nuclear warheads on their way to military targets located near our cities. We want especially to emphasize the protection of the instruments for exercising responsible control. The revolution in microelectronics makes control more effective and easier to defend since it permits less expensive, small packages of reliable sensors, powerful data processors and communications that may be easily multiplied and moved. Our negotiations and agreements with the Soviets, moreover, should be designed to further this policy of exercising discrimination and control, not to assure indiscriminate mutual destruction.

Selective assaults—Soviet attacks that are clearly not self-destroying—are the main threats the West must be prepared to deter or counter. Yet the focus of attention among our political and military leaders has been mainly on the possibility of a massive and indiscriminate use of Soviet nuclear force that would make nearly hopeless any Western attempt to contain the conflict, and therefore any Western response useless. Our

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elites vaguely hope against hope that a useless, in fact improbably suicidal, Western response may need to be only very slightly probable to deter an indiscriminate uncontrolled Soviet attack. Now they grasp at the possibility that a Soviet "all-out" attack—or any Soviet attack—would destroy the attacker even without our response.

The Western establishment only recently has begun to face up to the possibility that the Soviets may use conventional force decisively. It continues to evade the military, political and moral problems of responding in contingencies where the Soviets might use *nuclear* force decisively and still leave both sides a large stake in avoiding suicide and universal ruin. In such contingencies—the main ones worth considering—any credible Western counter will itself have to be well below the threshold of suicide, not to say universal ruin.

The West has limited options and needs more and better ones in order to deter the plausible attacks. There is no responsible *un*limited option. This calls for greater clarity in parts of our military as well as our anti-military establishment about what Soviet strategies will serve Soviet interests in a variety of important and plausible contingencies, and about what Western strategies in answer are responsible ones. When Western supporters of MAD say that MAD is a fact rather than a policy, they confuse prediction or description with prescription. Their expectations about future Soviet behavior are unqualified and more than dubious. Their statements about future U.S. behavior cannot be taken simply as predictions; they carelessly prescribe what we should do. They oppose improvements in offense precision, discriminateness and control, and therefore implicitly support threats to destroy cities, and they oppose any defense.[43]

If MAD were simply a "fact," its proponents could hope to escape responsibility. But to rely on MAD threats and to try to restrict us to a capability solely to destroy civil society is to make a choice—a reckless choice, quite apart from any potential for disaster on a global scale. And the possibility of a nuclear winter makes the absurdity of MAD threats even clearer. That, however, is to draw nuclear winter's implications for

[43] It was supporters of MAD during the ABM debate who revived the reckless idea that instead of defending ICBMs we should launch them on warning at Soviet cities. See, for example, R. Garwin, letter to *The New York Times*, October 22, 1967.

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policy in a way exactly opposed to that drawn by many theorists of nuclear winter most of the time.

Among the most revolutionary changes in precision that are in process, some will permit one or a few non-nuclear warheads effectively to destroy a variety of important military targets which previously had been thought of as susceptible only to nuclear attack or to huge non-nuclear raids. While such precisely delivered non-nuclear weapons are not likely to supplant nuclear weapons completely as a means of responding to nuclear attack, they have a large political importance—observed in the Soviet military literature, as well as in the West's—in reducing the pressures to resort to nuclear weapons. They would greatly increase the possibility of keeping a conflict under control. And they can reduce the one-square-mile area in which bystanders would be subject to unintended harm from even a small nuclear weapon to a thousandth of a square mile.

That should impress us. We tend to lose perspective. One square mile of destruction is still an enormous amount for a single weapon. We obscure these essential distinctions when we say, as do many who talk about "a spiralling race in weapons of mass destruction," that increasing precision implies that weapons are becoming more "destructive." For achieving a given military effect, they are becoming *less* indiscriminately destructive.

There has been much misunderstanding on this subject. It has been said that the improved precision now feasible means that there is no important difference between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons. That is not the case at all. The key difference has to do with unintended harm. Non-nuclear weapons will not be as effective as nuclear weapons against military targets for some missions in response to nuclear attack. But the extreme precision required to make conventional weapons effective on some major military missions also makes them more discriminate than even small nuclear weapons. Furthermore, essentially the same technologies that make a discriminating offense possible will also make increasingly feasible a non-nuclear defense that can intercept nuclear or non-nuclear ballistic missiles on their way to targets in the United States and Western Europe. And they improve our ability to keep destruction under control.

Many things besides technology are relevant to the issues of how best to deter Soviet attack. The preoccupation of many scientists and strategists with the technologies of releasing

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nuclear energy has been obsessive. A technological determinism has led them to focus almost exclusively on nuclear brute force. The most characteristic and important technologies of our time concern information, sensing and the extension of discriminating and intelligent control. But the spectacular terrors of Hiroshima and the peculiar mixture of pride and guilt about nuclear energy felt by key figures in the Manhattan Project have encouraged us to think of our time as "The Nuclear Age," the age of the apocalypse, and even to take a certain comfort from the possible totality of the menace.

IX

Let me summarize:

First, there is a substantial probability that if, in the course of a war, the opponents were to explode many thousands of high-yield nuclear weapons over targets in cities, they would directly kill or maim so many civilians and destroy so much of the substructure of civil society that little would be left of civilization on either side.

Second, while there are very large uncertainties that will not soon be resolved, there is also some finite chance that, aside from the enormous direct local destruction, such attacks might have global consequences endangering the species.

Third, this apocalyptic possibility underlines the necessity not only for relying less on nuclear weapons to counter conventional attack, but also for exercising restraint and discrimination in responding to nuclear attack. It does not mean that we have to ignore the long Western tradition that imposes constraints on conflict and calls for discrimination and proportionality. On the contrary, it makes that tradition more relevant than ever. It forms one more knockdown argument against preparing to respond to nuclear attack by destroying innocent bystanders in mass, and against eschewing any capability to respond by attacking military targets effectively with the least harm done to population that we can manage, including the least danger of initiating a nuclear winter.

Fourth, we do not have to subordinate all considerations of freedom in order to avoid the apocalypse. On the contrary, the chances of our avoiding catastrophe are much larger if Western leaders keep their heads and freedom of choice. Raymond Aron and Sidney Hook both pointed out that submission to a totalitarian power would not eliminate the risk of war. Nor, in a world that has known nuclear weapons, would it eliminate

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the possibility that the violence of such a war might climb to the nuclear level.

They were right. Communist Vietnam has attacked communist Kampuchea. Communist China has fought Vietnam. And the only two nuclear-armed countries whose military forces have ever been locked in battle are communist China and the Soviet Union. Even a nominally single totalitarian world is quite capable of dissolving into what would then have to be called civil wars rather than wars between nations. Nuclear weapons can easily be hidden, and also rather easily and quickly produced as a byproduct of nuclear electric power. They can be delivered by civil as well as ordinary military aircraft. In such a world, conventional conflicts could lead to the use of nuclear weapons and also to the mindless expansion of such use.

Fifth, escalation, of course, would not be inevitable even then. The People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union have used military force against each other warily. For the Chinese and Soviet communists, it is obviously "better to be red than dead." But then there is nothing inevitable about the escalation by a democratic government of the use of nuclear weapons to universal ruin, though it sometimes seems that ideologues in the West would like to make it so. They would like, at any rate, to foreclose any Western options for responding to nuclear attack other than the extremes of bringing on the apocalypse or giving up. Those who conjure up a vision of an imminent apocalypse to lend urgency to the potential surrender of Western autonomy would not eliminate that nightmare by subordinating the West to totalitarian power. In short, the alternatives are not whether to be red or dead. It is possible to be both red and dead. Or neither.

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Martin Feldstein

AMERICAN ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE WORLD ECONOMY

During the past few years, the American economy has demonstrated impressive resiliency and America's economic performance has improved substantially. Inflation has dropped from 13 percent to four percent. The rise in unemployment that was an inevitable consequence of the accelerating inflation of the late 1970s has retreated to just a fraction over seven percent. And real GNP has increased more than 12 percent in the two years since the recovery began.

Much of this progress has been mirrored in other industrial countries. Inflation is down throughout Western Europe and real GNP is rising. Unfortunately, though, unemployment rates remain extremely high.

The experience of the past few years has underlined the interdependence of the world economy. Sharp changes in international trade, in capital flows and in exchange rates have affected all major economies. The rise in real interest rates everywhere reflects the close links among capital markets.

I believe that the U.S. budget deficit has been the dominant influence on the world economy during the past two years and that the coming resolution of America's fiscal imbalance will have profound effects during the years ahead. It is America's budget deficit that has been the primary cause of the high real interest rates and therefore of the rising dollar. By increasing American imports and depressing our exports, the over-strong dollar has proven to be a direct stimulus to the economies of Europe, Japan and Latin America.

But, at the same time, the American budget deficit has raised real interest rates in the world capital market and induced

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Martin Feldstein is the George F. Baker Professor of Economics at Harvard University and the President and Chief Executive Officer of the National Bureau of Economic Research. From 1982 to 1984 he served as Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers and President Reagan's chief economic adviser. This article is adapted from remarks to The Trilateral Commission meeting in Tokyo, April 1985.

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European governments to pursue contractionary monetary and fiscal policies aimed at offsetting the inflationary pressure caused by the fall in their own currency values. The poor performance of European investment and employment is due in no small part to the budget deficits in the United States.

I am optimistic about the prospects for legislation that will reduce future budget deficits. That deficit reduction may not prove to be as much as I would like, but in my view it will be very substantial and it will have important effects on not only the American economy but also on the economies of Europe and on our relations with Japan.

II

The most dramatic effect of our budget deficit is the U.S. trade imbalance that has been so much in the news and in the policy debate in Washington. The U.S. merchandise trade deficit has quadrupled in the past three years, rising from $28 billion in 1982 to more than $107 billion last year. This year, it is likely to rise to about $140 billion, or over three-and-a-half percent of the U.S. gross national product.

Our vast trade deficit means that several important American industries have not been sharing in our economic recovery. The businesses that are suffering range from agriculture and timber to basic industries like steel and chemicals and to high-technology firms. Indeed, as the latest GNP figures indicate, the result of the trade deficit has been not only to create an unbalanced or lopsided recovery but perhaps even to reduce the overall strength of the economy.

Despite their very serious adverse consequences, both the trade deficit and the strong dollar have also brought some temporary advantages to the American economy. The 1984 trade deficit was financed by a new inflow of nearly $100 billion in capital from abroad. That inflow nearly doubled the funds available for net investment in the United States and kept real interest rates from moving substantially higher. In addition, the rising dollar lowered the prices of imports and competing American products by enough to cut our overall inflation rate by at least one percentage point last year.

There is a real danger, however, that the capital inflow and the rising dollar are giving Americans a false sense of well-being. The dollar must eventually decline by enough to offset most of the nearly 70-percent increase that has occurred since

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1980. When it falls, there will be upward pressure on prices in the United States that could return us to the stagflation conditions of the 1970s. And with a smaller capital inflow from abroad, investment in the United States could be substantially lower and real interest rates significantly higher unless the reduced capital inflow is offset by a fall in government borrowing.

The trade deficit and the capital inflow have now made the United States a debtor nation. In the future, we as a nation will have to give up some of each year's production to service our public and private debts to the rest of the world. To pay for our current profligacy, our children will not be able to keep all that they produce.

But the greatest danger in our current trade deficit is that it may foster the adoption of protectionist policies that would hurt both the United States and the world economy. The 20-percent tax on imports that has recently been proposed in Congress would immediately hurt American consumers and contribute to rising inflation in the United States. Moreover—and this is not well understood—a decreased demand for imports in the United States would reduce Americans' demand for foreign currency and that, in turn, would cause the dollar to rise further. As a result, American firms and farmers would find that they have an even harder time selling their products abroad. While those American firms that compete with imports would be able to raise their prices and profits, their gains would be more than offset by the losses experienced by American consumers and exporters.

Protectionism is never a one-sided affair. If the United States pursues protectionist policies, our trading partners will inevitably retaliate and will feel morally justified in protecting and subsidizing their own industries. American businesses and labor will suffer as we lose export markets and are denied the opportunity to do those things that we in the United States can do best. And the world as a whole will risk a trade war that could result in a collapse of our world trading system and a worldwide economic downturn.

Countries that are hurting each other in such a trade war are not likely to be effective political allies. Protectionist policies are therefore likely to have serious consequences for our foreign relations as well as for our economic well-being.

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III

To remedy our trade deficit, the real value of the dollar must decline by enough to reverse its nearly 70-percent rise in the past five years. Although the U.S. trade deficit also reflects the strength of the American recovery in the past two years and the ability of the debtor nations to become less reliant on foreign loans, we would certainly not want to reverse either of those developments. Although a stronger recovery in Europe and Japan would help to shrink our trade deficit, the potential magnitude of the gain from that source is rather small. So the dollar must be substantially reduced—a decline of at least 35 percent from the current level—if we are to return to at least an approximate balance of our external account.

The sharp increase in the dollar since 1980 has occurred because dollar securities have become much more attractive in comparison to investments in other currencies. The principal reason for this increased attractiveness had been the sharp rise in the real interest rate on medium- and long-term dollar investments relative to the returns available elsewhere. For example, interest rates on corporate bonds are nearly six percentage points higher in the United States than they are in Germany. Although everyone expects that the dollar will eventually decline, investors are willing to hold dollar bonds because the extra yield on American bonds would be enough in just a half-dozen years to offset a one-third fall in the dollar's value relative to the German mark.

Some people have pointed to the rise in the dollar during the last half of 1984 while U.S. interest rates were declining as evidence that the interest rate has not been so important in determining the dollar's value. I think that misinterprets the evidence. It is the expected real interest rates on medium- and long-term securities that matter and not the nominal market yields. And those real expected rates did not come down with the market interest rates. It must be remembered that last summer the American economy had just completed six months of real growth at a rate of 8.5 percent and the common worry then was that the economy would soon be overheating. Moreover, many monetarists were predicting that past money growth would generate double-digit inflation by the end of 1984. In fact, the inflation stayed below four percent and the rate of economic growth dropped to less than three percent. In short, inflation expectations have declined rapidly since last

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summer and may well have generated higher expected real interest rates by January and less uncertainty about inflation than had prevailed six months earlier.

Some commentators have tried to explain the sustained rise in the value of the dollar by pointing to the dynamism and profitability of the American economy. I believe that these factors have had relatively little direct effect on the value of the dollar. The vast bulk of foreign funds coming into the United States have come as bank deposits or as purchases of fixed-income securities and have not been investments in corporate stock or direct investments in American business. Thus the profitability and dynamism of the American economy have attracted foreign funds primarily by contributing to the rise in U.S. real interest rates.

Although the rise in the real interest rate on dollar securities has been the key reason for their increased attractiveness, it has not been the only reason. The attractiveness of dollar securities has also been enhanced in the past several years by the pursuit of a monetary policy that has reduced the risk of inflation in the United States. In addition, the reduction in borrowing by the debtor nations has reduced the supply of dollars in world financial markets and thereby increased the dollar's value. Moreover, the political stability of the United States encourages individuals and institutions around the world to place their investments in dollar securities. Although it is important to reduce the dollar's value, it would obviously be wrong to do so by increasing the risk of inflation in the United States, by inducing the developing countries to go more deeply into debt, or by weakening the political stability of the United States.

So the only appropriate policy for reducing the over-strong value of the dollar is to reduce the level of real interest rates in the United States. The sharp rise in those interest rates since the beginning of the decade has been due primarily to the dramatic increase in the level of current and future structural budget deficits. Although the higher real interest rates also reflect an improved climate for business investment, the only desirable way to reduce our real interest rates is by cutting the projected budget deficits. If Congress enacts legislation that cuts the projected budget deficits significantly, we will see a substantial further decline in real interest rates and in the value of the dollar before the end of the year. By 1986 there would be a clear improvement in our trade balance.

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IV

Our current and absolutely unprecedented trade deficit has been a particularly severe source of friction with Japan. This growing conflict is important not only because Japan is America's largest overseas trading partner but even more so because Japan is now the second largest industrial democracy in the world and the linchpin of democracy in the Far East. It would be a disaster if the current trade conflict were permitted to undermine the friendly political and economic relations between the United States and Japan.

Although Japan does have a $40-billion trade surplus with the United States and a $30-billion trade surplus with the world as a whole, sophisticated observers realize that it is wrong to blame our overall trade deficit on Japan or indeed to focus on any bilateral trade deficit in our multilateral trading world. Moreover, our bilateral trade position has actually declined less with Japan since 1980 than with either the European Economic Community or Latin America.

The fundamental reason for Japan's trade surplus with the rest of the world is Japan's extremely high savings rate. Gross savings in Japan are over 30 percent of GNP, 50 percent higher than the average of the other OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries. Because the combination of Japanese investment and the budget deficit of the Japanese government is not enough to absorb all of those savings at home, the Japanese invest abroad as well. That overseas investment must, of course, be matched by a corresponding trade surplus.

Looked at in a slightly different way, the high Japanese savings rate results in extremely low interest rates on Japanese bonds. Long-term corporate bonds in Japan now yield less than seven percent. It is not surprising that Japanese investors want to invest overseas. The process of selling yen and buying foreign currencies to finance that overseas investment depresses the yen and gives rise to Japan's trade surplus.

The Japanese could reduce their trade surplus if they pursued policies that increased investment in Japan. Improved tax incentives for investment would induce Japanese firms to invest more at home instead of seeking foreign investment opportunities. More important, investment in Japan could be increased if the Japanese government reduced the constraints that cur-

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rently limit American and other non-Japanese firms that would like to invest in Japan.

Although the Japanese recently acceded to U.S. pressures to allow increased borrowing in Japan by non-Japanese firms, this actually tends to depress the yen and strengthen the Japanese competitive position. It is far more important for Japan to encourage more direct investment in Japan by foreign firms.

It is frequently suggested that the Japanese favorable trade balance would be reduced if Japan increased its extremely low level of defense spending. This would be true only to the extent that the higher defense spending increased Japan's budget deficit, and thereby absorbed more of the private savings that are now going abroad. An increase in defense spending that is financed by higher taxes or reductions in non-defense outlays would have no effect on Japan's trade surplus. Indeed, even if Japan increased its defense outlays by purchasing more foreign-made defense equipment, that would only change the composition of Japan's trade surplus and not its total magnitude unless Japan increased its budget deficit in the process.

Because of Japan's current demographic situation, the national habits of thrift, and the institutional inducement to save, I believe that the Japanese will continue for many years to save more than they invest in Japan. The result will continue to be a capital outflow to the rest of the world and therefore a trade surplus. In a world in which capital is scarce, we should learn to regard this as an advantage rather than a problem.

We have heard that many Japanese say that Japan's trade surplus is caused by the high value of the U.S. dollar. I think that this is false. It is important not to confuse the cause of the current U.S. trade deficit with the world as a whole with the cause of Japan's structural trade surplus. Japan had a growing trade surplus before the second oil shock in 1979, even though the dollar was then very depressed. And Japan can be projected to have a trade surplus in the future even if the dollar declines substantially from its current level.

Japan has a structural trade surplus because Japanese institutions want to invest in foreign securities. They do that because domestic investment opportunities in Japan are not attractive enough to absorb all of Japan's very high rate of savings. Past experience suggests that lower real interest rates in the United States will not change radically the Japanese desire to invest in foreign securities. Even when U.S. interest rates decline from their current level, they will not decline to

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the level of Japanese interest rates because of Japan's extremely high savings rate.

The likely decline in America's overall trade deficit in the years ahead will make it easier for the United States as a nation to accept the view that Japan's structural capital outflow and the associated trade surplus are benign. But even with this understanding, it is important to recognize that there is a very serious Japanese trade problem that has deep political implications for Japanese relations with the United States and with Europe. Virtually every American firm that does business or tries to do business in Japan complains that the combination of tariffs and non-tariff barriers prevents the sale of foreign products and services in Japan even when they are clearly better in price and quality than their Japanese competition. American business is frustrated and furious about the way in which the Japanese government protects and nurtures Japanese industry. These same views are echoed by many leading European firms.

The current congressional action calling for a tariff to block Japanese products from the American market is not really a reaction to our trade deficit with Japan as such or to the volume of Japanese sales in America. Congress is reacting more out of anger and frustration than on a basis of economic logic. The Japanese should understand that the true basis of this frustration is the sense that Japan as a government and as a people is being unfair in its pursuit of policies that preclude foreign products from Japanese markets. If the international trading system is to continue to flourish and bring benefits to consumers throughout the world, the Japanese must make an opening of their markets to foreign products a matter of the highest national priority.

V

The current prospect for a reduction in future U.S. budget deficits also has profound implications for the economies of Western Europe. At past summit meetings and elsewhere, European leaders have complained loudly that large U.S. budget deficits cause high real interest rates and a massive capital flow to the United States. Although these same leaders are also prepared to admit that the U.S. trade deficit has increased demand for their exports, they are unanimous in their call for lower U.S. budget deficits.

I believe that these calls for lower U.S. deficits are more

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than the seizing of a convenient scapegoat for the relatively weak economic performance in Europe. In fact, European economic conditions have made the rising dollar and the net capital flow to the United States substantial impediments to an improved economic performance in Europe. Although the rising dollar has increased European exports, it has led to a lopsided recovery that, on the whole, is probably weaker than it would otherwise have been.

Let me explain why. Just as the stronger dollar has brought reduced inflation to the United States during the past several years, the consequent fall in the values of the French franc, the German mark and the British pound put upward pressure on prices in those countries. To prevent that pressure from initiating a new round of domestic inflation, the government in each of those countries was forced to pursue tighter monetary and fiscal policies than it would otherwise have chosen. These tighter monetary and fiscal policies have prevented a stronger recovery in Europe and have contributed to the continually rising rate of unemployment that now plagues all of the major European nations.

Let me be very clear. All of Europe's current abnormally high unemployment certainly cannot be attributed to the U.S. fiscal situation. There is no doubt that European real wages in the 1970s outstripped the natural increase in productivity and forced employers to reduce employment in order to raise productivity to the imposed rising real wage levels. The contrast between the American and European experience in the 1970s is striking. Between 1970 and 1980, real earnings per hour actually declined in the United States, but employment rose more than 25 percent. In Europe, during the same decade, real wages continued to rise at a substantial rate. The rigidity of the European labor markets exacerbated the problems caused by the resulting excess real wage levels. As a result, there was no increase in total employment in the European Community, and the rate of unemployment rose from less than three percent in 1970 to nearly 11 percent last year.

Although it was excessive real wages and basic labor market rigidities that raised the European unemployment rates in the 1970s, the rising U.S. dollar since 1980 has led to even higher European unemployment because it induced European governments to pursue contractionary policies designed to offset the inflationary effects of their falling currencies. Because the rigidities in the European labor markets reduce the sensitivity

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of inflation to increases in unemployment, it takes a substantial rise in unemployment in Europe to offset the inflationary pressure that results from a rising dollar. It is not surprising that European political leaders have been frustrated and annoyed by an American budget policy that they see has contributed to America's strong economic expansion while impeding their own.

The dramatic rise in the net capital flow to the United States has also made it more difficult to reduce European unemployment. The currently excessive real wage rates in Europe can only be corrected if the rate of increase in European real wages is reduced relative to the rise in productivity. Although the high level of European unemployment has recently caused some decline in real wages, this is clearly a slow and painful process. The gap between productivity and wages would be closed more rapidly and with less pain if productivity were rising faster. One way to achieve this would be a higher rate of investment in plant and equipment. European leaders rightly see the net capital flow to the United States as denying Europe some of the capital that could raise productivity and lower unemployment. They are frustrated that the U.S. budget deficits are depressing European productivity and raising European unemployment through a change in net capital flows that at the same time mitigates the adverse effects of America's budget deficits on U.S. investment and productivity.

It is difficult to judge the actual magnitude of these adverse effects. But there is no doubt that current European perceptions create a climate of ill will in which European governments can believe that the pursuit of protectionist policies aimed at increasing employment in Europe is a morally legitimate response to the harm being done by American budget deficits.

A substantial reduction in future U.S. budget deficits will certainly not eliminate all of the sources of economic friction between the United States and Europe, or cause European governments to abandon all of their protectionist policies. But it should create a climate of greater cooperation within which the United States could hope to be more effective in persuading European governments to reduce their import barriers and production subsidies. In addition, the substantial decline in the dollar which will follow the decline in our projected budget deficits will reverse the inflationary effect of deteriorating European exchange rates and therefore encourage European

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governments to pursue more expansionary monetary and fiscal policies.

This point is very important. A protracted decline in the dollar will mean less inflation in Europe and therefore more real growth of output and employment at any rate of expansion of nominal GNP. The European governments and their central banks may simply accept these more favorable consequences of maintaining the existing growth rates of their monetary aggregates. Alternatively, they could take advantage of the reduced inflationary pressure to raise the rate of money growth temporarily, thereby reducing unemployment more and inflation less. Additional fiscal policies aimed at raising the rate of investment would not only help to maintain and expand aggregate demand but would also contribute to achieving the increases in labor productivity that can raise the demand for the labor that is currently unemployed because wage levels exceed their potential productivity.

VI

This brings us back to the starting point: the prospects for reducing the U.S. budget deficit. I continue to talk frequently with my old colleagues in the Reagan Administration and with leading members of Congress in both parties. On the basis of those conversations, I am actually quite optimistic that we will see legislative action this year that will substantially reduce future budget deficits.

More and more members of Congress see the urgency of reducing the projected deficits. Moreover, they have come to recognize that 1985 is the best time to do the politically difficult things that need to be done. Of course, there are no sure things in politics. And the magnitude of the deficit reductions that I expect to be enacted this year is less than I would like to see. But I do believe that there is a better than even chance of really significant deficit reduction legislation during this year.

The thing that makes deficit reduction so hard to achieve, and that also makes the process so hard for foreigners to understand, is the independence of the executive and legislative branches of the American government. The opposition party now controls the House of Representatives and the President cannot control even his own party in either house of Congress. The result is not only a lack of discipline but also a great deal of posturing by all of the participants who are eager to avoid

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the adverse political consequences of the actions that they know should be taken.

The agreement reached in mid-April between the President and the Senate Republicans is therefore very significant. They agreed to a package of spending cuts that would reduce the budget deficit by about $50 billion in the next fiscal year, rising to $150 billion in 1988 and thereby reducing the Administration's projected 1988 deficit to $100 billion, or just two percent of GNP. This would put the economy on a path that could lead to a balanced budget by the early part of the next decade. Although the actual legislation will probably fall short of achieving this ideal pace of deficit reduction, the final result should not be far from this target.

What is likely to come out of the legislative process? The President agreed to cut his requested increases in defense spending to a three-percent real rate of increase from the more than seven-percent rate that he had previously requested. This will reduce the 1988 deficit by nearly $50 billion. It would not be surprising if the House of Representatives imposed even further defense cuts.

The President and the Senate Republican leadership agreed to total cuts in non-defense spending that will increase to $80 billion by 1988, including $11 billion of reduced outlays for old-age retirement benefits to be achieved by an ingenious plan for reducing the automatic inflation adjustment of benefits. All of these spending cuts will not survive the entire legislative process but, in the end, non-defense spending in 1988 is likely to be cut by about $50 billion.

In addition to trimming the budget deficit, this will represent a remarkable achievement in reversing the growth of government spending in the United States. By the end of the decade, non-defense spending, on all programs other than the social insurance benefits for the aged, will be back to the same share of GNP that it was at the beginning of the 1960s—just slightly over six percent. And total non-defense spending, including all of the programs for the aged, will be back to only 12 percent of GNP, a level not seen since the early 1970s. Even when the spending of state and local governments is included, total non-defense spending in the United States will be only about 22 percent of GNP—about half of the level now seen in many European nations.

The reductions in spending and the resulting savings in interest on the national debt would cut the 1988 deficit by

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about $110 billion, a reduction equal to about 40 percent of the deficit that would be likely with no legislative action. Such a deficit reduction would be a major achievement with favorable effects on real interest rates and on the value of the dollar.

It would, however, still leave an unacceptably large 1988 deficit of about $175 billion or 3.5 percent of GNP. In my view, further progress in shrinking the deficit will require increased tax revenue. Although President Reagan has made it exceedingly clear that he does not like the idea of raising taxes, I believe that in the end he will agree to a rise in tax revenue after he believes he has achieved as much spending reduction as Congress is willing to enact. Although the President would veto an increase in personal income tax rates, there are a number of other ways of raising tax revenue that I believe would be acceptable to him: a gasoline tax or other tax on energy; a modification of tax-bracket indexing in parallel to the change in the indexing of social security benefits; and a tax reform that modifies existing tax rules in a way that permits both a reduction in tax rates and an increase in tax revenue.

VII

What would be the effects of the type of deficit-reduction measures that I have been describing?

The long- and medium-term effects would clearly be good: a smaller national debt to be financed; lower interest rates and a more competitive dollar; a more balanced expansion; and greater capital accumulation leading to greater productivity and growth.

The near-term effects are more uncertain. The direct effect of deficit reduction is contractionary: a reduction in demand and therefore in economic activity. Reduced government spending means less demand for the goods and services that the government purchases. And reduced transfer payments or increased taxes mean less demand for consumer goods. So the direct effect of deficit reduction is to shrink demand and economic activity.

Of course, this direct contractionary effect is eventually outweighed by the indirect expansionary effects of the lower deficit. A smaller deficit means lower real interest rates and therefore increased investment. And a smaller deficit means a lower dollar and therefore an increase in net exports.

But experience shows that there are substantial time delays between the fall in the interest rate and the subsequent rise in

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investment, and between the fall in the dollar and the subsequent rise in net exports. It takes about a year to 18 months to reach the full effects of the changes in the interest rate and the dollar.

There is, therefore, a risk of a mismatch of timing. The American economy could stop expanding or turn down in 1986 if the direct contractionary effects of deficit reduction shrink economic activity before the countervailing expansionary effects of the lower interest rate and more competitive dollar are felt. This risk of a mismatch of timing cannot be avoided. It is the price that we must pay for having waited so long to deal with our budget deficits.

But I believe that even if such a mismatch of timing does cause an economic downturn in 1986, that recession would be short-lived and shallow because the fundamental condition of the American economy is basically sound. There has not been an overbuilding of plant and equipment capacity. There has not been excessive inventory investment. And there is not a high rate of inflation that the Fed must crush by a sharp tightening of monetary policy. So a 1986 recession, if it occurs because of a timing mismatch, would be mild and short. And when it is over, the economy would be in a healthy position for future expansion.

The next six months will be a crucial time for American economic policy and therefore for the future of the world economy. If the U.S. Congress and the Reagan Administration can now agree on appropriate budget and tax policies, America's economic future can be very bright indeed. But if these things are not done, America can lose the progress of the past three years and fall into a future of economic stagnation, high inflation and rising unemployment.

America's political leaders now know what should be done; they will try to take the needed steps in the months ahead. Their success will be important not only for the United States but for the rest of the world as well.

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David Lange

NEW ZEALAND'S SECURITY POLICY

New Zealand's decision to exclude nuclear weapons from its territory, and the American response to that decision, have raised serious questions about the character and management of the ANZUS (Australia-New Zealand-United States) alliance and the security of the South Pacific.

New Zealand's zone of direct strategic interest covers a vast area stretching from the Equator to Antarctica. It is nearly all sea. The inhabited part of this region consists mainly of small democratic island states, which control huge, potentially resource-rich, maritime economic zones. The vast distances separating countries in the region have in the past inhibited closer regional cooperation.

New Zealand's physical isolation, however, has not produced an isolationist outlook. As a small, predominantly agricultural economy, vitally dependent upon foreign trade and susceptible to the ebb and flow in the economic fortunes of our trading partners, New Zealand has a major interest in ensuring a stable and prosperous trading environment worldwide. New Zealand has been firmly committed to the concept of collective security, advocating and enthusiastically supporting efforts to institute through the United Nations workable and effective mechanisms for collective security on a global scale. As those initial hopes and expectations for effective collective security proved illusory, New Zealand also sought to protect its security by engaging the interest of powerful allies.

Fear of Japanese resurgence after World War II led New Zealand to seek a formal security arrangement with Australia and the United States in 1951. Circumstances obviously have altered since then. Yet New Zealand's relationship with the United States remains a critical preoccupation. The new factor in that relationship is the view of the New Zealand government that the security of New Zealand requires the exclusion from its territory of all nuclear weapons.

David Lange is Prime Minister of New Zealand.

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II

Over recent years, there has been growing concern in New Zealand about the intrusion of elements of the global nuclear confrontation into the South Pacific. The Labour government which came to power last July was in tune with its predecessors in wishing to encourage early and substantive progress in the nuclear arms control process. We have welcomed the recent resumption of arms control talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. New Zealand has also, under successive governments, attached particular significance to securing a comprehensive test ban treaty, which, in our view, offers the most realistic prospect for preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Along with Australia, New Zealand has for some years now cosponsored annually a resolution at the U.N. General Assembly calling for such a treaty. Last year this resolution won the most support of any of the test ban resolutions approved by the General Assembly. Furthermore, to help overcome the verification obstacles which would be involved in enforcing a comprehensive test ban agreement, New Zealand has contributed actively to the work of the U.N. Ad Hoc Seismic Group, which is investigating the technical aspects of establishing an international seismological network. Finally, as an earnest of our commitment to disarmament, and to enable us to monitor more closely developments in this field, New Zealand last year gained observer status at the Geneva-based U.N. Conference on Disarmament.

New Zealanders have felt an increasing sense of frustration and concern that progress in bringing the nuclear arms race under control has been minimal overall and in recent years nonexistent. This concern has been heightened by the growing realization that, despite its physical isolation, New Zealand would not escape the consequences of a nuclear conflict. Anti-nuclear sentiment has also been fanned by French intransigence in persisting with its nuclear testing program in the South Pacific, in defiance of the expressed views of countries in the region.

Against this background, the government has acted to implement the only practical measure of nuclear arms control available to it: the absolute exclusion of nuclear weapons from New Zealand. While New Zealand has never permitted the

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storing of nuclear weapons on its territory, the approach taken by previous governments, involving the unquestioning acceptance of the neither-confirm-nor-deny policy of the nuclear weapons states, meant that nuclear weapons were inevitably brought into New Zealand aboard visiting warships. To ensure that our exclusion of nuclear weapons is complete, the government decided, upon entering office in July 1984, that access to New Zealand's ports would be granted only to those vessels which we could satisfy ourselves were neither nuclear-powered nor nuclear-armed. Given the neither-confirm-nor-deny stance of the nuclear powers, this means that the government has to make its decision on port access based on our own assessment of the weaponry carried by the vessel under consideration.

Early in 1985, the United States made a request for a port visit by a conventionally powered warship, the USS *Buchanan*. Because the government was unable to satisfy itself that the *Buchanan* was not carrying nuclear weapons, the American request was declined. In turning down this particular request, however, the government emphasized that it continued to welcome port visits by allied, including American, vessels that were conventionally powered and armed.

That policy reflects the fact that there is simply no need for nuclear weapons to be brought into New Zealand. The strategic environment does not call for nuclear weaponry. American strategists themselves have said that New Zealand does not form part of a nuclear strategy. Successive New Zealand governments have affirmed that ANZUS is not a nuclear alliance.

The minister of defense in the previous government wrote in his annual report in 1983 that "New Zealand is not a nuclear power and does not become one by association with nations that are. ANZUS is not a nuclear alliance. To suggest otherwise is nonsense." Under that government, New Zealand naval vessels exercised with U.S. naval vessels in the techniques of conventional, not nuclear, warfare. New Zealand does not ask, nor do we expect, to be defended by nuclear weapons. By keeping such weapons out of New Zealand, we aim to ensure both that a nuclear dimension is not inappropriately injected into our area and that we do not, even inadvertently, become embroiled in a nuclear strategy. The policy applies to all countries, without exception.

New Zealand has lent strong support in the South Pacific

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Forum[1] to moves toward establishing a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. The proposal has its roots partly in the Forum countries' anger and frustration at continued French nuclear testing in French Polynesia. It also reflects the region's fears about the possible dumping of nuclear waste in the South Pacific by countries outside the region. The nuclear-free zone proposal is essentially designed to enhance regional security. When in place, such a zone should greatly assist efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. It will demonstrate clearly that South Pacific countries do not want their region to become an arena for rivalry involving nuclear weapons.

The concept of a nuclear-free zone dates back some years. The Labour government, which held office in New Zealand from 1972 to 1975, promoted the initiative vigorously, but in subsequent years the proposal lost impetus. In August 1984, however, the Forum agreed on the desirability of establishing a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone at the earliest opportunity. An official working group established last year by the Forum has made good progress in developing the framework and elements of such a zone. As a result, it is expected that a draft treaty will be ready for preliminary consideration by the Forum at its meeting this August in the Cook Islands.

The draft treaty will be designed to prevent the manufacture, possession, stationing, testing and use of nuclear weapons in the South Pacific. High seas freedoms for all nations will, of course, be respected in the draft proposal, while the issue of access to ports or airfields of Forum countries by nuclear-armed vessels or aircraft will be declared to be a matter for sovereign decision by each state. Once agreement is reached within the Forum on the draft treaty, assurances will be sought from all the nuclear weapons states that they will respect its provisions.

Antarctica is the other area of New Zealand's strategic interest. The Antarctic Treaty has, for over 25 years now, successfully looked after New Zealand's security interests in that area by defusing national rivalries and ensuring the non-nuclear status of the continent. New Zealand, like the United States, is a defender of the Antarctic Treaty, which we regard as a stabilizing factor in our part of the world. Any unraveling of

[1] The South Pacific Forum is a consultative grouping comprising Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Western Samoa. The Federated States of Micronesia has observer status.

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the Antarctic Treaty system could only have an adverse impact on New Zealand's security.

III

Critics of New Zealand's exclusion of nuclear weapons have made grave accusations about the results of our policy. It is suggested that we are unwilling to pull our weight and contribute to the collective Western security effort, that our policies are in breach of ANZUS, or that we have deserted or weakened the Western alliance. Clearly, the government of New Zealand, a democratic government aligned with other democracies, would not have followed its chosen course had it intended any such result, nor would it maintain it should such a result eventuate.

ANZUS is as much the reflection and assertion of common interests as the framework of a formal military alliance. ANZUS is not the southern hemisphere replica of NATO. A South Pacific NATO was not, and is not, needed. The contrast is absolute between Europe, a landmass divided ideologically and physically into antagonistic blocs, and the South Pacific. The two treaties reflect these strategic circumstances: in terms of both their core provisions and the form of defense cooperation evolved, they differ fundamentally.

The ANZUS partners pledge to maintain and develop their individual and collective defense capacity; to consult when the security of any of the parties is threatened in the Pacific area; and to act, in accordance with constitutional processes, to meet the common danger presented by an armed attack on any of the parties in the Pacific area. Unlike NATO, the ANZUS partners have not moved toward formal military integration under a standing unified command structure. There are no ANZUS standing forces designated as such. Nor have defined military strategies or contingency plans been developed. ANZUS has, however, served as both catalyst and umbrella for a whole range of defense cooperation activities. It is that sort of cooperation which the United States has cut back drastically in protest at New Zealand's policy on nuclear ship visits.

New Zealand's commitment to democratic interests remains unshakable. We have made this plain, not only to our friends and allies, but also to the Soviet Union. Mischievous attempts by the Soviet Union to exploit the situation have been knocked back hard by us. I recently summoned the Soviet ambassador in New Zealand and told him in the strongest possible terms

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that the government took great offense at misleading attempts by agencies inside the Soviet bloc to depict New Zealand's action as in any way supportive of nondemocratic interests. What was said at that meeting was widely publicized. There is no doubt in Moscow where New Zealand stands.

Those who question our willingness to pull our weight in the defense of democratic values and interests do us a grave disservice. New Zealand has an honorable history of military involvement in conflicts which did not pose any direct threat to it. New Zealand declared war on Germany in 1939, and throughout the war maintained at least a division in support of the Allied effort in the Middle East and Europe (an enormous contribution in terms of the New Zealand population and the fact that another division later had to be raised for the war in the Pacific). New Zealand forces served in Korea, Malaya and Vietnam.

New Zealand has long made a major and practical contribution to underpinning the peaceful, stable development and democratic orientation of the South Pacific. Our role here has been fundamental in maintaining the almost complete strategic denial of the region to Soviet penetration. In the wider regional setting, New Zealand has played a useful role in helping maintain peace and stability in Southeast Asia. Our involvement in the Five Power Defence Arrangements (which provide a framework for consultation and cooperation on defense matters between Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia and the United Kingdom), the permanent presence of an infantry battalion in Singapore, and our military assistance programs—largely training—with countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations highlight the positive contribution we make to the security of the region, thereby helping sustain broader Western interests. Further afield, New Zealand participates in the Sinai Multinational Peacekeeping Force—because the United States asked us to do so.

ANZUS is not a one-way street. It serves U.S. interests as much as New Zealand's. Indeed, taking a look back over ANZUS' 33-year history, one could argue persuasively that the burden of alliance membership for the United States has been rather light, and that ANZUS has represented a good return on America's investment. Bear in mind that ANZUS has never yet been invoked, and unlike, say, Western Europe, neither New Zealand nor Australia has sought or received American aid, economic or military.

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For the United States, ANZUS has provided a stable, reliable alliance with two friendly democracies in a region of growing strategic importance to America. It is worth emphasizing too that the low-key, practical role played by Australia and New Zealand, supportive of democratic interests in the Asia-Pacific region, is one that is often not available to the United States as a superpower. Because New Zealand is smaller and non-threatening, we have much greater freedom to work alongside formally nonaligned countries in sensitive areas like military training. I spell these points out because it is common interests like these which help underpin the relationship between New Zealand and the United States.

IV

Our port access policy has given rise to a serious dispute with the United States. From New Zealand's perspective, there is nothing in ANZUS that requires us to allow nuclear weapons into New Zealand. As I noted earlier, New Zealand does not form part of a nuclear strategy, and, in our view, nuclear weaponry is inappropriate to the security requirements of the South Pacific region.

The United States took a different approach. U.S. officials chose to see New Zealand's action as an affront, although the New Zealand government had taken pains to stress that there was no element of anti-Americanism in the policy. More than that, the United States saw New Zealand's action as a major default by a treaty partner, and responded in accord with that perception by severely curtailing its cooperation with New Zealand.

The fact that two treaty partners could take such different views of the character of the alliance raises serious questions as to how the alliance will be managed, and the security of the South Pacific maintained, in the future.

The dispute about access for nuclear weapons highlights differing perceptions between New Zealand and the United States about ANZUS and the Western alliance. U.S. foreign policy reflects, understandably, a global perspective. A major drawback of this perspective is that it encourages a rather unitary and indivisible approach to foreign policy matters. Relations with smaller powers, friends or foes, tend to be seen chiefly in the context, or as a function, of the central East-West relationship. Interpretations of particular issues or events tend similarly to be shaped by this overriding consideration. Specific

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factors or nuances differentiating a particular country or issue may, often unwittingly, be underplayed or overlooked in U.S. policy. Those critics who claim that New Zealand policies have undermined and weakened the Western alliance also tend to argue from this unitary premise. This, it seems to me, has a bearing on the ANZUS/ship visits issue in two rather important and fundamental ways.

First and foremost, the approach often fails to differentiate between different parts of the world. This is a vital point: the strategic circumstances of the South Pacific are entirely different from those of Western Europe or northeast Asia. The South Pacific is *not* an area of superpower rivalry or confrontation. The kinds of security threats faced by South Pacific countries are of a different order than those existing in Western Europe: these small island states tend, entirely realistically, to view their security as much in economic as in military terms. So, while we share the commitment of our friends and allies to uphold democratic values and interests, we maintain that the means used to defend those interests can and should vary from region to region, depending on the circumstances. It is this principle which underpins our anti-nuclear policies: the strategic environment in the South Pacific is such that nuclear weaponry is essentially irrelevant to the defense requirements of the region. The security threats most likely to arise in the South Pacific are those that could normally and best be handled in a low-key manner.

New Zealand recognizes that other democratic governments will want to act differently to safeguard their security—including accepting the nuclear deterrent—reflecting their own interest and circumstances. That is entirely comprehensible to us; we seek comprehension of our different circumstances in turn.

Second, a global, unitary approach tends to presuppose, erroneously, that the Western alliance is monolithic. It overlooks the fact that democracy derives its very strength and vitality from unity through diversity. Pluralism, the right to differ, is surely one of those fundamental values we seek to defend. Total uniformity of views is a characteristic of the Soviet bloc, not the West. As the 1983 ANZUS communiqué noted, "varying views and perspectives" are natural between free democratic nations. The New Zealand government has exercised its right, and indeed its obligation, to formulate independently security policies which accord with its perceived

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national interests and circumstances. That in no way diminishes our commitment to ANZUS and to the broader democratic community.

V

Disagreements between allies such as New Zealand and the United States are not unusual. They are to be expected. What has in this case surprised and saddened New Zealanders is the U.S. response. This was not how we expected the leading power of the West to treat a loyal friend and ally. Furthermore, with respect, it seems to us that the American approach runs counter to the United States' own long-term interests.

First, we recognize that, fearful of the allegedly contagious effect our anti-nuclear stance on port access might have, the United States took retaliatory action which was as much a warning directed at others in the Western alliance as a rebuke to us. That is hardly in keeping with the pluralistic character of the Western alliance.

Second, the American response strikes us as potentially counterproductive in its apparent disregard for the United States' own interests in the South Pacific. The important role New Zealand has played, and intends to go on playing, in helping to ensure the stability and prosperity of the South Pacific underpins ANZUS and serves American interests directly. It hardly makes sense, then, for America to make it harder—and its response *has* been damaging for New Zealand—for us to go on playing this role. Who is shooting whom in the foot?

The heat and passions aroused by the dispute about access for nuclear weapons now seem to have subsided to a degree, although essential questions remain to be answered. We have time for pause and reflection. Early progress seems unlikely. We need eventually to find a way forward and to explore means of reaching agreement about the basis of the relationship.

As a starting point, we must proceed from the premise that ANZUS exists because of the fundamental community of interests we share, not the other way around. These wide-ranging common interests imply a continuing close relationship across the board. From New Zealand's perspective, over and beyond the security bond, we have long-standing intimate political links and interests worth protecting. The United States is our third largest trading partner, in terms of both imports and exports; it is also a leading source of technology, investment and tour-

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ism. Interwoven through this fabric of bilateral relations are the innumerable strands formed by extensive personal contacts.

My point is that we have too much in common and too much at stake for this present disagreement between us to linger unresolved. It is a matter for good alliance management. New Zealand understands that the leading role in the Western alliance is a form of burden for the United States; the rich diversity of nations and viewpoints make this an exacting and difficult task. It demands an awareness of fundamental values and interests, consistency of purpose, flexibility of approach, breadth of vision and considerable patience. And while it naturally demands a global perspective, it also requires an understanding of the regional perspectives smaller allies, by definition, will have.

VI

The New Zealand government has a positive, forward-looking security policy. It is focused on the South Pacific, because that is where New Zealand's dominant security interests and commitments lie, and where we have been most effective. This security policy, of which our anti-nuclear stance is an integral feature, reflects the political and geographical realities of our part of the world. While there is no immediate threat to the security of the region, we need to take constant care to ensure that one does not arise.

Over the years, New Zealand has made an important contribution to maintaining the peace and stability of the South Pacific. As our resources permit, we shall do more. The American decision to reduce defense cooperation with us has imparted urgency to our resolve, not least by encouraging us to go back to basics in policy terms: to reexamine New Zealand's interests and assess how best to pursue them.

We are determined that New Zealand will accept its responsibilities for the security of the South Pacific. This will require us not only to work even more closely with friends and allies in the region, especially Australia, but also to play a much more genuinely self-reliant role ourselves. Our increased efforts will naturally be closely attuned to the security needs of the region, involving defense assistance (maritime surveillance, training, exercises), political cooperation, and economic and social assistance. It is worth pointing out again that, in playing this role, we are acting not only in New Zealand's but also in the United States' and broader democratic interests. And, by demonstra-

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ting a willingness to take a greater responsibility for our own defense and that of our region, we are acting in the spirit of President Nixon's Guam Doctrine advocating greater self-reliance.

On the basis of this more active and self-reliant regional role, we will seek to consolidate, reorder where necessary and expand our important and substantial bilateral relationships with the United States and Australia. Over time, it seems to me likely that the underlying ties and interests which bind together the ANZUS partners will reassert themselves, leading to a resumption in due course of trilateral defense cooperation. If and when this occurs, however, such cooperation may well take a different form. Certainly, in any future trilateral defense cooperation, New Zealand will be a more independent, self-reliant and valuable partner.

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Earl C. Ravenal

EUROPE WITHOUT AMERICA: THE EROSION OF NATO

The end of Hitler's New Order in Europe in May 1945 ushered in a new order in America's relationship to Europe. The arrangements that were designed, debated and put in place during the following four years endure to this day. They are part of the world into which the present generation of foreign policy practitioners and commentators were professionally and intellectually born; and they shape the perceptions and limit the imagination of the general public. NATO, in particular, is a fixture in the international political and strategic firmament. The present Atlantic relationship is not without flaws, but since its framework has the aspect of a given, critiques fix on surface phenomena and proximate factors—apparent weaknesses or apparent strengths. Improvements are considered within the given framework, not as alternatives to it. Even the flaws are felt as mere irritants, inspiring only enraged political opposition or petulant geopolitical daydreams.

In the past few years, the tides of discontent have been lapping at the base of the Atlantic alliance. And there has formed a sort of unholy and unintended coalition of the European left (for example, the German Green Party and the radical wing of the Social Democratic Party, or the left wing of the British Labour Party) and the American right. The outbursts of one nourish the resentments of the other. Indeed, if NATO ever is washed away, the cause may be seen to be the feuding of these transatlantic factions.

But, after almost four decades, it is time to gain more perspective on the architecture of NATO and to do some wholesale reckoning of NATO's situation. For there is another, structural, reason for NATO's present debility, which is at the root of the attitudes of the factions of left and right on both sides

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Earl C. Ravenal, a former official in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, is a professor of international relations at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service and a Senior Fellow of the Cato Institute in Washington, D.C. He has written extensively on foreign policy and national security; his most recent book is *Defining Defense: The 1985 Military Budget*.

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of the Atlantic: the danger and yet the incredibility of the American military guarantee of Europe, including our "nuclear umbrella." The cracks in America's guarantee in turn proceed from a tension inherent in the American assumption of this strategic commitment to Europe 36 years ago.

The commitment to Europe presents the United States with a choice between high, and perhaps unsupportable, costs associated with the confident conventional defense of Europe, and unassumable risks attributable to reliance on the earlier use of nuclear weapons. The direction in which this tension is resolved, by any particular American administration, is not rigidly determined; to some extent, cost can be transmuted into additional risk, and risk can be transformed into mere cost. (That is what is meant by "lowering" or "raising" the nuclear threshold.) But as long as the United States is committed to Europe, the choice itself is inescapable.

The Europeans have a somewhat parallel choice: costly generation of sufficient conventional forces, or acquisition or expansion of their own national nuclear arsenals, with more resolute and risky doctrines of employment. But there is an obvious difference: the European allies are situated along the forward line of defense. The United States can "decide" whether it wants to pitch its own security perimeter along that common line.

It may be unpleasant to inquire about the problems of NATO from an American viewpoint, and it may seem crass to weigh those problems primarily on the grounds of cost to Americans. Yet considerations of cost (underlying the political pique voiced by conservative Americans, and traded off against the risk involved in holding our nuclear umbrella over our European allies) will decide the future of NATO. And that future will be disposed within the American political, economic and social process.

Moreover, there may be little that is peculiar to NATO that argues for a change in the present dispositions. The attempt (and most are of this kind) to treat NATO as an issue in itself will probably end in exhausted and frustrated affirmation of the present stance. It is America's need to reexamine its comprehensive national strategy that may indicate a shift in its relation to Europe.

II

The alliance of Atlantic nations has been beset by many problems. There have been the periodic recrudescence of

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commercial and agricultural disputes; the irreconcilable antagonism of pairs of nations, such as Greece and Turkey; the threat of Eurocommunism; the acrimony over "burden-sharing"; the complaints about the "one-way street" of American military production for the alliance; the assaults of neutralists and anti-American political groups; the failures of "consultation"; and the recriminations about American "hegemony." But, whatever else is wrong with the Atlantic alliance, its essential problems are strategic.

NATO's history, from its beginning in 1949 to the present, could be written in terms of a series of strategic crises: the failure of the EDC, the Suez and Hungarian crises, the Cuban missile confrontation, the Skybolt fiasco, the failure of the MLF, de Gaulle's withdrawal, the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Kissinger's futile "Year of Europe," the October 1973 Mideast war and the response to OPEC, the divergent reactions to Afghanistan and Central America.

The recent crisis of intermediate nuclear forces (INF) deserves special comment. Although the emplacement of American missiles was a response to German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's 1977 plea for some regional balance to the Soviet SS-20s, the compromise "two-track" decision opened an abyss between the European and American allies: the United States bent on a considerable deployment of INF, the Europeans intent on negotiations with the Soviet Union. True, the cohesion of NATO has weathered five years of Soviet bluster and the excitement of West European peace groups. But the crisis illustrates a point of deeper significance. One might ask why European governments—with some reluctance in Holland and Belgium—would have wanted these longer-range nuclear weapons in the first place. The additional protection they afford is illusory; they are not even subject to European control. The new missiles are not an increment to NATO's strength; rather, they represent another European attempt to secure America's commitment to the defense of Europe. They are a symbol of Europe's abiding distrust of America's extended deterrence.

III

What does all this history prove? First, NATO's crises are not random. There is a common thread; they are all tests of confidence among the allies. Second, the crises are not accidental or superficial. They would not be crises if they did not have deep causal roots; in fact, they derive from the divergent

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conceptions of alliance, the divergent security needs, and the divergent geopolitical situations of the United States and Europe. Third, the crises are not novel. They stem from problems that have been implicit in the alliance from its inception.

Thirty-six years after the founding of NATO, the defense of Western Europe still rests on the proposition that an American president will invite the destruction of our cities and the incineration of 100 million of our citizens to repel a Soviet incursion or resist a Soviet ultimatum in Western Europe. On its face, America's war plan—never denied by any president from Truman to Reagan, or by any secretary of state from George Marshall to George Shultz—is the first use of nuclear weapons, if necessary, to defend Europe. But, under the surface, America's nuclear commitment to Europe is not so sure. The word that encapsulates this problem is "coupling"—a term of art used by strategic analysts to connote the integrity of the chain of escalation, from conventional war in Europe to theater nuclear weapons to the use of America's ultimate strategic weapon.

In a larger sense, coupling connotes the identity of the fates of the peoples, societies and political systems on both sides of the Atlantic. The root of the problem is that America, the alliance guarantor, hoping to escape the destruction of nuclear war, will seek to put time between the outbreak of war in Europe and the decision to escalate to nuclear weapons, and will take whatever advantage it can of its distance from Europe. (Not that an adversary is likely to test American will with an attack on Europe. Odds of, say, 65 percent of an American nuclear response will restrain a potential aggressor. Even a whiff of American nuclear retaliation is probably enough to keep the Soviet Union from invading Western Europe. But those odds will not convince allies. There is a nagging asymmetry about nuclear protection: it takes more credibility to keep an ally than to deter an adversary.)

Virtually every American strategic move—the multilateral force, flexible response, the Schlesinger Doctrine, the neutron bomb, INF—has evoked the specter of decoupling in one or another of its forms: either the avoidance of a nuclear response altogether or the attempt to confine even a nuclear conflict to the European theater. Recently, the Strategic Defense Initiative, a design to protect American society from Soviet missiles, has stirred European concern that the United States could afford a "Fortress America" mentality and ignore forward

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defense in Europe. And America's current attempt to endow NATO forces with "emerging technology" has had the significance, for some Europeans, of further detaching the United States from its commitment to escalate to nuclear weapons, specifically by promising conventional coverage of some targets that now require nuclear systems.

At issue here is not whether these American strategic moves are well planned or well meant—they might even have the declared or ostensible purpose of affirming coupling—but whether they have the possible effect of attenuating the American connection with Europe; whether they provide reasons, or pretexts, for the United States to make its escalation to strategic nuclear weapons less than prompt and automatic; whether they give the United States additional "firebreaks." Coupling is the essence of alliance protection in a nuclear age, and firebreaks are an imperative of American security. But coupling and firebreaks are inversely related.

IV

America's commitment to NATO can scarcely be evaluated without examining the logic of extended deterrence. Extended deterrence (as opposed to central, or primary, deterrence) is the attempt to discourage attacks or pressures against nations and peoples other than ourselves by threatening the use of our nuclear weapons. Some would say that NATO, more than other alliances, not only depends on, but virtually consists of, the extended deterrence provided by its principal guarantor, the United States. That is perhaps an exaggeration, but it suggests a fault-line in NATO: the requisites of extended deterrence and the difficulties in achieving those requisites result, to the extent that we succeed, in danger and expense to the United States, and yet, to the extent that we fail, in the implausibility of our protection of Europe.

What are the requisites of extended deterrence? It can be argued that to validate extended deterrence—that is, to be seen as standing ready to implement it as convincingly as we do central deterrence—requires the practical invulnerability of our own society to Soviet attack. (I say "practical," since absolute invulnerability is beyond anyone's reach; what is required is to limit damage to "tolerable" levels of casualties and destruction.) This is so an American president can persuade others that he would risk an attack on our homeland in the act

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of spreading America's protective mantle over Western Europe and other parts of the world. If we were to seek societal invulnerability, we would have to work through both our defensive and our offensive strategic systems. First, we would have to achieve a strategic defense. Second, we would have to be able to hold in reserve, after any of the earlier stages of protracted nuclear exchange, enough destructive power to threaten strikes against Soviet cities. Finally, we would have to acquire the capability to limit damage to the United States by killing hard targets, such as Soviet missiles in their silos, and perhaps Soviet command bunkers, and control and communication facilities.

This latter requirement for a counterforce capability has two liabilities: it is open-ended, and it is unstable. A damage-limiting attack against hard targets is a demanding requirement, in numbers and characteristics of weapons. And, to have its intended effect, it must be preemptive. Indeed, counterforce and first nuclear strike are mutually dependent. A first strike implies counterforce targeting, since, at the strategic level, the only initial attack that makes sense is the destruction of as much of the enemy's nuclear force as possible. In return, counterforce targeting implies a first strike, because a second strike against the enemy's missiles is useless to the extent that one's missiles would hit empty holes.

This is not to argue for any of these implementing measures. Quite the contrary, it is to show how our weapons and our strategic doctrines, far from being mindless, are closely dictated by our alliance responsibilities. Conversely, our willingness to protect allies rises and falls generally with our ability to protect our own society from nuclear attack and, more specifically, with the prospective viability of counterforce. To the extent that there is any explicit doubt—technical, economic, political—that we will achieve that invulnerability or that we should pursue counterforce (and I believe there should be such doubt), there is an implicit doubt that our extensive nuclear commitments, especially to Western Europe, can survive.

As long as the United States is committed to the defense of Europe, the risks that stem from our extended deterrence will inspire attempts to avoid the contingent nuclear destruction of our homeland. Such an attempt is the case against the first use of nuclear weapons, of which the most notable statement in recent times is the 1982 article by McGeorge Bundy, George

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F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara and Gerard Smith.[1] The article is classic not only in its exposition but also in the problems it incurs in its premises and argument.

Its principal problem is that it insists on maintaining the integrity of the American commitment to the defense of our West European allies; and yet it seeks to obviate the risk, to the United States, of destruction in a nuclear war. One must try to reconcile these awkward objectives. Thus, crucial to the Bundy-Kennan-McNamara-Smith proposal is that its apparent renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons is conditioned on the acquisition of an adequate conventional defense.

But those who opt for conventional defense cannot mean just any effort; they must mean high-confidence defense. And they cannot just exhort or prescribe; they have the further burden of predicting that this will be achieved. To determine the feasibility—and hence the predictive probability—of conventional defense, we must have a bill of costs. In terms of forces, I judge (from an analysis of Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger's 1986 "Posture Statement," presented to Congress on February 4, 1985) that, for fiscal year 1986, the Reagan Administration intends the following regional attribution of our total of 21 active ground divisions: NATO/Europe, eleven and two-thirds divisions; east Asia, three and two-thirds divisions; other regions and the strategic reserve, five and two-thirds divisions. By applying these fractions to the total cost of our general purposes forces, $241 billion, we can calculate the rough cost of our regional commitments. By my estimate, Europe accounts for $134 billion (Asia absorbs $42 billion, and the strategic reserve, including an expanded requirement for rapid deployment forces, mostly for Centcom—that is, the Persian Gulf and southwest Asia—takes $65 billion).[2]

Given a reasonable projection of current cost growth, over the next ten years Europe will cost the United States $2.2 trillion. The appropriate question is whether even those resources will be forthcoming, let alone the greater ones required for self-sufficient conventional defense.

[1] McGeorge Bundy, *et al.*, "Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1982, pp. 753–766.

[2] These costs are in terms of originally requested budget authority. One hastens also to point out that most of the costs involve support units and Pentagon overhead. A more ample explanatory section appears in Earl C. Ravenal, *Defining Defense: The 1985 Military Budget*, Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 1984.

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V

NATO and its critics have responded by proposing various solutions to provide sufficient conventional defense, or to adjust the American relationship to the alliance, or otherwise to meet the challenge within acceptable parameters of European and American sacrifice and exposure to risk. Though generally right-minded and full of individual points of merit, in the end they prove insufficient or contradictory, or improbable of execution.

NATO has proceeded with a long list of schemes to patch up its tactical deficiencies and repair its basic defensive stance. Energetic and often imaginative efforts have been made by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, beginning in the Carter Administration. These moves fall mainly into the category of "quick fixes" in NATO's existing posture: increasing armaments and firepower, including precision-guided antitank weapons and heavier American army divisions; improving electronic warfare; bringing about greater military integration of NATO in the areas of logistics, air defense, weapons procurement, communications and headquarters, and intelligence; refining doctrine and stressing maneuver; improving mobility and readiness; fostering greater use of reserves; and correcting the maldeployment of forces along the front.

Many of these moves have been accomplished. Some are sensible, as long as the alliance exists in roughly its present form, with more or less its present mission, in an international environment similar to the present one. But some of the quick fixes are not as quick or cheap as they might seem. And some moves—such as logistics integration and weapons standardization—would reduce our autonomy of decision-making and flexibility of action in the event of hostilities.

There is also a question of sufficiency, even if all these measures were taken. Such a former advocate of a staunch conventional defense as General Maxwell Taylor has doubted NATO's capability, to the point of advocating a return to the nuclear "tripwire." Taylor cites certain factors that are inherent in NATO's situation, notably the lack of maneuver depth and the vulnerability of supply lines resulting from the French withdrawal from NATO in 1966.[3] Others have questioned the ability of the navy to resupply the army in Europe in a sustained

[3] Speech at the U.S. Army War College, June 19, 1972; reprinted in *Parameters* II, 1972.

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conventional war.[4] The attrition of American convoys or individual ships would be fearsome, even if we exacted an equivalent toll on attacking Soviet naval forces, undersea and surface. In any case, few European terminal ports would survive the devastation of the first few days of a war. Alternatively, heavy reliance on pre-positioned equipment would make our entire posture vulnerable to prompt Soviet air strikes.

NATO's second response is addressed to the more advanced offensive capabilities imputed to Soviet forces in central Europe. To this end, NATO has acquired an interest in emerging technology and associated tactical concepts. Emerging technology is literally a *deus ex machina*. It consists of revolutionary developments in long-range surveillance and target acquisition, and in lethal specialized submunitions and accurate terminal guidance. The tactical concepts—sometimes generically labeled "Deep Strike"—are bold attempts to target the second-echelon Soviet armored units, logistical installations, choke points and airfields, usually far behind the forward edge of battle.

Many aspects of the new military technologies and tactical doctrines are constructive. But serious questions have arisen. Some center on the technical feasibility and high cost of the new systems. Still other critiques challenge their relevance to the specific threat, the Soviet "operational maneuver groups." These are mobile, combined-arms units of less than divisional size that range laterally, just behind the front edge of the battle, to exploit opportunities; they would be hard to interdict with the new weapons and tactics, since they operate close to the front and do not require massing.[5] Another objection is that the new munitions, though themselves conventional, use the same delivery vehicles that are assigned to nuclear weapons; this might create a fatal ambiguity in a war. And the duality of delivery vehicles might subvert arms control by complicating verification. Indeed, emerging technology itself could spur a conventional arms race in central Europe.

Other measures are periodically proposed to ease the impact

[4] On this point, see the statements of Admiral Ralph W. Cousins, commander in chief, Atlantic Fleet, and Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., chief of Naval Operations, reported in Federation of American Scientists, *F.A.S. Public Interest Report*, December 1974. See also Captain Robert H. Smith, "Toward a Navy Second to One," *Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute*, November 1972.

[5] See Steven L. Canby, "The Conventional Defense of Europe: The Operational Limits of Emerging Technology," The Wilson Center, Washington, D.C., May 29, 1984. Cited by permission of the author.

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of the American commitment to defend Europe. One category involves adjusting roles and burdens within the alliance. The West European countries are spending on defense, in percentages of their gross national products, only fractions of what the United States is spending; that gap is growing larger as European governments, in periods of economic stringency, slight their contributions to defense. In one reckoning, comparative contributions of certain NATO allies are as follows: the United States, 7.3 percent; Britain, 5.3 percent; France, 3.3 percent; Netherlands, 3.2 percent; and West Germany, 2.7 percent.[6]

The reaction in the U.S. Congress to these discrepancies is reflected in an amendment proposed by Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) in the spring of 1984. Nunn, normally a strong supporter of NATO, was attempting to coerce our European allies into fulfilling their 1977 promise to increase defense spending by three percent a year. (In 1983, non-U.S. alliance members, including Canada, increased defense spending by between 1.2 and 1.7 percent, while the United States had increased its NATO spending by 4.9 to 9 percent annually over the previous four years.)[7] Nunn proposed that U.S. troop levels in Europe be cut by 90,000 (about one-third) by 1990, unless the Europeans either increased real defense spending growth to three percent or met specified logistical and force goals. The amendment was opposed by the Reagan Administration and defeated in the Senate, 55 to 41.

Yet those who support the present dispositions argue that Europe is paying the lion's share of the common costs: ". . . of the ready forces currently available in Europe, about 91 percent of the ground forces and 86 percent of the air forces come from European countries, as do 75 percent of NATO's tanks and more than 90 percent of its armored divisions."[8]

But comparing burdens is not the point, or the problem. The question has always been whether the United States is getting its own money's worth out of its forward strategy, and would still be getting its money's worth even after some putative redistribution of burdens. Inevitably, we are thrown back

[6] These figures are derived from *The Military Balance, 1984–1985*, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1984. Figures are generally from 1983, a few from 1982. For some reason, they appear to overstate the United States slightly and to understate West Germany, and perhaps France, somewhat.

[7] Described in Helen Dewar, "Reagan Fights Nunn Bid to Cut Troops in Europe," *The Washington Post*, June 20, 1984.

[8] Stanley R. Sloan, *Defense Burden Sharing: U.S. Relations with NATO Allies and Japan*, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, July 8, 1983.

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on the economy of alliance. There are several ways of formulating this issue. It may be that the actual costs of our preparations to support the alliance exceed our gains, even if we include as gains the benefits we derive from the contributions of allies. It may also be that, in the calculus of a possible war, the losses we would sustain through not defending forward in Europe would be less than the losses we would incur through such a defense, even if it were successful. The value of both of these outcomes must be cut by their fractional probability, which is far less than certainty, and to the latter we must add the real costs we would have sustained in preparing to defend in that way. If we are assessing bargains, it is these more comprehensive and more complex calculations that are the appropriate ones.

A more far-reaching approach to mitigating America's burdens in NATO has been labeled "devolution." It comprises a deliberate, orderly and militarily adequate effort by the United States to confer defensive capability and responsibility upon Western Europe. More than the other remedies, devolution is premised on European unity; there would have to be a fit political and strategic receptacle for the increased security capabilities and responsibilities. But the integration of the European states has not been impressive. And there is the more challenging question of combined military competence, particularly in nuclear arms. True nuclear allies must share strategies, decision-making and targeting. Even if it could be achieved, an independent European nuclear force would be at best useless to the United States, and at worst a considerable embarrassment.

The question here is not whether the West European nations could defend themselves, in some measure. It is whether the United States would benefit from continuing to be a party to such an alliance. The trouble with devolution is that, for the United States, it combines aspects of commitment and decommitment, arraying them in a series of contradictions: we would have participation without authority, risk without control, involvement without the clear ability to defend and exposure without adequate deterrence.

Another approach is the unilateral withdrawal of part of the American forces in Europe. The salient version was the Mansfield Amendment, or Resolution, offered annually in the Congress for eight years, until 1975. In its various forms, it would have reduced American troops in Europe by as much as two-

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thirds, redeploying them to the United States but not (in all but one year's version) deleting them from the active force structure. Yet withdrawal of units saves nothing unless they are also deactivated.[9] Nor would the Mansfield proposal have touched the forces kept in the United States for European contingencies. Most significantly, our commitment to European defense would have remained in full force. This is not a virtue but a flaw; the Mansfield type of initiative represents withdrawal without decommitment, a precarious stance.

VI

The foregoing ideas for remedying or mitigating America's situation in Europe have some value and are often ingenious. But they do not, severally or in the aggregate, constitute a policy that would close the gap between conventional requirements and available resources, or obviate nuclear strategies that are precarious and still lack credibility.

A thorough and consistent disengagement from Europe would shed the responsibilities as well as the burdens of alliance. I believe the United States should devolve defensive tasks upon the European states, but not insist on the orderly and sufficient substitution of capabilities or harbor illusions of maintaining American political weight in subsequent European decision-making. Withdrawal from Europe would probably take a decade of preparation, diplomacy and logistical rearrangement. We would progressively reduce Europe's strategic dependence on us, and insulate ourselves from the consequences of conflict in Europe.

It is important to reiterate and emphasize that disengagement from the defense of Europe would make sense (or not) only as part of a broad alternative conception of foreign policy and national strategy for the United States. The resolution of our defense predicament and our fiscal dilemma suggests a wholesale remedy. Globally, we would draw back to a line that has two mutually reinforcing characteristics: credibility and feasibility; a line that we *must* hold, as part of the definition of our sovereignty, and that we *can* hold, as a defensive perimeter and a strategic force concept that can be maintained with advantage and within constraints over the long haul.

[9] Morton H. Halperin, "Keeping Our Troops in Europe," *The New York Times Magazine*, October 17, 1982.

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If we were to disengage, we could save on the order of $150 billion a year from the current defense budgets. (Another $80–$100 billion or more, to close the federal budgetary gap that looms each year for the rest of this decade at least, should come from stringent cuts in entitlements and other domestic programs.) We could defend our essential security and our central values with a much smaller force structure than we now have. Such a force structure would provide the following general purpose forces: eight land divisions (six army and two marine), 20 tactical air-wing equivalents (11 air force, four marine and five navy), and six carrier battle groups. With the addition of a diad of nuclear forces—submarines and cruise-missile-armed bombers—this would mean manpower of 1,185,000 men (army 370,000, air force 315,000, navy 365,000, marine corps 135,000). The total defense budget at the end of a decade of adjustment would be about $158 billion in 1986 dollars. In contrast, the Reagan Administration has requested, for 1986, 21 land divisions and 44 tactical air-wing equivalents, with 13 carrier battle groups; this force requires 2,178,000 men and $314 billion.

Unless we change our course, the defense budget will be close to $750 billion by 1995, and cumulative defense spending during that decade will be over $5.1 trillion. Under a noninterventionist policy, the 1995 defense budget would be two-thirds less, and the cumulative cost over ten years would be under $2.7 trillion. The savings from our present European spending would amount to a greater fraction than the savings from the overall defense budget, since Atlantic-oriented forces would constitute only 26 percent of the non-interventionist program, compared to the current European-oriented forces that constitute 42.5 percent of the present defense program. At the end of a decade of adjustment, there would be no American forces in Europe; but in and around the United States, oriented toward the Atlantic, there would be three (army) divisions, seven tactical air-wing equivalents (five air force and two navy), and three carrier battle groups. Cumulatively, over ten years, instead of spending $2.2 trillion on NATO, we would have spent only $900 billion in that direction.

If we are to cut defense spending significantly, we must change our national strategy and our foreign policy. The only way to save significant sums from the defense budget is to remove large, noticeable units from the force structure. And this would make it necessary, somewhere along the line, to

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reduce our defensive commitments in the world. Specifically, both of the cardinal elements of the present American national strategy would have to change. Instead of deterrence and alliance, we would pursue war-avoidance and self-reliance. Self-reliance is a response to (as well as a precipitant of) the dissolution of alliances, nuclear proliferation and the practical demise of extended deterrence. Precisely because America's stance in the world is essentially defensive, rather than aggressive and expansive, we would benefit from a compartmentalization of deadly quarrels between other nations. Compartmentalization must mean the delegation of defensive tasks to regional countries and the acceptance of the results of this, win or lose. We would, over time, accommodate the dissolution of defensive commitments that obligate us to overseas intervention—not just in Europe, but in the western Pacific and the Middle East.

The other phase of this alternative national strategy, war-avoidance, is a response to the diffusion of power, the attainment of nuclear parity by the Soviet Union, and the risk of nuclear destruction to ourselves. It is based on the fact that we can no longer intricately and reliably manipulate or manage conflict. We will always need a strategy that discourages direct nuclear attacks on our homeland or intolerable coercion of our national political choices through nuclear threats. But today our own safety depends on maintaining "crisis stability," where both sides have a strong incentive to avoid striking first with their nuclear weapons. A design for stability must include, among other elements, an unconditional doctrine of no first use of nuclear weapons. And a consistent policy of no first use implies the dissolution of our defensive commitment to NATO.

VII

Because I propose a more restrained national strategy, with smaller forces and defense budgets, that does not mean that I take the "threat" as trivial or nonexistent. On the contrary, the essence of a true noninterventionist position, both historically and logically, is that it takes threats seriously but is prepared to accept some foreign damage, for fundamental reasons that have to do with preserving the integrity of our political, social and economic system from the kinds of distorted effort and misguided control that proceed from far-reaching responses to external challenge.

There are other kinds of answers to the doubts about Amer-

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ican disengagement. The alleged unfavorable consequences that we should examine are the ultimate effects on the core of basic American values: the integrity of our constitutional system, the safety of our lives and domestic property, the health of our economy and the quality of our lives. (This definition does not include the indefinite defense of relatively congenial political systems abroad.) The possibility that we would have to confront a final threat to these basic values is remote. Surely it is not the contingent certainty (1.0 probability) conjured up by those who fear any departure from the status quo.

Still another kind of answer to the doubts that follow upon American disengagement would be the demonstration that Europe by itself does indeed have a strong basis for self-defense and therefore could achieve a good probability of deterrence. A seeming contradiction here is really a simple irony: as long as the United States remains the alliance guarantor, it must contribute substantial conventional forces, as well as provide continuous coupling of our nuclear forces for extended deterrence. These specifically American contributions are necessary to satisfy the requisites of alliance, not absolutely necessary to ward off a Soviet attack or pressures.

In the event of an American withdrawal, the most obvious, though least likely, scenario is a calculated large-scale Soviet invasion of Western Europe. A more plausible challenge is that American withdrawal would lay Western Europe open to Soviet pressures and, because of Europe's sense of impotence and exposure, the outcome would be "Finlandization." True, Finlandization and more intensive establishment of satellites have occurred in cases marked by special circumstances. The real question is: would the model apply to a large, populous, rich, industrially capable, socially whole, politically resolute country with a military force that would have far more than nuisance value—a country, in short, such as West Germany? It is hardly likely. Finlandization requires a willing victim as well as a determined aggressor.

But, if Finlandization is excluded, what would America's European allies do in the event of our disengagement? Their options range from acquiring national nuclear forces, to improving their conventional defenses, forging a new European military community, adopting unconventional defensive strategies (often suggested are forms of territorial defense or mobilization on the Swedish, Yugoslavian, Swiss or Israeli models, or even less orthodox strategies of denial or attrition), or doing

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all, or several, or none of the above. Each nation, according to its external and internal situation, would adopt some combination of moves. It is far from certain that West Germany would independently go nuclear; that would worsen its position not only with the Soviet Union but also with its West European partners.

Were Western Europe to coalesce, it could become the second most powerful entity in the world—in theory more powerful than the Soviet Union. Even now, Western Europe has greater population (372 million), more ample economic potential ($2.6 trillion in gross national product), comparable military manpower (over 3.1 million), a respectably competitive military technology, and the calculable nuclear forces of Britain and France. NATO Europe's aggregate defense spending, however, is markedly inferior ($83 billion).

Indeed, the proposals of military analysts for quick fixes, though designed to improve NATO so that it would be bearable for the United States to remain, ironically hold possibilities for Western Europe without the United States. If NATO's weaknesses are just beginning to be addressed (the alliance has been maldeployed, stretched thin, immobile, wrongly configured, badly integrated) and, further, if the Soviet Union could have achieved its present military advantage from an inferior production and manpower base and from a weaker economic and social system, then it is not fanciful to imagine that the West European countries—together, or even powerful ones such as West Germany individually—could generate a formidable defense.

Finally, when the question of American disengagement is broached, an automatic rejoinder is that shared values—cultural, political, social, economic—form both the basis of our attachment and the ultimate justification for our continued defensive support. Indeed, it is argued (in an exercise of circular reasoning) that our support itself is a value, a moral worth that transcends any calculus of net utility. But no argument about values is whole, or even clear, unless it is stated from the vantage point of some subject. Whether right or wrong, my argument is a view from the United States. Americans are faced with an increasingly demarcated choice: the salvation of Europe, or their own solvency and safety.

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John Steinbruner

ARMS CONTROL: CRISIS OR COMPROMISE

The issues of strategic arms control are complex in their technical details, but they nonetheless revolve around a reasonably simple central problem. The United States is primarily interested in reducing the level of strategic force deployments in order to alleviate a perceived threat to the U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile forces and a politically sensitive imbalance in weapons deployed in Europe. The Soviet Union is primarily interested in restricting the process of technical improvement in order to alleviate what it perceives as an emerging threat to Soviet ICBMs and ultimately to the entire structure of Soviet military forces. With the United States committed to revising the past and the Soviet Union to shaping the future, viable compromise requires arrangements that do both. The issues are too extensive and the underlying hostility too great to allow an immediate, comprehensive solution. Thus, compromise must be achieved through a series of partial measures, each of which balances force reductions and modernization restrictions.

Recent arms control negotiations have not focused on a balanced but limited combination of force reductions and weapons modernization restrictions, and that fact has virtually precluded their success. The proposals the U.S. and Soviet governments have advanced could be supplemented or combined in a variety of ways to embody such a balance, but in the context of related events the practical opportunities are limited. The Strategic Defense Initiative announced by the United States and the Soviet reaction to that announcement have made the issue of weapons in space a necessary element of any immediate compromise. Both in the substance of security and in the politics of adversarial diplomacy, that issue has become the gate to all others.

John Steinbruner is Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution.

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II

To the extent that an objective perspective is possible on matters so dominated by national sentiment, it appears that an agreement restricting the direct use of weapons in space is of overriding mutual interest for both countries. The reasons are quite fundamental. Over the past 20 years, space has been accepted as a sanctuary for gathering and communicating information necessary for the safe and stable management of worldwide military operations. The satellites that support these purposes depend upon mutual tolerance that has been established in practice, though not legally defined. They are susceptible to disruption and are highly vulnerable to deliberate attack. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have long been able to improvise indiscriminate attacks in space that would damage their own satellites as well as the opponent's, but neither has fully developed the weapons and organizations dedicated to precise and systematic destruction of the opponent's assets. Both are now in the early stages of doing so. If not established by formal agreement, the informal tolerance that now protects intelligence and communication activities in space is likely to be degraded very severely, with consequences for the stability of international security far greater than those posed by any of the weapons issues that are more prominently discussed.

With apparently compelling mutual interests at stake, an agreement restricting weapons in space should in principle emerge from the Geneva negotiations. In broad outline the plausible content of such an agreement is reasonably apparent. A distinction would be drawn between military research in space, which would be allowed, and weapons development, which would be prohibited. At the same time, reductions in ICBM deployments would be undertaken, affecting particularly the Soviet SS-18 as the largest and potentially most destructive member of that class.

In actual practice, however, such an outcome does not appear likely. Thus far, the two governments have taken starkly opposing positions. The Soviet Union insists on banning what they refer to as "strike weapons" in space as a necessary condition for any other measure of strategic arms control, and has proposed a 25-percent reduction in total force deployments to accompany such a ban. The Soviets have not as yet suggested reductions focused on the specific weapons that are of primary

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American concern. The United States rejects any additional restrictions on weapons testing in space in order to protect plans for developing what we refer to as defensive technologies, and in general has not offered any meaningful restraint on the process of weapons modernization. The compromise necessary to avert a collision on these questions will require a degree of change in prevailing attitudes that rarely occurs. It is still plausible to hope for a constructive outcome, but it is not realistic to expect it.

III

The primary reasons for this situation extend well beyond the politics of the moment—the personalities of the current leaders, for example, or their putative bargaining maneuvers. The problem emerges from very basic differences in the security positions of the two countries, in their political systems, in their dominant perceptions, and in their respective policies. Some of these many enduring differences have immediate practical importance.

As has been true for much of the past 40 years, the timing of major decisions in the United States and in the Soviet Union is out of phase. In each country the size and technical character of its strategic establishment has been determined historically by a few fundamental decisions that, once made, have required a decade or more for full implementation. The fact that the two countries have made their critical decisions at different times has encouraged a sequential interaction between their respective weapons programs and has compounded the difficulties of achieving arms control. The preferred moment for compromise has been different for each country.

This problem of timing is quite acute at the moment. The United States is currently in a phase of implementing recently established commitments to a series of technical modernization programs and to two significant additions to the structure of its strategic forces (the deployment of submarine-based cruise missiles and of intermediate-range missiles in Europe). The surge of investment associated with this effort is highly unusual, and currently authorized programs will require several more years to be completed. The Soviet Union is emerging from a decade during which the top leadership did not authorize any major new strategic weapons *deployment* programs (as distinct from research and development efforts). As the Soviets completed previously authorized programs during the 1970s (no-

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tably the SS-17, SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs, and the SS-20 intermediate-range missile system), overall Soviet investment in military forces remained essentially constant, and that portion allocated to strategic forces declined.[1] The Soviet leaders appear now to be contemplating a series of new strategic weapons deployment initiatives and associated adjustments in security policy. More than they were during the 1970s and more than the United States at the moment, the Soviet Union is in a reactive phase.

In addition to the disparity in timing of decisions, there are also fundamental differences in the way the two political systems make decisions. The Soviet Union initiates major decisions by establishing general military doctrines and by adopting planning assumptions; the implications are then imposed reasonably systematically on the details of weapons acquisition, operational posture and diplomatic positions. The system operates, as it were, deductively. In contrast, the United States requires widespread political consensus in order to make authoritative decisions and does not readily achieve this regarding doctrinal abstractions. The U.S. system makes very specific decisions and leaves open their broader implications for subsequent interpretation and political discussion. The U.S. decision-making process operates inductively and at any given time displays substantial internal inconsistencies representing unresolved political issues.

This difference in style has affected perspectives on strategic arms control. The Soviet Union understood the arrangements embodied in the SALT (Strategic Arms Limitations Talks) treaties as a fundamental political bargain focused on the principle of conferring "equal security" on both countries. Since equality could not be precisely defined—given the wide differences in established force deployments, geographic position, alliance arrangements and economic potential—the Soviets believed that the aggregate positions of the two countries had been arbitrarily but not unreasonably declared to be equal; advantages enjoyed by one side were assumed to be balanced by those of the other. Specifically, Soviet advantages in ICBMs, theater forces and numbers of weapons carriers were assumed to balance U.S. advantages in total weapons, submarine and

[1] Richard Kaufman, "Causes in the Slowdown in Soviet Defense," *Soviet Economy*, Vol. 1 (January-March 1985), pp. 9–32.

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bomber operations, overall force quality, geographic position and economic capacity. Moreover, with a baseline condition established, the Soviets believed that rules of evolution were to be followed preventing either side from securing any additional advantage that was not offset by the other side.

The U.S. political system is not equipped to make a bargain of that scope and did not do so. Actual decisions in the United States focused narrowly on the specifics of the formal treaties, and the broader implications of the arrangements were subjected to an as yet unresolved internal political debate. A well-organized group of security specialists has objected to the concession of Soviet advantage in any important dimension of military power, most notably in the payload capacity of the respective ICBM forces. Disputes over compliance with technical details of the treaties have been generalized into sweeping charges of Soviet cheating that resonate with general American distrust of the Soviet Union. The idea of a limited compromise that did not include a settlement of major political disputes has been opposed by constituencies in the United States that have strong grievances over human rights in the Soviet Union, political repression in Poland, military intervention in Afghanistan and many other matters. The United States has not formed the domestic consensus necessary even to ratify the SALT II agreement, let alone establish an enduring political bargain.

These different levels of conception and of political commitment have combined with the long-standing animosity between the two countries to produce sharp recriminations. The United States now accuses the Soviet Union of numerous treaty violations, the most prominent of which is a radar installation whose function is acknowledged to be legitimate but whose location is believed to be illegal under the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972. The Soviet Union staunchly defends its own compliance record and accuses the United States of reneging on the basic political understanding, most notably by introducing new missile deployments in Europe which "circumvent" the SALT agreements and by announcing the intent to develop defensive weapons. With both sides now projecting weapons programs that would collapse the entire structure of existing arms control arrangements, each profoundly doubts and fears the basic intentions of the other.

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IV

The current surge in U.S. strategic force investment is being interpreted by Soviet military planners as an offensive threat representing, potentially, a significantly enhanced capacity for a preemptive attack on Soviet forces. This underlying intention is imputed primarily on the basis of U.S. weapons modernization programs and additions to the force structure: the MX, the Trident II missile, the Pershing II in Europe, and cruise missiles with stealth technology. All in combination appear to establish the potential for precise attacks on the Soviet military infrastructure with tactical warning that would be too short to allow protective reaction. Moreover, as the Soviets view them, U.S. arms control proposals appear to have been designed to support such a preemptive strategy: if accepted, U.S. proposals would reduce deployed forces but they would not inhibit weapons modernization and would thus render successful preemption easier to accomplish.

The U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative is also assimilated into this pattern. In Soviet estimation, the technical prospects for a successful defense against an offensive attack designed to penetrate defenses are too remote to be a rational basis for a security policy. In this view, the only serious aspiration is for a defense against an offense already severely diminished by a preemptive attack. So interpreted and fully credited, this overall pattern presents a security threat to the Soviet Union of the gravest proportions.

Even if practical-minded Soviet leaders doubt that the United States can in fact achieve an effective capacity for strategic preemption, there are secondary implications of the U.S. effort that eventually are also very threatening. At its core, the U.S. strategic investment program is based on information gathering and processing technologies that represent the area of greatest U.S. advantage relative to the Soviet Union. These technologies have strong implications across the full range of U.S. military effort—conventional as well as nuclear weapons, offensive as well as defensive missions. Despite U.S. rhetorical emphasis on defense, it is reasonable for the Soviets to expect the most immediate and most dramatic results to involve offensive weapons. Indeed, it has become technically conceivable that precision navigation, rapid collection and dissemination of target information, automated battle management and related

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developments will eventually enable attacks on the Soviet military infrastructure by conventional munitions that are comparable to nuclear weapons in range, destructive effectiveness and even timing.[2] Beyond that, the underlying technologies are also likely to have very significant implications for general economic productivity. In effect, the United States appears to be marshaling its strongest comparative advantage for an extended competition in general military and technical positions. If that process is not restrained and if equal security is not conceded, then eventually the Soviet security position is likely to be severely degraded even if the ultimate destruction of nuclear war can be prevented.

Cast in these terms, the implicit American threat to the Soviet Union is sufficient to motivate a very extensive Soviet response and to force very difficult internal choices. If Soviet leaders cannot achieve acceptable restraints on the process of weapons modernization by normal diplomatic means, they will confront the apparent necessity of military reactions that are demanding enough to impose significant new burdens in the allocation of economic resources. Moreover, they face immediate deadlines for these choices. A new five-year plan (for 1986–1991) is nearing the point of final approval, to be accompanied, in all probability, by an unusually far-reaching policy review under the new political leadership.

V

The United States, of course, generally rejects the validity of Soviet fears and the legitimacy of any reaction to current U.S. programs. In the prevailing U.S. perspective, the MX and Trident II programs are justified responses to the perceived threat to U.S. ICBM installations emanating from the Soviet SS-18 and SS-19 programs that have already been completed. Similarly, the Pershing II and cruise missile deployments are accepted as necessary ripostes to the earlier Soviet SS-20 program. They have been reconciled with legal requirements strictly construed, and the thought that they might contradict a broader political understanding would be summarily dismissed by most Americans.

[2] The chief of the Soviet General Staff, Nikolai V. Ogarkov, bluntly pointed out this emerging threat shortly before he was "reassigned." Interview with Marshal of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov, "The Defense of Socialism: Experience of History and the Present Day," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, May 9, 1984, first ed., pp. 2–3.

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With a limited qualification for the purpose of bolstering the conventional defense of Europe, the United States has consistently declared its only strategic intention to be that of deterring nuclear war by threat of appropriate retaliation. The explicit acquisition of a reliable preemptive attack capability against Soviet forces rather clearly would not receive broad support in the United States. To be sure, there is a possibility that U.S. forces facing the apparent inevitability of war might feel compelled to attempt a preemptive attack as the only conceivable route to victory and at any rate the most effective means of limiting damage.[3] This tendency might be enhanced as a greater capacity for preemption is in fact acquired. These possibilities, however, have not yet been sufficiently absorbed to have immediate influence on security policy. In short, an inclination to compromise in the arms control negotiations is not likely to emerge in the United States from any sympathy for the substance of Soviet arguments.

Moreover, prevailing opinion in the United States discounts even the subjective sincerity of the Soviet position. The central purpose of Soviet diplomacy is presumed to be the political division of NATO, and Soviet objections to American weapons programs are interpreted as tactical measures designed to promote dissent in Western Europe. A display of alliance resolve, it is believed, will eventually force the Soviets to accept what they cannot prevent. This assessment was strongly reinforced when the Soviets allowed negotiations on intermediate-range missiles to be reestablished after many stark warnings that they would not do so unless U.S. Pershing II and cruise missile deployments were first removed. The same logic is now being applied to the Soviet position on space weapons.

Given these attitudes and the state of its strategic weapons programs, the United States at the moment both enjoys the virtues and suffers the defects of a fortified position. There are no internal deadlines to force diplomatic actions. Extensive modernization of the U.S. strategic weapons arsenal has already been authorized by recent defense budgets, and the fact of active negotiations provides political accompaniment adequate to deal with domestic and even allied sentiment for arms control. President Reagan's vision of a transition to a posture

[3] Bruce G. Blair, *Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the Nuclear Threat*, Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1985; and Daniel Ford, "U.S. Command and Control," *The New Yorker*, April 1, 1985; April 8, 1985.

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of protective defense rather than retaliatory offense dominates the discussion of security policy. The vision has inspired a strong technical critique, but as yet no effective political opposition has crystallized. In the process of negotiation the United States is playing a waiting game and has thereby imposed on the Soviet Union both the burden of initiative and the associated opportunity.

VI

Aside from ideological rhetoric, the Soviets have been very cautious and conservative in recent history and they are unlikely to abandon that pattern suddenly, even under more vigorous political leadership. Though the greatest resolve must prudently be assumed, the Soviets are likely to maintain a rational preference for diplomatic solutions and to adjust that preference only in discrete stages. Some of those stages have undoubtedly already passed, but it is a reasonable assumption that an acceptable agreement with the United States remains the primary Soviet objective, as they themselves assert. Romantic Western ideas about hard bargaining notwithstanding, direct military pressure on the Soviet Union works to increase its terms for an acceptable agreement rather than to diminish them. As in any political system with internal integrity, the Soviet Union cannot be expected to collapse under pressure if it has other options; it will quite predictably seek to react in kind.

In making the issue of weapons in space the centerpiece of their diplomatic position, the Soviets are using it as both the symbol and the primary immediate instance of the broader issue of weapons modernization. This is a logical choice. Restrictions on weapons testing in space would in fact inhibit any short-term "demonstration" of missile defense technology beyond the limited purposes allowed under the ABM treaty.[4] Such restrictions offer a practical means of reducing the American defense initiative to its minimum and most legitimate claim—exploratory research on the fundamentals of defensive technology. To accomplish that in the area currently proclaimed by the United States as being of highest priority would establish

[4] In National Security Decision Directive No. 119 establishing the Strategic Defense Initiative, President Reagan mandated the Department of Defense to "demonstrate" defensive weapons technology. *The Washington Post*, January 26, 1984, p.1. Under standard U.S. military practice, demonstration entails activities that go well beyond the stages of research and clearly involve the display of weapons prototypes.

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the heretofore missing element in the U.S. arms control position: the principle of balancing force reductions with restraints on weapons modernization.

The choice of space as the central topic also conveys an implicit warning that antisatellite weapons will be an element of Soviet reaction if arms control efforts fail, and unfortunately that is also a logical choice. The Soviets can ill afford a comprehensive and sustained reaction to the perceived threat of American strategic investment. Before they commit themselves to broad weapons programs of the scope and magnitude required, they will very likely attempt a focused reaction designed to provide enough countervailing leverage to force an American compromise. If adroitly managed, a Soviet antisatellite weapons program could provide leverage that would be quite effective both in military and in political terms.

It is well within Soviet technical capability to develop and deploy advanced antisatellite weapons that will threaten critical assets of the U.S. command system—by far the most vulnerable and most important element of U.S. strategic forces. Though they already possess a rudimentary capability of this sort, the Soviets have not yet developed the dedicated, discriminating antisatellite weapons that they could produce if they chose to do so. Such weapons might effectively preclude the coordination required to organize a U.S. preemptive strike even if the raw firepower required for such a strike could not be denied. Moreover, by challenging the legitimacy of current space activities and creating controlled interference with military support systems, the Soviet Union could also introduce issues that would be enormously divisive both within the American political system and within the NATO alliance. In effect, the Soviet Union can create an immediate conflict between the continuation of military support activities and the developmental testing of new space weapons.

Beyond that, there are two areas of strategic weapons deployments where the Soviets can compete with relative advantage despite underlying technical inferiority. First, the large-scale deployment of submarine-based cruise missiles will be to the Soviet Union's advantage even if its versions are not as effective as ours. The reason is that the United States and its allies are exposed to threats from the oceans, have many critical targets near coast areas, have no significant air defense systems, and have strategic command arrangements that can readily be disrupted by attacks that develop with little warning. Second,

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the Soviets also have advantages in any competitive deployment of land-mobile ICBMs: notably, large empty land areas, authoritarian political control and internal secrecy that allow effective concealment, a ready system (the SS-25) that has already been designed and tested, and established experience with mobile missile operations on land.

Systematic exploitation of these advantages would bring the U.S. forces under significantly greater threat of preemption than they now experience and hence would increase our own incentive to initiate strategic operations under the pressure of crisis circumstances. Though this exploitation would be subtle and not very visible politically, in terms of military realities it would be profoundly destabilizing. Moreover, such a development would be accompanied by a highly visible increase in the forward positioning of Soviet naval assets; over time this would register politically as a major change in security circumstances. Finally, concealed deployment of land-mobile ICBMs combined with extensive submarine cruise missile deployments could readily deny any accurate counting of total Soviet strategic assets. That would also be likely to register politically as a major and unfavorable change in security circumstances.

The short of it is that the Soviet Union, even though competing at a considerable technical disadvantage, can degrade the current U.S. and allied security position very significantly. In the absence of effective mutual restraints, it will probably do so.

VII

Given these circumstances, the diplomatic component of current U.S. security policy does not appear adequate to deal with emerging strategic conditions and is in need of substantial revision. In particular, its objectives have been misspecified. The virtually exclusive focus on achieving reductions in Soviet force levels and the consequent sacrifice of opportunities to impose restraints on future weapons deployments distort the priorities of actual American security interests. Force reductions, though desirable, are not as important as preventing new Soviet weapons programs. Restraint on new weapons is, at any rate, a necessary concomitant to reductions.

The further development of dedicated Soviet antisatellite systems represents the most serious immediate threat to the integrity and operational capability of U.S. military forces, particularly when combined with forward deployments of sub-

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marines and other measures designed to enhance a preemptive threat to the central U.S. command system. Though absolute protection against this threat is not possible, very significant restrictions could be achieved by a prohibition on further testing and deployment of antisatellite systems. In any reasonable assessment, that should be the diplomatic objective of highest immediate priority. Categorical rejection of both the technical feasibility and inherent desirability of this objective has dominated recent American policy;[5] this is an error of judgment serious enough eventually to force a major political correction. Whether this can be accomplished before irreversible consequences have been triggered is perhaps the single most important security question confronting the United States at the moment.

The deployment of submarine-based cruise missiles is an issue somewhat similar in character but different in implication. The U.S. commitment to unilateral deployment of these systems without any serious attempt to achieve negotiated restraints is also a major mistake but one that has already been made. The consequences probably have already become irreversible, though they might conceivably be mitigated by eventual limitations on the scale and positioning of these deployments. The issue is largely whether the United States can learn from this experience to diagnose a significant flaw in its security planning: weapons acquisition and diplomacy are being separately managed, and the integration of them that circumstances require is not being achieved.

Regarding theater weapons, the threat to European and Asian allies posed by the SS-20 is less significant than the potential represented by the new SS-25. The characteristics of this system have not yet been fully displayed, and an assessment of it requires a degree of imagination. The problem is not so obscure, however, that security planners should be excused from anticipating it. The SS-20 is a system improvised from the cancelled SS-16 ICBM program, and there are reasons to believe that the Soviets considered its deployment to be a transitional arrangement. It is prudent to suppose that substantial improvements have been embodied in the SS-25, and that the new system provides a significantly better basis for a large-scale mobile deployment, one that is capable of covering targets

[5] This position was officially articulated in the Department of Defense *Report to the Congress on U.S. Policy on ASAT Arms Control*, March 31, 1984.

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throughout the entire U.S. alliance network in Europe and east Asia. If the Soviets choose fully to exploit their advantages in concealed mobile operations with a better system, the NATO missile deployment—so inherently visible that it is exposed to preemptive destruction by conventional Soviet forces—is not likely to be considered an adequate response indefinitely. Anyone worried about the SS-20 should be distinctly more worried about the SS-25 and relatively more interested in arms control arrangements that would prevent its deployment. No effort of this sort appears to have been made in Geneva, however, and U.S. officials at the moment appear to be conceding the inevitability of an impending surge in this category of weapons.

Beyond these more familiar issues lies the problem of the integrity of the command system. It has yet to emerge into clear public focus as the central strategic security problem of the age but is ultimately destined to do so. Current strategic command systems could not withstand even a small fraction of the offensive firepower that could be directed against them by existing forces, and this fact creates pressures on both sides for rapid and large-scale reaction to the perceptions of an impending attack. Since the interaction of these pressures under conditions of intense crisis could produce a sudden catastrophic breakdown of deterrence, diminishing them should be a major objective of arms control.

The problem is a difficult one in that it requires a combination of measures, no single one of which is likely to be decisive, or even effective, by itself. To be successful, the controls must dominate each country's overall assessment of the opponent's entire strategic posture. The most compelling method would be to remove the offensive capacity for an effective attack against the command system. But the force reductions required to accomplish that are too extensive to be a realistic immediate aspiration. Practical controls, therefore, must deal with the more ambiguous matter of intentions, largely through measures designed to prevent either side from *optimizing* a rapid, highly coordinated preemptive attack. A number of such measures can be identified to control the timing, precision and operational coordination of offensive forces: for example, the elimination of short-range systems and the disengagement of all systems from forward deployments; the design of deeply buried weapons and other means of protection that do not require and do not allow rapid responsiveness; the protective dispersion of command system assets; and the introduction of

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operational doctrines based on reconstitution after attack. These measures and the objectives they serve need much more development than they have yet received.

VIII

In sum, then, the familiar tragedy of avoidable and mutually damaging weapons deployments appears again to be emerging from the interaction of U.S. and Soviet strategic security policies. The situation is not yet irremediable. Effective statesmanship could still prevent misfortune, but many opportunities have been squandered. It has become difficult to believe that such statesmanship will suddenly emerge to master current trends. As indicated at the beginning of this article, designs for necessary compromises are certainly available, the most promising of which combines a prohibition on weapons development tests in space with reductions in large multiple-warhead missiles. It is prudent to acknowledge, however, that such arguments are being rapidly overtaken by events.

Let us repeat, then, some of the pieties of the nuclear age that have yet to become driving principles of policy. The securities of the United States and the Soviet Union have been locked together; it is extremely unlikely that either power can obtain any enduring net advantage by unilateral efforts. The age of technical virtuosity and dramatic weapons development has largely run its course. It has produced a dangerous situation which cannot be transformed by more weapons development, inevitable and even desirable as the individual projects may be. The cause of security primarily requires the establishment of a structure of political understanding and formalized restraint between the United States and the Soviet Union. For this to occur both political systems will have to undergo very substantial shifts in their prevailing attitudes and perceptions of security.

The most important threat to each country does not arise from weaknesses in political resolve, technical capacity, organizational competence or destructive firepower. The gravest threat is the inability to impose reasonable restraint, a mutually acknowledged problem for which each prefers to blame the other. There is in fact plenty of blame to be shared and, simply on practical grounds, each country would be well advised to begin at home. In the case of the United States, that requires adjustments in our strategic arms control policy.

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Yu-ming Shaw

TAIWAN: A VIEW FROM TAIPEI

The Republic of China (R.O.C.) has a unique international personality. It was a founding member of the United Nations, yet since 1971 it has not been a member state of the U.N. or of any of its specialized agencies. It has scored impressive successes in political, economic and social development and in science and technology—indeed, the R.O.C. today is ranked as one of the most developed of the developing countries. Yet it has been asked to leave the World Bank, the World Health Organization, UNESCO, the International Atomic Energy Agency and other international organizations. The R.O.C. even faces the danger of losing its membership in the Asian Development Bank.

Despite these setbacks, the R.O.C. on Taiwan still enjoys wide contacts with many nations and international bodies. It is still recognized by 25 nations and maintains substantive (though unofficial) relations with more than 140 others. Some 21 nations have official representation in Taiwan, and the R.O.C. maintains 90 official and unofficial offices abroad. It is a member of ten international organizations that limit their membership to governments, and of 656 non-governmental international organizations.

The base for the Chinese Nationalist Party (the Kuomintang) since 1949, when Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's forces withdrew from the mainland, Taiwan lies 100 miles off the coast. A population of 18.7 million inhabit a land area of about 14,000 square miles, forming one of Asia's most dynamic free industrial and trading economies.*

For 36 years, the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.) has

* *Editor's Note.* The spelling of Chinese names in this article is that preferred by the author.

Yu-ming Shaw is Director of the Institute of International Relations of National Chengchi University, Republic of China. Previously on the history faculty at the University of Notre Dame, he is the author of many books in Chinese and English, including *Essays on Sino-American Relations*. The author wishes to thank his colleagues at the IIR for assistance in preparing this article, an adaptation of a paper presented to the Atlantic Council of the U.S.

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sought unsuccessfully to diminish the R.O.C.'s international stature. As late as March 1982, the P.R.C. Foreign Ministry circulated a note to all foreign embassies in Peking, demanding promises that they neither establish offices in Taiwan nor allow official or unofficial R.O.C. representation in their countries.

The R.O.C. has been able to maintain a vigorous international existence for several reasons. First, it has effectively exercised sovereign control over Taiwan and Penghu (the Pescadores), and offshore islands such as Kinmen (Quemoy) and Matsu in the Taiwan Strait, for the past four decades. Second, the Republic of China has brought substantial trade and cultural benefits to the world. Third, it has enjoyed the support and respect of the great majority of the Chinese communities overseas, and also on the Chinese mainland: over the years, 2.5 million refugees from Chinese communism have chosen Taiwan as their haven of freedom. Fourth, no matter how small the R.O.C. may be in size and population (in comparison with the P.R.C.), its success story offers an alternative to the record of misrule and the cruelties of communism on the mainland.

II

Recent changes in the domestic and foreign policies of the P.R.C. have been greeted by the world at large with relief and high expectations: relief that the "revolutionary" phase of the Chinese communist revolution seemed to have finally exhausted itself, and expectations that a more stable and self-sufficient China would emerge to make a greater contribution to the world order. In the view of many Western observers, the once predominant perception of a Chinese communist threat appears to have lost its validity.

To the R.O.C., however, the threat of Communist China remains. Some Westerners rejoiced that Teng Hsiao-p'ing announced "anti-hegemony" to be one of the P.R.C.'s three major tasks for the 1980s, but the people of Taiwan took wary note that "reunification" was also on his list, along with modernization. Indeed, the P.R.C. constitution as amended in 1982 (the fourth amendment since 1949) explicitly proclaims the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland as one of its policy goals.

More ominously, Peking has never renounced its so-called sovereign right to use force to achieve this goal. The military balance in the Taiwan Strait has been widely analyzed: the

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P.R.C. enjoys vast quantitative superiority and is capable of launching a full range of offensive actions against the R.O.C. But, it is argued, the P.R.C. leaders are constrained by broader considerations, such as the reactions of the United States, the Soviet Union, Vietnam and Japan, and being rational and attentive to costs and benefits, they will not attempt an invasion unless forced to do so by contingencies thus far not foreseen.

One cannot be complacent. The P.R.C. continues to modernize its defense capability—even receiving some U.S. assistance in various areas. The R.O.C., on the other hand, is restricted by the U.S.-P.R.C. joint communiqué of August 17, 1982, from purchasing advanced weapons, such as high-performance fighters, from the United States. Thus, the qualitative edge that the R.O.C. is said to enjoy currently is bound gradually to disappear. Moreover, the P.R.C. is coming to enjoy the favorable position of being the pursued rather than the pursuer in the U.S.-Soviet-P.R.C. triangle. In the coming decade, strategic constraints may not be as powerful a deterrent to aggression toward Taiwan. Finally, communist leaders are no more immune to folly or miscalculation than are capitalists. North Korea's attack on South Korea in 1950 and the P.R.C.'s costly campaign against Vietnam in 1979 are but two examples. P.R.C. policymaking, thus, is often driven as much by perceived ideological and/or national needs and opportunities as by rational calculation of costs and benefits.

As part of Peking's "reunification" policy, the P.R.C. is maneuvering internationally, particularly with regard to the United States. The P.R.C.'s strategy, not well understood in the West, is two-pronged. First is a step-by-step strangulation of the R.O.C. through increasingly stringent limits on U.S.-R.O.C. ties. Second, Peking is attempting to foster an international image of "reasonableness" in pursuing a policy of peace toward Taiwan. The stream of proposals that started flowing on January 1, 1979, the day of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the P.R.C., has sought to establish a record of numerous "peace offers." But parallel to these "peace" overtures, the P.R.C. has also consistently applied pressure on the R.O.C. in diplomatic, economic, even athletic and cultural activities. These tactics have spread distrust and anger in the minds of the people of Taiwan, who are determined to remain alive and well in the family of nations.

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III

The Republic of China clings, to the bewilderment of many in the West, to a one-China policy, despite its many diplomatic setbacks. This is not irrational; it is at once a choice of belief and of necessity.

"China" names a country and symbolizes a cultural system, of which Confucianism has long been a fundamental ingredient. Confucian thought has helped maintain the continuity of Chinese culture, serving to propel the advances of the Chinese people over centuries past. Late in the nineteenth century, traditional Chinese culture faced a powerful onslaught of Western influence. For the last hundred years, China has been trying to reconcile the incoming Western culture with its own.

Developing under two different systems on either side of the Taiwan Strait, Chinese culture has been heading in two very different directions since 1949. On the mainland, communism, a heresy within Western civilization, has become official dogma, and the Chinese communists have repeatedly attempted to destroy traditional Chinese culture. At the same time, the R.O.C. on Taiwan has implemented modern and universal education, and succeeded in importing Western ideas and practices without abandoning its cultural heritage.

From the viewpoint of many social scientists, the major reason for Taiwan's successful modernization has been its efforts to preserve the content and form of Chinese culture, while incorporating elements of Western culture where appropriate and beneficial. It is my view that Taiwan's experience can serve as a model for Communist China, and Taiwan's cultural synthesis promises to be the mainstream of the modern Chinese culture of the future.

Since ancient times, the notion of one unified China has been deeply embedded in the minds of all Chinese. Perhaps alone among the major world civilizations, China is marked by a single, unbroken line of cultural identity. Periods of political division have always given way to much longer periods of political unity. In fact, the struggles among political groups in China's history have often revolved around competing claims to represent the whole of China—politically, legally and morally. The current conflict between the R.O.C. and the P.R.C. fits this pattern. It is a struggle for power, but also a clash of competing claims to cultural and political legitimacy. Under

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the burden of Chinese history, neither the R.O.C. nor the P.R.C. could dare to deviate from the one-China concept and still claim legitimacy as a Chinese entity.

If Taiwan were to succumb to a two-China policy and declare independence, it would probably provoke an attack from the mainland. Not only would conflict intensify among diverse political groups inside Taiwan, but questions of reallocating political authority would immediately be posed. The dominant Kuomintang has consistently received more than 70 percent of the vote in elections over the past three decades, particularly impressive in light of the fact that more than three-quarters of its membership now are Taiwanese by birth. If, for whatever reason, the R.O.C. were to declare independence, active political opposition groups, which became vocal during the diplomatic setbacks of the late 1970s, would seek to take advantage of the situation to gain political power. Once such a political confrontation developed, political and social stability, which has served as the very foundation of Taiwan's progress for years, would no longer be possible.

Therefore, the R.O.C. believes that by maintaining a one-China policy, it can not only avoid these dangers of political and social instability, but also nurture the hope that its achievements during its sojourn on Taiwan will eventually win the respect and support of the Chinese people.

Taipei has repeatedly attempted to exercise flexibility within a fixed posture of one China. For example, it agreed to participate in the 1984 Olympic Games and in the 13th Asian Baseball Championships Series (held in Australia in January 1985) under the name "Chinese Taipei." The R.O.C. government in Taipei also has encouraged active participation, even agreeing not to use its official state name or fly its national flag, in non-governmental international organizations, in hopes of expanding ties with other societies. There is a limit, however, to its flexibility in these matters. So long as it is a non-governmental gathering, the R.O.C. is willing to bend over backwards to join. But if the gathering is governmental or official in nature, then the R.O.C. must insist on using its national name—the Republic of China—and its national flag.

The R.O.C. also cannot afford to enter into any official negotiations with the P.R.C. Internal politics in Taiwan are delicate and confrontational, and any move by the government to negotiate with the P.R.C. regarding Taiwan's future would immediately trigger mass opposition. Although the people of

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Taiwan welcome a united China, this must come about on their terms and not under those imposed by the P.R.C. It would be suicidal for the Nationalist government to be a party to any negotiations with the P.R.C. so long as the P.R.C. remains an essentially communist state.

IV

Several pending issues directly affect the future security of the R.O.C., most immediately the issue of Hong Kong. Since the P.R.C. obviously intends to use the Hong Kong formula to solve the so-called Taiwan question, the premier of the R.O.C., Yu Kuo-hwa, declared last September that the Republic of China would not recognize the U.K.-P.R.C. agreement on Hong Kong, finally signed on December 19, 1984, which grants Peking sovereignty over the British Crown Colony as of 1997. The R.O.C. considers itself to be the legal government of China, and the Chinese in Hong Kong to be its overseas nationals. Besides its legitimate concern over the fate of the people of Hong Kong, the R.O.C. also realizes the political and economic significance of Hong Kong. Sun Yat-sen's 1911 revolution had its beginnings in Hong Kong; from there it was taken to Canton, and from Shanghai to the inner Yangtze Valley, until the Republic of China was finally established in 1912. Using the past as a mirror for the future, the R.O.C. believes that Hong Kong can increasingly serve as a springboard for extending capitalist, free-enterprise and democratic influence to the Chinese mainland.

It is the R.O.C.'s hope that those who choose to remain in Hong Kong be able to continue to live in freedom and prosperity. The R.O.C. stands ready to extend its support and assistance in this regard. In his September statement, Premier Yu welcomed Hong Kong residents considering resettlement in Taiwan, promising one-year multiple-entry visas and the right to withdraw funds from Taiwan's offshore bank. He also invited them to educate their children in Taiwan.

Two other issues are often raised in discussing the R.O.C. responses to P.R.C. threats to its security. One is whether the R.O.C. should play a "Soviet card"; the other is whether it should develop nuclear weapons. The answer to both these questions is no.

To the government on Taiwan, the "Soviet card" is a red herring. The R.O.C.'s survival and eventual victory over Chinese communism is predicated on the maintenance of the

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respect and goodwill of its compatriots on the mainland. If the R.O.C. were ever to resort to a tactical alliance with the Soviet Union, its image as a Chinese state upholding Chinese nationalism would be destroyed. As for becoming a nuclear power, the R.O.C. government has rejected this option for many years on three grounds. First, it would provide an easy excuse for the P.R.C. to retaliate militarily against Taiwan. Second, it would be unthinkable and unforgivable for the R.O.C. ever to use such weapons on its own people on the mainland. Third, it would be so prohibitive in cost that the economic development of the island would be seriously harmed.

With these two issues laid to rest, the R.O.C.'s national security now relies on two endeavors: the acquisition of advanced weapons from the United States and other nations, and the development of a domestic defense industry.

The P.R.C.'s military might is rapidly increasing, and it has built up a heavy concentration of forces on its side of the Taiwan Strait. The P.R.C. deploys more aircraft—fighter, bomber and reconnaissance—against the R.O.C. than against the Soviet Union. Today the P.R.C. has close to 5,300 combat aircraft as compared to slightly more than 500 for the R.O.C. Unless the R.O.C.'s requests for more advanced aircraft, submarines and other types of sophisticated military hardware are fulfilled very soon, the security imbalance will become threatening. Add to this the P.R.C.'s superiority in nuclear weapons, major surface combat ships and submarines, and its massive number of troops, and the R.O.C.'s defense picture becomes even gloomier. Accordingly, the government has assigned high priority to establishing a large degree of independence in its domestic production of military weapons.

Faced with overwhelming pressures and shrewd tactics from the Chinese communists, the R.O.C. enjoys little room for maneuver and an even smaller margin of error. Its weakness and alleged inflexibility stem not from lack of effort but from its unique policy environment. Its strength stems less from its various tangible efforts than from a deep-seated historical sense that its existence and cause will in the long run prove worth the while.

V

The R.O.C. on Taiwan represents the culmination of a century-old Chinese quest for "modernization" and "democratization," and offers a viable alternative to the communist

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experiment on the Chinese mainland. It also stands as a strategic bastion in the western Pacific.

The R.O.C. exercises jurisdictional control not only over the Pescadores, but also over the offshore islands of Kinmen, Matsu, Tung-yin, Wu-chiu, Pratas and the Spratlys. These islands are advantageously situated astride the main sea-lanes of the Pacific Basin and those connecting the Pacific and the Indian Oceans. The sea-lanes around Japan, the Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa), Taiwan, the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia are vital not only to the United States but also to all free nations in east Asia. The choke points are the Straits of Malacca, the Taiwan Strait, the Bashi Strait and the Tsushima Strait. If the free nations were to lose control over any one of these choke points, the sea-lanes between the Indian Ocean and the western Pacific would be severely endangered.

The R.O.C. can be considered the free world's "unsinkable aircraft carrier" in the western Pacific. More than 3,500 offshore islands line the China coast, of which Taiwan is the largest. Its loss could break the continuous defensive chain of the Asian rimland stretching from Japan to the Republic of Korea and the Ryukyus, down to the Philippines and on to Southeast Asia. In light of the massive Soviet buildup of naval strength in the western Pacific in recent years, Taiwan has become especially important to regional security; it lies along the most direct routes for Soviet naval vessels traveling southward from bases on the Soviet Pacific coast to points such as Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam. Without the R.O.C. as a friendly power, the security of Japan, the Republic of Korea and the Philippines would be seriously jeopardized. In addition to its geostrategic location, the R.O.C. maintains a strong military force, with outstanding naval and air bases and other logistical support facilities, and air and naval forces equipped with American-made weapons systems.

In short, the R.O.C. on Taiwan could directly support a variety of strategic interests for the United States and other east Asian free nations. It also serves the basic U.S. objective of maintaining a secure, stable and prosperous group of pro-Western nations in the Asian-Pacific region as a whole.

VI

The economic performance of the Republic of China over the past 36 years has been internationally regarded as something of a miracle. Annual economic growth has averaged nine

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percent during this period, and except for the recession years of the two world oil crises, 1973 and 1979, price levels have remained stable. Foreign trade has also grown rapidly—an annual increase of about 25 percent over the last two decades or so.

Last year, the R.O.C.'s per capita gross national product reached a record $3,000, and overall two-way trade topped $52.4 billion, with an export volume of $30.5 billion. This trade record last year made the R.O.C. the 15th largest trading country in the world in terms of volume and the 11th in exports. Along with Japan, West Germany and Saudi Arabia, the R.O.C. was one of the few countries that enjoyed a trade surplus in 1984. The R.O.C. today is the fifth largest trading partner of the United States; the R.O.C.'s total trade with the United States in 1984 was $19.8 billion (two-way trade between the United States and the P.R.C., by contrast, was $6.2 billion in 1984).

The R.O.C. has managed to maintain a substantial equality of income distribution during this period of rapid economic growth. In 1984, the ratio between the incomes of households in the top 20 percent and those in the bottom 20 percent was a remarkable 4.3 to 1.

A spinoff of the R.O.C.'s economic progress has been the sharing of experience and fortune with other nations. From 1954 to the present, the R.O.C. government has trained at least 7,500 persons from more than 20 nations in its various foreign assistance programs, including land reform, family planning, agricultural and industrial improvement, transportation, public health, education, public administration and community development. Even today the R.O.C. still maintains technical assistance programs in more than 20 countries, including many which have no diplomatic relations with the R.O.C.

But the question is properly raised, what about the future of Taiwan's economy? Assuming continued peace across the Taiwan Strait, the crucial question is whether the R.O.C. can successfully upgrade its economic and production structure to meet the challenge of less developed countries with lower production costs, as well as the challenge from its more comparable competitors, the newly industrialized countries of Asia. Several factors are in the R.O.C.'s favor.

First, there is the high caliber of education and training on Taiwan. One-fourth of the population is currently enrolled in

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some kind of school. Ten percent of the work force has a college education; 30 percent has a senior high or senior vocational school education; 25 percent of R.O.C. youth are in colleges or universities. During the past three decades, out of the 85,000 students that went abroad for advanced education (most to the United States), 12,000 have returned to Taiwan and assumed leadership roles in various sectors of society. This return flow of human talent has been on the rise in recent years; between 1979 and 1984 about 5,300 returned, over 800 with doctorates and almost 4,500 with master's degrees.

Another factor contributing to the enhancement of the R.O.C.'s industrial base is the development of a strong defense industry. Faced with a constant threat from the P.R.C. and an uncertain arms supply from abroad, nearly eight percent of the R.O.C.'s GNP, over 50 percent of its national budget, goes to defense, including a defense industry that strives for as much self-sufficiency as possible.

The current economic policy of the R.O.C. government is to promote both public and private investment. Private sector investment has been low for the past decade or so; concern with unfavorable diplomatic and security developments has clearly been a major contributing factor. In 1984, the R.O.C. government decided to increase its annual public investment through the early 1990s by $20 billion in order to launch 14 national development projects, including steel plants, environmental protection and facilities for electric power. The government has also adopted policies aiming to make Taiwan's financial and trade policies more liberal and international in substance and orientation; for example, by lowering tariffs, easing the flow of capital into and out of the country, and offering more incentives for foreign investment.

The R.O.C.'s level of economic development is not too far removed from that of the developed nations, is very close to that of Hong Kong and Singapore, and is far ahead of the P.R.C. and other Asian nations. Economists estimate that Taiwan will be able to maintain an annual growth rate of 6.5–7 percent over the next 15 years, and its per capita income in the year 2000 will be $11–12,000. (The P.R.C.'s projected per capita income in the year 2000 is $1,000.)

A century ago, Yen Fu, a reform-minded scholar of note, declared that for China to continue to survive and flourish in the family of nations, it must strive to be rich and powerful.

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Following the collapse of the Ch'ing dynasty and the creation of the Republic of China, Sun Yat-sen proclaimed his now-famous Three Principles of the People: nationalism, democracy, and the people's well-being. During the May Fourth Movement of 1919, democracy and science were upheld as the supreme goals for China's future. The late President Chiang Kai-shek later supplemented these goals with that of ethics. At the same time, the Chinese Communist Party presented itself as "peasant reformers," and the aims of the communist revolution in China were said to be, in part, anti-feudalism and anti-imperialism.

Looking back at this historical experience, one is inclined to ask: who has truly inherited the spirit of the modern Chinese revolution? Who has more successfully accomplished the goal of modernization? Who has done more and better things for the peasants, the "broad masses," and the "people"? Who has really removed the vestiges of feudalism and imperialism left from China's old society?

For the average Chinese on the street today, the pertinent indicators are such factors as per capita income, the number and quality of schools, hospitals and museums, and basic human rights. Here the Chinese communist experiment seems to have failed miserably, not only when compared to Taiwan, but also when compared to the Chinese Communist Party's own initial goals. The fact that the R.O.C. on Taiwan has built itself up from a poor resource base and in a besieged security environment into a nation envied by many Third World countries is, in and of itself, a potent challenge to everything the Chinese communists claim to stand for: "revolution," "modernization," or even "socialism."

It is in this sense that the existence and continued prosperity of the R.O.C. have served to goad the P.R.C. to change and reform. It is no exaggeration to say that many of the economic reform programs of the P.R.C. today are direct or indirect results of the impact of R.O.C. achievements on Taiwan, a fact the P.R.C. leaders have openly, if reluctantly, admitted. The P.R.C.'s establishment of special economic zones, for example, was inspired by the success story of the R.O.C.'s export processing zones in Kaoshiung, Taichung and Nantze, which earn billions of dollars for Taiwan. As long as this beneficent influence from Taiwan continues, mainland China will be impelled to change. The belief of the people on Taiwan that we can continue to exert such a positive impact on the Chinese main-

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land in the years to come gives heightened significance to Taiwan's existence and success.

VII

Despite its disavowal of any intention to interfere in the resolution of the Chinese destiny, the United States has been and remains a participant in the process. In the decade to come, there are two major issues that the United States will have to deal with skillfully and fairly. One is the question of the R.O.C.'s national security and the related question of U.S. arms sales to the R.O.C.; the other is the ever-present danger of P.R.C. military pressure on Taiwan.

In fiscal year 1979, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan were valued at nearly $600 million. The upper limit for arms sales in 1983 was $800 million. But according to the State Department, the limit on arms sales to the R.O.C. in 1984 was reduced to $780 million, and will drop further to $760 million in 1985 and $740 million in 1986.

The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 stipulates that the nature and quantity of American arms to be made available to Taiwan should be based on the principle that Taiwan shall be allowed to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. It follows that the United States must take into consideration the military relationship between Communist China and Taiwan. If there is an increase in the P.R.C.'s military capability, the quality and quantity of arms made available to Taiwan should be correspondingly upgraded.

But the issue of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan cannot be discussed solely in terms of the quality and quantity of weapons. Also to be considered is the influence of this supply on the morale of the people of Taiwan, as well as on Taiwan's economic development. In addition to the objective enhancement of Taiwan's security, advanced arms sales to Taiwan can serve to bring a stronger sense of security to the populace and thus ensure continued economic progress in Taiwan.

The danger of P.R.C. military action against Taiwan in the next decade stems not only from Peking's outright adventurism, but also from its possible miscalculations. If the P.R.C. were to mount a military attack against Taiwan, the United States would be confronted with an awkward choice: hasty intervention, difficult mediation or a humiliating backdown. At stake would be not only the lives and well-being of the nearly 19 million people on Taiwan, but the credibility of the

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United States as an ally and the bulwark of freedom and democracy.

The postwar American involvement in world affairs seems to indicate that a policy without a firm root in American ideals—hence without the support of the American people—cannot long survive or escape the judgment of history. The reality today seems to be that while the American people favor a normalized relationship with the P.R.C., they continue to value their long-standing ties with the government and people on Taiwan. While America's Asian allies find merits in a stable relationship between Washington and Peking, they remain suspicious of the direction of Peking's future policy and watchful of the way Washington handles the P.R.C./R.O.C. issue. It seems only prudent for the United States to reaffirm from time to time its commitment to the security of Taiwan until this issue can finally be solved by the Chinese themselves—in their own way and in their own time.

VIII

History as well as necessity have dictated the long-term goal of the Republic of China, namely, a unified China. But this does not mean a China under the communist system, which has proven to be such an utter failure on the mainland that it has invoked the anger and hatred of the people subjected to it. Rather, it should be a China where basic human rights are universally guaranteed, in theory and in practice; where the people's energies are fully released to work at the long overdue task of nation-building; and where the aspirations of the Chinese people to lead a decent life can be fulfilled.

Whither the R.O.C. on Taiwan? What will be its final fate in the long drawn-out competition and struggle with the P.R.C.? Our belief today is that, after a prolonged period of competition between the R.O.C. and the P.R.C., developments on the mainland will slowly but surely turn in our favor.

The roots of communism in China are shallow, its base is weak. We believe traditional Chinese culture to be the ultimate preventive to communism taking permanent root. After 36 years of competition, the R.O.C. has already demonstrated its superiority in every factor except size, population and military power; its living standard has become increasingly attractive to its compatriots on the Chinese mainland.

On the surface, the P.R.C. appears to be reviving as a result of its recent economic reform program. But in reality, the

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society is full of current and potential problems. We believe that the opening of reform will produce a kind of revolution of rising expectations which will so seriously shake the political and ideological foundations of the communist government, as it is constituted today, that for the sake of survival the Chinese people and their communist leaders will have to look for other models of state-building and government administration. The Hong Kong model is basically a free-port and colonial model and, as such, it is both inapplicable and distasteful. The Singapore model applies only to a city-state and cannot be copied. The "Chinatown" model in many Western societies is too insignificant and too tainted with foreign influence to be an example. Therefore, it is only natural for the people and government on mainland China to choose the Taiwan model as a solution.

People on the mainland are gaining increasing knowledge of Taiwan's achievements through the news media and Chinese and foreign visitors. The significance of the Taiwan success story is that it was accomplished by Chinese people themselves and, that being the case, there is no intrinsic reason why the Chinese people of any province on the mainland cannot repeat the Taiwan story. Herein lies the irresistible attraction of the Taiwan model. Once our model is chosen, the foundation for China's reunification will be laid. When this happens, we will naturally play a very significant role in determining the future form and substance of Chinese politics on the mainland. In short, the R.O.C. on Taiwan is, and will increasingly be, the guiding light for the future development of mainland China.

Nations, like humans, live by good works as well as by faith. We have had both, and they have made our life in Taiwan a meaningful one. The Taiwan story is not only an economic miracle but a magnetic force for a united China of tomorrow.

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Guo-cang Huan

TAIWAN: A VIEW FROM BEIJING

The coming decade will be critical for Taiwan, and for its relationship to the Chinese mainland. Taibei will face the difficult problem of succession to President Jiang Jingguo, its economic development will meet new and serious challenges, and its relations with the People's Republic of China will evolve—in one direction or another.* Developments in Taiwan-P.R.C. relations will continue to influence the Sino-American relationship and the political structure of east Asia. Relations between the two governments claiming to rule over China, however, will increasingly depend on the interaction between Beijing and Taibei themselves, rather than on Washington and other international players.

Three related factors determine the texture of this interaction: the policies evolving in Beijing, internal developments on Taiwan, and the international environment. This article will examine each of these factors, then discuss Taibei's policy options and their possible consequences, and finally suggest a desirable course of developments for the decade to come.

II

The most important influence on Taibei's relationship with the mainland is, of course, Beijing itself. P.R.C. policy toward Taibei has changed significantly since Mao's death in September 1976, and especially since Deng Xiaoping's consolidation of power three years later. The new policy has three components: an effort to reduce tensions and convince Taibei to come to the negotiating table; a parallel strategy of pressuring Taibei to talk with Beijing; and the policy of setting limits to constrain Taibei's behavior.

* *Editor's Note.* The spelling of Chinese names in this article is that preferred by the author.

Guo-cang Huan, born in Shanghai, pursued graduate studies at the Institute of World Economics and Politics of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing. For this year he is a visiting Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council of the U.S. in Washington, D.C. This article is adapted from a paper presented to the Atlantic Council, and the author expresses his appreciation to his colleagues there for help in its preparation.

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During the past several years, Beijing has offered Taibei several proposals for reunification. These proposals, including Deng Xiaoping's recent "one state, two systems" proposal,[1] allow Taibei to maintain its social and economic system, its armed forces and its unofficial ties with foreign countries. In return for promising not to interfere in Taibei's internal affairs, Beijing expects Taibei to give up its claim to represent all of China and agree to become a "special administrative region" of China. Beijing has repeatedly suggested that open direct trade should be allowed in the interim, as well as the free exchange of mail and travel between the two sides. Beijing has also stated that it is prepared to open its market to Taiwan's exports, allow Taiwan commercial interests to invest on the mainland, and provide to Taibei natural resources, including oil. Beijing has accorded good treatment to former officials of the government party, the Kuomintang (KMT), and to others who have relatives on Taiwan, and has encouraged its scholars and students abroad to contact their colleagues from Taiwan. In the international community, Beijing has allowed Taibei to return to many international organizations under the name of "Chinese Taipei" or "China-Taiwan."

The P.R.C.'s offer of reunification is sweetened by its remarkable internal reform program, its expanded cooperation with the West, and its flexibility and sensitivity in handling the Hong Kong issue. But Taibei is still publicly critical of Beijing's overtures. It takes the position that the P.R.C.'s current reforms will collapse, it views Beijing's efforts to improve ties with the West as a strategy to isolate Taiwan, and it does not recognize the Sino-British agreement on Hong Kong.[2]

Despite this rigid posture in Taibei, Beijing's policies have had some effect on the island. The P.R.C.'s ongoing political and economic reforms have strongly influenced public opinion, especially among Taiwan intellectuals, businessmen and technocrats. International press coverage of the reform program and direct contacts between Taiwan and mainland Chinese students and scholars have provided a perspective different from that of the KMT's anti-P.R.C. propaganda; they have brought increased understanding about the mainland, and reduced the old hostility to Beijing. This has already created

[1] *The People's Daily* (Beijing), Dec. 20, 1984, p. 1, and Jan. 1, 1985, pp. 1–2.
[2] *The Central Daily News* (international edition, Taibei), Feb. 10, 1984, and Jan. 24, Feb. 10, Feb. 13, Feb. 16 and Mar. 2, 1985.

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dissent over Taibei's long-standing policy of the "Three Nos"—no contacts, no negotiations and no compromises toward Beijing.[3] The views—openly expressed—of dissenting intellectuals and politicians have strengthened liberal tendencies within the KMT and provided an impetus to search for alternatives to the present hard-line policies.

Continued political stability on the mainland will also be an important incentive for Taibei to reduce tensions with Beijing. If Deng's successors, namely Hu Yaobang, the secretary general of the Chinese Communist Party, and Premier Zhao Ziyang, are able to continue the reform program, Taibei should feel much more secure, because such reforms require a stable international environment. And any serious tension or confrontation between Beijing and Taibei would damage business confidence on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

Beijing's increasingly close ties with the West and Japan have worried those in Taiwan who believe that such ties will give Beijing increased leverage over Taibei and further isolate Taiwan from the international community. Actually, stronger ties with the West would reduce Beijing's incentive to try taking Taiwan by force, since such a move would damage those ties.

During the past two years, Beijing has increased the pressure on Taibei for reunification talks. Reunification with Taibei is one of the P.R.C. government's three principal objectives, together with the economic reform program, and its goal of freedom of action and independence from both the Soviet Union and the United States. As soon as the Sino-British agreement on Hong Kong was initialed in September 1984, Deng Xiaoping expressed his willingness to adopt the Hong Kong model of "one state, two systems" to solve the Taiwan issue.

Actually, the Beijing government is willing to provide more favorable conditions to Taibei, as Taiwan and Hong Kong are different in important respects: unlike Hong Kong, Taiwan has been self-governing for over three decades; it has maintained its own armed forces and independent international ties; it is geographically separated from the mainland.[4] Nevertheless, Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang have repeatedly announced that Beijing is not willing to rule out the possibility of using

[3] *Baixin* (*The People*, Hong Kong), Mar. 1, 1984, pp. 3–6, and Mar. 16, 1984, pp. 34–37; *Zhonga Zhazi* (*China Magazine*, Taibei), June 1984, pp. 8–10, and Oct. 1984, pp. 27–35.

[4] *The People's Daily*, Jan. 1, 1985, p.1.

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force against Taibei if the latter continues to reject their proposals for reunification talks.[5]

Finally, Beijing has put pressure on Washington to cut back its support of Taibei. The P.R.C. has emphasized that the Taiwan issue is now the principal obstacle to the further development of Sino-American relations, and has demanded that Washington reduce and eventually stop its arms sales to Taibei and revoke the Taiwan Relations Act of April 1979, which defined the unofficial relations between the United States and Taiwan following the end of diplomatic relations.[6]

Beijing's new policy derives from several factors. The P.R.C. leaders are worried about the succession to Taiwan's President Jiang Jingguo. They know little about the next generation of KMT leaders; they understand, but probably exaggerate, the conflicts between the regime and the native Taiwanese. They fear that Jiang's successor might lead Taiwan in the direction of independence and are aware of the instabilities that could arise from structural weaknesses in Taiwan's economy and politics. At the same time, Beijing is confident of its military capability vis-à-vis Taibei, and the successful settlement of the Hong Kong issue has apparently increased a parallel confidence in its ability to deal politically with Washington and Taibei. One can, therefore, expect Beijing to increase pressure on both Taibei and Washington in the near future.

But Beijing may overestimate the role that Washington can play to encourage Taibei to negotiate with the P.R.C. Washington has reacted ambiguously to Beijing's pressure. On the one hand, it has indicated that it will not make further concessions to meet Beijing's demands for revocation of the Taiwan Relations Act or to rapidly reduce arms sales to Taibei. On the other hand, the Reagan Administration has become more cautious in its dealings with Taiwan. Washington has repeatedly denied Taibei's requests to purchase highly sophisticated fighter planes. So far, therefore, Beijing has had some success in setting certain limits on U.S. policy toward Taibei.

III

Taibei has not softened its position in response to Beijing's inducements or threats and it probably will not do so in the

[5] *Meizho Huaqiao Rebao* (*China News Daily*, New York), June 22, 1984, p. 1 and June 23, 1984, p. 1.

[6] *The New York Times*, Jan. 17 and Apr. 28, 1984; *Liaowang* (*The Outlook*, Beijing), No. 29, 1984, pp. 3–4.

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near future. On the contrary, the pressure from the P.R.C. has only made Taibei more skeptical of Beijing's parallel promises of non-intervention in Taiwan's internal affairs.

Taibei views Hong Kong as a test of Beijing's policy intentions and will be watching the P.R.C.'s behavior closely. Beijing's experiences with Hong Kong should teach it about the complexity of some of the issues involved in reunification, and its progress in resolving the Hong Kong issue through a moderate approach could encourage it to use a similar moderation toward Taiwan.

The P.R.C. has not yet defined the detailed principles and procedures for the establishment of local administration in Hong Kong. Beijing's offer to Taibei raises similar questions. Furthermore, the P.R.C. has promised that Taibei would be allowed to maintain its armed forces after reunification—yet its position on whether Taibei would be allowed to import weapons is still unclear. And nothing has been specified about Taibei's future position in the international community. For such basic reasons, Beijing's pressure for reunification has so far provoked no receptive response from Taiwan.

Under what conditions would Beijing use force to regain authority over Taiwan? Deng Xiaoping has set the following five: if Taibei leaned toward Moscow instead of Washington; if Taibei decided to develop nuclear weapons; if Taiwan claimed to be an independent state; if Taibei lost internal control as a result of the succession process; or if Taibei continued to reject reunification talks for "a long period of time."[7]

The first three conditions are part of Beijing's policy to limit Taibei's freedom of action. In fact, Taibei is unlikely ever to be in the position of wanting to play a "Soviet card." Such a move would damage relations with Washington, not to mention provoking a strong reaction from Beijing. The policy would undermine the KMT's internal legitimacy as well as its ideology. It is also unlikely that Taibei would manufacture nuclear weapons—at least openly—in the near future. Such an effort would put Washington in a difficult position, further weakening the existing U.S.-Taiwan relationship, and would cause

[7] Congressional Research Service, *Taiwan: One Year After the United States and China Normalization*, report sponsored by the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Washington: Library of Congress, June 1981, pp. 119–120; *FBIS Daily Report: China*, Oct. 11, 1984, pp. D1–2; *Meizhou Huaquiao Rebao*, June 22, 23, 1984 p. 1.

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serious political tensions with other Asian countries, especially Japan and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The major danger of trying the nuclear option, of course, would be a possible preemptive attack by Beijing. Finally, a claim to independence would hardly solve Taibei's problems; rather, it would create immediate military, political and economic crises.

On these three conditions, Taibei is already on public record: President Jiang has announced that Taibei will never lean toward Moscow, will never develop its own nuclear weapons, and will never claim to be an independent state.

The fourth condition—internal disorder on Taiwan—reflects Beijing's worries about a succession crisis in Taibei and a possible loss of KMT authority to the Taiwan Independence Movement, though the latter does not seem likely in the near future.

The last of Deng's conditions—rejection of negotiations—is the one that will ultimately be determined by Beijing's own evolving policy calculations. Some elements are constant: the costs of military action against Taiwan, even if it were only a blockade, would be very high. Taibei has the capability to retaliate by attacking the entire east coast of the mainland, where over 70 percent of the P.R.C.'s industrial capacity is located. Politically, any military offensive would damage Beijing's expanded relations with the West and destroy the peaceful international environment that is essential to the process of modernization—to which the Dengist leadership is committed. Whether Washington would strengthen its support to Taibei, under conditions of military pressure, is still an open question. More important, public opinion on the mainland, especially among the young and the educated elite, has changed since Mao's death. People seem more interested in improving their living standards than in fighting a war, and a war would probably destroy the ongoing reform program. Beijing would therefore use force against Taibei only if there seemed to be no alternative.

IV

The most important factor in Taiwan's domestic situation is the succession to President Jiang Jingguo (Chiang Ching-kuo), son of the late Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek). There is no clear and qualified successor. Jiang, now 76 years old and in failing health, has made several important personnel changes in the

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last year and a half, including the ouster of General Wang Sheng, head of security affairs and intelligence forces, regarded as the second most powerful man on the island and a potential contender for the succession. Among other current contenders is Yu Guohua, identified with the conservative wing of the KMT, who was appointed Premier Sun Yunxuan's successor after Sun was hospitalized in the summer of 1984. Jiang Yanshi, the secretary general of the Central Committee of the KMT, is another possible candidate; he is a well-known technocrat and moderate, who was recently replaced by Ma Shuli, a member of the conservative old guard with close ties to President Jiang's son, Xiaowu.

The succession has not, however, been clarified by these changes. Many observers have speculated that the purpose of these shifts in personnel was to secure a strong position for Xiaowu. But he is not a member of the KMT Standing Commission of the Central Committee, the party's decision-making institution, nor has he made any significant contribution to Taiwan society or established an independent reputation. Unlike his father, Xiaowu has never been well received by the technocratic establishment. His succession would be made even more difficult by the opposition of the dissident movement on Taiwan to the possibility of yet another "dynastic succession." In addition, widespread speculation has implicated Xiaowu in the assassination of Henry Liu, a Taiwan writer with American citizenship, in Daly City, California, last October. President Jiang's choice of Xiaowu as his successor, in sum, would probably increase political tensions, and might even undermine the political stability that the island has enjoyed over the past three decades.

Politics within the KMT range from liberal to conservative. The conservative camp has a strong hold in the military, security and party apparatus, especially in the Standing Commission. The liberals are stronger in economic affairs and public administration.

The liberal faction of the KMT has lost several important posts over the last year, and it is unlikely to regain power in time for the succession struggle. Popular among technocrats, business circles, and the intellectual establishment, the liberal faction has very little influence within the army and intelligence forces. Moreover, it is not a unified force and lacks a strong leader capable of coordinating different interest groups within the regime and society. The liberals are unlikely to gain dom-

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inance within the KMT Standing Commission, though the faction will continue to be influential in the policymaking process.

There is always a possibility that the succession might result in joint rule by the army, the KMT conservative faction and the intelligence forces. Such a regime would be able to maintain political stability, at least temporarily. It would, however, seriously reverse Taiwan's process of political pluralization. Tensions between the regime and the democracy movement, known as the Dang-wai (non-KMT) movement, would increase. It would also encourage intellectuals and technocrats to become further alienated from the regime. In the long run, it would be politically destabilizing.

In any event, the succession process is likely to be painful and difficult. There are real possibilities of an upheaval, or the formation of a new dictatorship. In either case, Taibei would be likely to take a tougher position toward Beijing, at least temporarily, as the new regime would need an excuse for tightening political control.

V

The second challenge to political stability on the island is an accelerating process of social and political pluralization. This process, largely a result of Taiwan's economic growth during the past 30 years, has now reached a new stage. On the one hand, the Dang-wai has already become a strong opposition force in Taiwan's society, capable of significant popular mobilization against the regime. In the national elections of both 1980 and 1983, it gained roughly 30 percent of the total vote.[8] It is backed by many businessmen, most of whom are native Taiwanese, and it has been highly critical of the KMT.

The Dang-wai is not yet an alternative to the KMT. Because of the restrictive conditions of martial law, which has been in force for more than 35 years, and the operations of the secret police, the movement has not been allowed to organize as a formal political party. As a result, it is unable to organize its supporters effectively and create a strong consolidated leadership. Moreover, the Dang-wai is particularly weak in its ideological appeal. Without much of a theoretical basis, the move-

[8] Richard L. Engstrom and Chu Chi-Hung, "The Impact of the 1980 Supplementary Election on Nationalist China's Legislative Yuan," *Asian Survey*, Apr. 1984, pp. 447–458; Edwin A. Winckler, "Institutionalization and Participation on Taiwan: From Hard to Soft Authoritarianism?", *The China Quarterly*, Sept. 1984, pp. 481–499.

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ment is not able to present an alternative program to the KMT or attract much support from the well-educated elite. Factionalism is another problem for the Dang-wai. It has never been, and probably will not be in the foreseeable future, a unified force.

The Taiwan Independence Movement is another focus of dissent on the island. Many activists of the Dang-wai are members of the independence movement, but most of the TIM's activists now operate overseas, particularly in Japan and the United States. The TIM has strong financial backing, mainly from wealthy native Taiwanese businessmen. But the movement's political future may not be as bright as some American scholars believe. Like the Dang-wai, it is not a unified political force. Sharp political and ideological conflicts within the movement weaken its ability to challenge the KMT in any practical sense.

The gradual relaxation of restrictions on political freedom, and the KMT's program of "Taiwanization," a policy to bring more native Taiwanese into various party and governmental institutions, including the army, has countered the appeal of the TIM. The independence movement does not seem to enjoy much support from the educated elite, partly because it does not have persuasive political and economic programs, and partly because the younger generation has been deeply influenced by traditional Chinese culture.[9] The old tensions between mainlanders and native Taiwanese have softened among the young. Instead, social and political tensions have arisen between the authoritarian regime and the democracy movement. Even if neither the Dang-wai nor the TIM seems capable of replacing the KMT government on Taiwan, both can exert strong influence on Taibei's policy toward Beijing.

Lacking an effective institutionalized opposition, the ruling KMT continues to enjoy considerable support throughout Taiwan, due primarily to the success of its economic policy. In 30 years (1949–1979) of KMT rule, Taiwan's remarkable economic growth has made it one of the most successful examples of

[9] The primary factor is that the TIM does not have a strong cultural base. Many native Taiwanese have strong family ties with mainlanders both on Taiwan and the mainland. Their local dialect is based on the Chinese language—and still spoken on the mainland in the southern part of Fujian Province, from whence the "native Taiwanese" emigrated. In fact, there are great similarities between the culture and customs of the native Taiwanese and those of the mainlanders in the southern Fujian and Guangdong. Furthermore, the KMT has been successful in building up a traditional Chinese educational system, and the postwar generation has therefore been deeply imbued with Chinese culture.

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economic development in the world. But the island's export-oriented strategy has come under challenge—both from industrial competitors such as the United States and Japan, which have the advantage of superior technology and financial capacity, and from other east Asian states, notably South Korea, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia and, most recently, mainland China, where labor costs are lower than in Taiwan. In addition, Washington has put strong pressure on Taibei to reduce its trade surplus with the United States.

Taiwan does not have the natural resources—especially oil, which supplies some 70 percent of its energy—necessary to fuel its economy. It imports over 95 percent of its oil from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Although oil prices have been declining, any further turmoil in the Persian Gulf could pose serious problems for Taiwan.

Since the end of the 1970s, the government of Taiwan has placed high priority on shifting from a labor-intensive to a technology- and capital-intensive economy.[10] However, this transformation has not been fully successful. Because of the island's uncertain political future, a large proportion (85 percent) of Taiwan's students studying abroad do not return, and businessmen are hesitant to invest in large-scale and long-term projects, preferring more stable overseas investments. Furthermore, the island's large military budget has made it difficult for the government to increase investment in infrastructure and research and development. These structural weaknesses and vulnerabilities are unlikely to be overcome in the next decade.

Taiwan's economic problems and the increasing pressure from its business community—which has been engaged in indirect and even direct trade with the mainland for years, and has been impressed by the results of Beijing's "open door" policy—are strong inducements for the government to take a more conciliatory line toward Beijing in the future.

VI

Ronald Reagan's election in 1980 led the Taiwan government to hope, albeit briefly, that Washington might turn back the clock of history and restore official diplomatic ties with Taibei. Before August 1982, when the most recent U.S.-P.R.C.

[10] See, for example, *The Central Daily News*, Jan. 11 and Feb. 13, 1983, p. 1; Shirley W.Y. Kuo, *The Taiwan Economy in Transition*, Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1983, pp. 315–320.

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joint communiqué was signed, Sino-American ties were indeed in deep trouble. But the clock has not been turned back—and it is unlikely to be.

In fact, Sino-American relations have solidified since the second half of 1982. While both Washington and Beijing have played down their need for strategic and military cooperation against Moscow, strategic consultations and military exchange programs between the P.R.C. and the United States have advanced.[11]

Economic relations between the two countries have also prospered: trade between the P.R.C. and the United States reached about $6 billion last year and the United States is now the P.R.C.'s third largest trade partner (after Japan and Hong Kong).[12] Several hundred American companies and banks now operate in China. This development is likely to continue as China's demands for Western technology and capital increase, and China's economic reforms further reduce the institutional gap between the Chinese economy and Western market economies.

Almost 14,000 Chinese students are now studying in the United States and another several thousand in Western Europe and Japan. At least 60–70 percent of them will return to China and will have great influence on policymaking in various government and nongovernment institutions. The Dengist leadership in Beijing seems likely to continue this open door policy, and the positive trend in Sino-American relations is unlikely to be reversed.

During the coming decade, Washington will surely try to adhere to its commitment to sell defensive weapons to Taibei, as called for under the Taiwan Relations Act. Nevertheless, the United States will face at least two tough tests. There is a sharp contradiction between the August 1982 joint communiqué and the Taiwan Relations Act. In the communiqué, Washington promises that arms sales to Taiwan "will not exceed either in qualitative or in quantitative terms" the level supplied in the years since the establishment of diplomatic relations with the P.R.C. in January 1979, and that the United

[11] See Paul H. Kreisberg, "The U.S. and Asia in 1984," *Asian Survey*, Jan. 1985, pp. 1–20.

[12] Paul D. Wolfowitz, "The U.S.-China Trade Relationship," *The Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 84, No. 2090, Sept. 1984, p. 28; Christopher H. Phillips, "Trade, Economic, and Financial Relations with China," in *China Policy for the Next Decade*, the Report of the Atlantic Council of the U.S., Committee on China Policy, Boston: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1984, pp. 427–432; the figure for 1984 is from *The China Business Review*, Mar. 1985, p. 55.

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States "intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution." The Taiwan Relations Act, however, claims "to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character," without specifying any reductions. Under increased pressure from Beijing, Washington may find reason to reduce even further its arms sales to Taibei.

Because shifts in the regional balance of power seem likely to favor the Soviet Union and its allies, notably Vietnam and India, Washington may need to increase its strategic cooperation with Beijing on regional security issues.[13] This, in turn, could strengthen Beijing's bargaining position.

Political instability in the region will have its impact in Taibei. The noncommunist dissident movements in South Korea and the Philippines encourage the Dang-wai of Taiwan, which has been following these political developments closely. These movements have one important common feature: they all command strong support in the United States.

Taibei may find it increasingly difficult to participate in multilateral organizations unless it returns to the flexible policies it pursued up until the end of the 1984 Olympic Games. These included Taibei's efforts to regain its place in some 400 non-governmental organizations under the name "Chinese Taipei," a name that is acceptable to Beijing and which was used at the Olympics. In addition, Taibei reduced restrictions on trade between Taiwan and the mainland, and allowed greater public discussion within Taiwan about future relations with the P.R.C.

Following the Olympics, however, there was a sharp move away from these flexible policies. Yu Guohua, the new premier, and Zhu Fusong, the minister of foreign affairs, are among those who doubted that the flexible approach would in fact strengthen Taibei's position in the international community, and this group has gained the upper hand in policymaking. They believe that the model used in the Asian Development Bank—which seats both Beijing, under the name the People's Republic of China, and Taibei, under the name Republic of China—should be applied to other intergovernmental organizations.[14]

[13] Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., "Allied Responses to the Soviet Challenge in East Asia and the Pacific," *The Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 82, No. 2065, Aug. 1984, pp. 55–57; and see Donald Zagoria, "The U.S.S.R. and Asia in 1984," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXV, No. 1, pp. 21–32.

[14] *The Central Daily News*, Feb. 16, Feb. 26, Mar. 2 and Mar. 3, 1985, p.1.

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As the result of this new rigidity, Taibei lost its seat last fall in the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), one of ten international governmental organizations to which Taibei still belonged. This inflexible approach, though criticized by many liberal KMT politicians, seems to have become the current strategy of the Taibei government in its efforts to reinforce its international position.[15] At the same time, Taibei has reintroduced restrictions on trade with the mainland and on free discussion of the issue.

This policy is becoming less and less viable. Taiwan's neighbors (mainly Japan, South Korea and the ASEAN countries) will not support an inflexible approach by Taibei; most of them no longer even include Taiwan in their security and strategic planning. It is unlikely that Taibei will be able to apply the Asian Development Bank model to other international organizations, since Beijing is not willing to make any further concessions on this matter.

VII

Over the next decade, Taibei has four basic options. The first is "Yi Bu Bian Ying Wan Bian"—to maintain its current policy in dealing with the changing world. This "cold-war" policy has the stated objective of "reunifying China under the Three People's Principles" (Nationalism, Democracy and People's Livelihood). It would reject direct trade with Beijing, limit indirect trade between the two sides, and further minimize informal contacts between the people on the mainland and on Taiwan. Taibei would continue to compete with Beijing in international institutions, and would make every attempt to damage Sino-American relations. It would increase its defense spending and try to import more sophisticated weapons from the United States. Internally, this policy would require further restrictions on the press and human rights. It would probably increase tensions, even provoke a confrontation, between Beijing and Taibei.

Taibei would continue this policy only if the forthcoming succession produced a conservative leadership, or if Beijing were suddenly to take a tougher approach toward Taibei. A cold-war policy would temporarily consolidate the KMT's con-

[15] *Jiushi Niandai* (*The Nineties*, Hong Kong), Sept. 1984, pp. 26–29; *The Central Daily News*, Jan. 4, Feb. 4 and Feb. 17, 1985, p. 1.

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trol over the island and help to stabilize a conservative successor to Jiang.

The cost, however, would be very high. It would slow the process of the island's pluralization. It would meet strong resistance from the internal opposition forces, and heighten policy differences and political struggles between the conservatives and liberals. Taiwan's program of upgrading the economy would be damaged, as businessmen were pushed to channel more of their investments overseas and the well-educated elite was discouraged from returning to Taiwan. In addition, foreign investors would be less inclined to move their capital and technology to Taiwan. The government would also be forced to increase its military budget, as Taibei would face the possibility of an invasion, or at least a blockade, from the mainland. Without direct U.S. involvement, Taibei would probably be unable to break up a blockade, and no one can predict the eventual economic and political results.

If Beijing initiated a blockade or attack on Taiwan, Taibei would probably receive American political support and arms. But whether such support would be transformed into direct U.S. military involvement is unclear. In my view, if the tensions came from Taibei's succession crisis or a self-initiated offensive, it is unlikely that the United States would continue its commitment to the security of Taiwan, as such involvement would provoke a strong reaction from Beijing, thereby destabilizing the international system of the region and endangering ongoing Sino-American cooperation. Furthermore, other states in the region would not welcome increased tensions between Taibei and Beijing.

What if Taibei chose another option, and claimed independence? A policy of independence would change the nature of the relationship between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait; it would be perceived abroad as a conflict between two states rather than civil conflict within a sovereign nation. Even if independence were claimed by the ruling KMT, rather than after a takeover by the TIM, Taiwan's internal politics would be destabilized. More seriously, the KMT, whose authority rests on the claim that it is the true government of all China, would lose its legitimacy as well as its power base. Political tensions and conflicts between different interest groups would be heightened, especially between those who support independence and those who oppose it. The majority of the people on the island would be worried about the possibility of war with

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Beijing and many would seek to leave. Most foreign companies would pull their investments out of Taiwan, and the island's economic prosperity would be jeopardized.

Facing an independent Taiwan, Beijing would be strongly tempted to launch a preemptive strike, because of strong domestic nationalism and the fear that a "do-nothing" policy would damage China's international credibility. If the TIM took power and declared the island to be independent, the sharp confrontation between the KMT and the extremists of the TIM could serve as a pretext for a military invasion by Beijing.

Independent, Taiwan would be more isolated than ever. No major world power would be likely to recognize its new status. Washington would publicly support it only at the risk of confronting Beijing and chancing a fundamental change in the balance of power in the Pacific. In addition, Taibei might even lose most of its existing informal or nongovernment contacts with other countries and international organizations, since Beijing would certainly put very strong pressure (including cutting off diplomatic ties) on any country that recognized the independent Taiwan. No country in Asia would encourage Taiwan to become independent in this manner, as it would destabilize the area and possibly provoke a regional war.

The only way Taiwan could gain sympathy (though not necessarily recognition) for a declaration of independence would be if it resulted from a preemptive attack by Beijing. But even under this condition, the choice for Taibei would still be dangerous. Washington might not be willing to fight a war with Beijing; the rest of Asia would protest the attack, but probably do nothing to help Taibei.

Clearly, the consequences of either continuing Taibei's cold-war policy or declaring independence would be costly and dangerous. There is a third option, theoretical, at least at present, rather than realistic: Taibei could choose to accept Beijing's proposal of reunification in the near future. This course would relieve Taibei of immediate fears of a preemptive attack by Beijing and allow direct economic ties with the mainland. But it would immediately cause an internal political upheaval. The distrust and hostility that has divided the political leaderships of Beijing and Taibei for over 60 years remains strong—the fundamental schism has not altered with the passing of the generations.

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VIII

The final option for Taibei in dealing with Beijing is to adopt a policy somewhere between the first and third, that is, to reduce tensions and to expand contacts, even informal ones, with Beijing, but not start formal negotiations immediately. To a certain extent, this policy was in fact followed by Taibei from 1981 to the summer of 1984.

This policy can be characterized as follows:

—A gradual shift away from the aim of "reunification of China under the Three People's Principles." The central policy issue would no longer be whether Taibei should talk with Beijing, but rather when and how to do so while protecting its fundamental interests. The two sides could even start informal but direct talks, in particular on the issue of Taiwan's future position in juxtaposition with the mainland. Taibei could be more flexible about its status in international forums, gradually shifting from the Asian Development Bank model of recognition to the Olympic model, expanding cultural and economic relations with countries with which it does not have diplomatic ties, and shoring up its political support in Washington.

—Decreasing tensions between the two sides by reducing hostile propaganda and provocative military or intelligence operations against the mainland; gradually reducing the restrictions on direct trade, exchange of mail and travel, and encouraging "people-to-people" contacts and scholarly exchanges, while maintaining well-trained and equipped armed forces, and continuing to import certain weapons. The basic security strategy would reasonably be shifted from one of "recovering the mainland" to effectively deterring military invasion.

—Continuing the process of pluralization and "Taiwanization," and terminating martial law.

Two basic conditions must come about for this policy option to be adopted: internally, the accession to power of a liberal group with broad popular support, in which technocrats play important policymaking roles; externally, the continuation of Beijing's reform program and "open door" policy, and a moderate approach toward Hong Kong and Taiwan.

Such a policy would change Taibei's weak position: it would reduce the possibility of a military attack by Beijing and buy

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time for Taibei. It would gradually increase mutual understanding and create a favorable atmosphere for formal negotiations.

This option would not undermine Taibei's autonomy or its international posture, as Taibei would not have to promise anything specific. There might be some increase in internal political tensions, should the conservatives within the KMT challenge a flexible policy. But there would be no marked increase in insecurity on the island, the Dang-wai would find little opportunity to challenge the government, and the continuing process of Taiwanization would erode the TIM's position. Expanded cultural and economic exchanges between Taiwan and the mainland would reinforce existing ties between mainlanders and Taiwanese, especially in intellectual and business circles.

Taiwan's program of upgrading its economic structure would also be strengthened. The island would be able to transfer more resources from its defense program to economic construction, especially large and long-term investment projects and high technology. It would certainly increase business confidence and encourage more of the well-educated to return to the island. It would also give Taiwan businessmen an advantage over foreign companies wanting to do business on the mainland.

Taibei would enjoy wider international contacts and could increase its participation in various international organizations. There is a possibility that some in Beijing might take advantage of this shift in policy to push Taibei to make further concessions. And Beijing would, of course, continue to pressure Washington to revoke the Taiwan Relations Act and rapidly reduce its arms sales to Taibei. But its incentive to do so would be reduced as tensions between Beijing and Taibei lessened and Beijing's concerns about the possibility of Taiwan's independence were allayed. In the long run, this moderate policy would create a favorable environment for peaceful reunification between the mainland and Taiwan.

It took 30 years for Beijing to change its policy from "liberation of Taiwan" to "reunification with Taiwan." It took even longer for Taibei to respond to such a fundamental change by shifting from "recovery of the mainland" to "reunification with the mainland under the Three People's Principles." Time and a well-reasoned approach by both sides should allow even further progress toward peaceful reunification.

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Henry F. Jackson

THE AFRICAN CRISIS: DROUGHT AND DEBT

The foreign debt of African nations has increased so rapidly in recent years that threats of bankruptcy hover across the continent, raising the prospect that Africa's most serious crisis will be triggered not by drought, but by debt. The debt problem is not only slowing economic growth and increasing poverty; it is fomenting political upheaval by forcing these nations to neglect social and economic development in order to make debt payments. People in many countries are denied the most basic public services as their governments devote dwindling export earnings, their main source of income, to economic and political survival.

Famine is now the familiar signal of Africa's misery, and the drought is a basic cause of the current emergency. But the foreign debt represents the long-term danger to the African countries' economic viability because it blocks their return to steady economic growth and locks them into greater dependency on the outside world. Without a solution to the debt crisis, the African nations can neither gain the agricultural self-sufficiency that is needed immediately, nor dream of an economic takeoff even beyond the year 2000.

Latin America has emerged as the focal point of alarm over the debt problems of developing nations. Latin American debt is huge, mainly commercial, and concentrated among fewer countries; the aggregate debt of the 50 states belonging to the Organization of African Unity (OAU), by comparison, is exceeded by the combined debt of just two Latin American countries, Brazil and Mexico. It has been projected that default by Brazil alone would cost the United States a loss of $25 billion in gross national product and of 400,000 jobs, within a year.

But if the preponderance of Latin America's indebtedness

Henry F. Jackson, author of *From the Congo to Soweto: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Africa Since 1960* and other works, is Professor of Political Science and Chairman of Black and Puerto Rican Studies at Hunter College in New York.

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represents the international debt bomb, the fuse extends to Africa. Notwithstanding the smaller magnitude of African external debts as a whole, the debt of almost every African country is astronomical in relation to its export earnings. And nearly two decades of failed economic policies have rendered African societies more volatile and less productive, weakening their capacity to repay. Debt servicing has exceeded the ability of most countries to fulfill their obligations to external creditors, public and private. The short-term consequence has been debt rescheduling by creditors in order to forestall an erosion of the traditional rules underpinning the international economic system, including the necessary rationale for new lending. But the future danger is that today's debt crisis in Africa will culminate in bankruptcy problems reaching far beyond its shorelines.[1]

II

The origins of Africa's debt crisis stem from external and internal factors spanning the last decade. Perhaps the most fundamental are the external: oil price increases commencing with the Arab oil boycott of 1973–74 slapped oil importers with new burdens; the subsequent worldwide recession devastated foreign exchange holdings; the steep rise in Western interest rates and the higher costs of refinancing unpaid balances bloated existing debts. At the same time, African nations continued to be marked by the colonial vestige of a fixed linkage between their primary commodities and cash crops, on one hand, and external trade, on the other. Africa's economic fortunes, in other words, remained subject to the vicissitudes of world export markets.

Internally, agriculture was widely neglected as most African governments concentrated on the development of urban areas, despite the fact that African populations remained overwhelmingly rural. Farm output, increasing about 1.3 percent annually through the 1970s, was steadily surpassed by an annual birthrate of over three percent. Inflation reached Latin American proportions. Border and civil wars devoured precious capital and sometimes prevented development of both cultivable and mineral-rich territories. Weapons imports grew to the point at which Africa (excluding Egypt) claimed 14.9 percent of world

[1] This essay deals only with members of the OAU. It therefore excludes South Africa, which most analysts regard as an exception to the continent's debt crisis.

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arms imports in 1982, becoming second in the Third World only to the Middle East, which had 41.9 percent. (The African total rises with the inclusion of Egypt, which, like Algeria and Libya, is among the world's ten biggest arms importers.)

The drought, meanwhile, exacted its terrible toll on agriculture and populations alike, leaving the afflicted nations with no choice but to use their foreign exchange reserves for food purchases abroad. In 1984 the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization identified 24 sub-Saharan countries threatened by drought-induced famine. Ethiopia has so far been the most conspicuous object of Western relief efforts; but Sudan, where approximately six million people now face starvation, seems destined to become the next theater of misery.

The accumulated factors, external and internal, did not apply to every nation; but the solvency of the fortunate few, such as Gabon and Botswana, was heavily outweighed by the spreading plight of the debt-ridden majority. Thus, by 1981, 20 of the 32 developing nations with arrears reported on external payments were African. Unlike the Latin American debt, the external debt of African nations is preponderantly public, or official, owed mainly to international financial institutions and West European governments. Commercial, or private, debts are not the main concern simply because commercial banks, anxious about most countries' creditworthiness, have denied loans to all but a few African countries; the exceptions include such major oil exporters as Nigeria and Algeria, and such non-fuel commodity exporters as Zaïre, Cameroon, Ivory Coast and Kenya.

The indebtedness of individual African countries ranges from amounts regarded as inconsequential by most bankers to sums so large they not only imperil the stability of the borrowers in question but are also causing increasing concern among official creditors. In 1983, Africa's total external debt climbed to $150 billion, as estimated by the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa. This figure equals about one-third of Latin America's debt, but the African crisis has placed increasing strain upon the so-called Paris and London Clubs, the international agencies that reschedule, respectively, public and private debts. In 1984, African countries were responsible for ten of the 14 official reschedulings by the Paris Club.

Oil-importing countries—the vast majority of African states—have been hardest hit. Their stability was upset first by the Arab oil boycott, then later by the doubling of oil prices

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from 1979 to 1981. The big oil exporters (Nigeria, Algeria, Libya, Gabon, Angola and Congo) have naturally fared much better. However, oil exporters and importers alike are now reeling from damages of the debt crisis—as are the privileged few, such as Nigeria and Ivory Coast, who benefited from the commodity price boom of the 1970s and until recently maintained high credit ratings. Consequently, the real question for the future is which countries will acquire the capacity to manage their debt problems and which will slide further down the slope toward bankruptcy.

Rescheduling has been the principal respite from the debt burden for most African countries. Zaïre holds the world record of six reschedulings between 1975 and 1983. Togo, not far behind, had five reschedulings; Liberia and Sudan tallied four each; Madagascar and Malawi, three. Indeed, Africa surpassed all other developing regions in the number of multilateral debt renegotiations during the period.

The scope of the African crisis is starkly dramatized by the plight of Sudan, which at the beginning of 1983 had an estimated debt of $7 billion, or more than seven times its export earnings; by 1985, its foreign debt had risen to $9 billion. Sudan's debt-service ratio, according to World Bank projections, will still average 80–90 percent for the rest of this decade, even with such remedies as a consolidation of outstanding arrears. Considering Khartoum's persistent failure to make payments on its debt to the United States, President Reagan's decision to freeze U.S. assistance to Sudan in February 1985 was not surprising.

III

Africa's current debt problem is inextricably connected to severe setbacks in other economic sectors. Surely the most painful has occurred in agriculture, the traditional backbone of Africa's predominantly rural societies. Among the mineral-rich countries, the decline is mainly attributable to government policies that neglected agricultural productivity in the vain hope that rising revenues from mineral exports, particularly oil, would assure ample income for consumer purchases abroad. State control of agriculture in most African nations undermined productivity by fixing farm wages so low that peasant farmers frequently abandoned the countryside, leaving cultivable land fallow and farm marketing in decline. The result was a sharp drop in Africa's share of world trade, even in the

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commodities in which the continent had a comparative advantage—coffee, tea, groundnuts, sugar, sisal, cocoa and cotton. After the 1960s, when most of Africa acquired political independence, agricultural output grew by more than three percent annually in only six countries (Ivory Coast, Kenya, Cameroon, Malawi, Swaziland and Rwanda), and it had begun to decline in some of these by the early 1980s.

Everywhere in Africa agricultural productivity suffered from the decline of prices for non-petroleum primary commodities that started in the 1970s and continued into the 1980s. In current dollars, these prices dropped by 27 percent between 1980 and 1982. Meanwhile, the prices for African imports of manufactured and various consumer goods from industrial nations increased, using up almost all those foreign exchange earnings not already consumed by debt repayments. The value of Africa's total exports dropped for the third consecutive year in 1983 to $64 billion, or nearly one-third below the 1980 level. So serious were the negative terms of trade by 1984 that African primary exporters encountered their worst year since the Great Depression.

A decrease in the volume of external investment, both private and public, has compounded the setbacks in African production and trade. For example, in 1980, American private direct investment of $592 million in Africa trailed far behind investment in most other Third World regions—$736 million in the Far East and $5 billion in Central and South America. Official development assistance dropped four percent in real terms overall in 1981; the International Development Association, the soft-loan window of the World Bank, which had been disbursing 30 percent of its credits to Africa, was forced by a reduction in U.S. contributions to curtail its activities significantly. Total foreign investment in Africa, particularly from West European countries, had grown rapidly during the 1970s, but began a downward trend early in this decade. Net disinvestment is emerging in some countries, resulting in a collapse in public utilities and the communications infrastructure.

Debt servicing, above all, has vitiated the development of African economies. A decade ago analysts regarded it as worrisome when a country spent more than a fifth of its annual export earnings on payments of its medium- and long-term external debt: by this standard, the vast majority of African countries are in deep trouble. Their debt-service ratios have risen so steeply in the last five years that they now average 30–

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40 percent. This means that the typical country must allocate from a third to nearly a half of its foreign exchange earnings merely to service its foreign debt, with dramatic increases expected in the next few years.

Debt-service payments on current public and publicly guaranteed medium- and long-term debt will probably expand from $5 billion in 1982 to an average of $11.6 billion during 1985–1987. Capital formation in Africa, which peaked in 1981 at 27.8 percent of gross domestic product (at constant prices), decreased to only 5.7 percent in 1983, largely as a result of debt-service payments. Relative to the declining financial resources of most African nations, debt servicing has been onerous enough to compel some to postpone necessary development projects and others to shelve indefinitely their modernization plans.

Indeed, debt servicing can be said to be at the core of the African countries' economic crisis. Externally, it prolongs their dependence on external creditors. At home, it thwarts their fundamental objective of transforming their stagnating economies into modern developed societies. By depleting available hard currencies, it also cuts back capital for food imports at a time when the drought is compounding this need.

To escape the debt burden, several countries have raised the possibility of forming a debtors' cartel. Some African countries, such as Algeria and Nigeria, are among the biggest debtors in the Third World; four other countries (Zambia, Ghana, Malawi and Sudan) were among the 11 largest recipients of International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans as of March 1985. Deliberate default by a group of debtors would inflict visible damage on the financial institutions of major Western creditors. On the other hand, the chances for a cartel's success are lessened by the official nature of the African debt, which denies these countries the collective influence they would have if their debts were concentrated among private banks. To formulate a common platform for negotiating loans and repayment of their foreign debts, the OAU states have scheduled a special summit meeting in Addis Ababa during July 1985.

Political upheaval—sometimes violent—is the more likely, and increasingly common, consequence of Africa's economic problems. Cutbacks in food subsidies and public services have provoked anti-regime demonstrations in Tanzania, Ghana and Zambia during the past five years, and "bread riots" have erupted in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. Civilian deaths and

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political instability have been the ubiquitous result of these uprisings, which were quelled by police or military repression.

Violence also exploded in Sudan in February 1985, after President Gaafar al-Nimeiri terminated government subsidies on fuel and food in a last-ditch effort to cut state spending. Nimeiri had hoped that this move would help win IMF approval for new credits. Within days, however, university students and professional unions demanding Nimeiri's resignation took to the streets in a nationwide strike that precipitated a communications blackout and paralyzed Khartoum. At the time, Nimeiri was in Washington making a desperate plea to the Reagan Administration for renewed U.S. economic assistance. The Sudanese leader's fate was sealed not in Washington, but in Khartoum: the military responded to the uprising by toppling the regime, and the deposed president could not go home again.

When the coup took place, Sudan owed the IMF almost $130 million in arrears, and the figure was expected to reach $225 million by the end of 1985. It is not surprising, therefore, that the IMF had required that austerity measures be imposed, among them an end to state subsidies, as a precondition for additional loans. IMF conditionality did not cause the coup; Nimeiri's downfall must ultimately be attributed to numerous political and economic failures that had already thrust the country into chaos and bankruptcy. But, insofar as Nimeiri's move to end subsidies for bread and other basic commodities resulted in sharp price rises, which in turn sparked the riots, the IMF program was clearly a precipitating factor.

IV

International aid efforts to alleviate the African crisis began to engage the IMF at the beginning of the 1980s, when it emerged as a major lender to African nations. IMF negotiations were tense from the outset, as African supplicants objected to its binding loan conditions, such as restrictions on the level of domestic spending, relaxation of price controls and ceilings on external borrowing. In particular, the IMF's common requirement for eliminating subsidies on consumer goods, often perceived by Africans as the *agent provocateur*—as in Sudan—of the food riots, provoked strong objections.

Currency devaluation, however, epitomizes the contradictory perspectives of the IMF and Africa. Devaluation is supposed to expand a country's foreign exchange earnings by stimulating

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its production and curtailing its imports, which become more expensive as a direct result of devaluation. But African producers remain incapable of exerting much influence over the prices of their exports, or reversing the decline in demand for their commodities that has resulted from Western substitution of synthetics for cotton, aluminum for copper, and artificial sweeteners for sugar. Thus Tanzania angrily resisted IMF conditions of a massive devaluation in 1981. Likewise, Nigeria has continued to reject IMF conditionality in the aftermath of the military coup in 1983.

But most of Africa's cash-starved economies have accepted devaluation as part of the acrid medicine they must take to obtain IMF loan assistance. Ghana, for example, reduced its currency from 1.75 cedis to the dollar in 1981 to 30 cedis to the dollar only two years later—a devaluation of over 90 percent. For certain African states, especially the resource-poor, compliance with IMF conditions is inescapable because the IMF represents their ultimate safety net against financial ruin. Somalia, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, for instance, have obtained as much as a third or more of their GNP from official development assistance.

The IMF and the World Bank work closely together on structural adjustment programs in Africa. Membership in the IMF is a prerequisite of membership in the World Bank, which allows for longer-term adjustment not provided for by the IMF. Substantial delays in payments of outstanding loans can provoke a suspension of disbursements on existing credits. The debt crisis has only accentuated Africans' vested interest in access to multilateral loans. By May 1985, every one of the 50 OAU states except Angola had become a member of the IMF.

In 1984 the World Bank created the Special Assistance Facility for sub-Saharan Africa, a new operation to provide loans on easy terms to boost food output and restore decaying infrastructures. Originally proposing a budget of $2 billion, the bank scaled back its original target to only $1.25 billion by May 1985; the United States, preferring bilateral to multilateral arrangements, refused to contribute. Economic reform remains a condition for assistance from the available budget.

The Reagan Administration, emphasizing free market policies, has reinforced the pressures for reform. Certain countries have been made ineligible for U.S. economic assistance by the Brooke Amendment, approved in 1976 as part of the Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act. This amendment prohibits U.S.

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assistance to any country defaulting for more than a calendar year on payments of both principal and interest on a U.S. loan. Under this law, Tanzania and Ethiopia were denied economic assistance in 1984 (though not emergency food aid); Zambia, a pro-Western nation, and Liberia, an American partner since its nineteenth-century creation by Afro-American settlers, were listed as potential violators of the Brooke Amendment. The U.S. African Economic Policy Reform Program, launched in 1985 with $75 million in economic support funds, constitutes the Administration's new lever of pressure on selected countries. Its target of more than $1 billion in fiscal year 1986 for bilateral economic assistance to selected sub-Saharan countries will further encourage African governments to relinquish statist and socialist policies in favor of free market reforms.

A consensus is growing among all Western lenders, whether multilateral or bilateral, public or private, that the African economies cannot be stabilized without fundamental adjustments. The real possibility that these lenders will eventually coordinate aid policies turns yet another screw on African leaders' ability to obtain aid without yielding to Western prescriptions.

Nearly all African leaders have conceded the need for some kind of reform. Complaints persist on certain aspects of IMF support, especially its usual short-term duration of less than two years. But Ghana, Senegal and Malawi, among others, have already initiated major efforts to advance economic growth in accordance with IMF guidelines. In March 1985, even Tanzania's President Julius Nyerere reversed his position and resumed talks for an IMF loan.

Regardless of the outcome of the economic reforms, it is evident that massive infusions of additional capital will neither resolve the African debt crisis, nor eliminate the larger economic problems of which it is a part. As a matter of fact, heavy borrowing by some countries has merely enabled them to postpone policy reforms because the new loans eased the adjustment process—though only at the expense of higher debt-service ratios. Such loans saved the African governments from having to shrink consumption levels that have fallen so low that they expose approximately 150 million Africans to death from malnutrition. Domestic savings also disappeared in countries with access to external aid, as governments expanded consumption and deferred tax increases.

The cumulative effect of foreign aid on African economies

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has not only caused them to relax local efforts at resource mobilization, it has made them vastly more dependent on external support than they were when most acquired political independence nearly two decades ago.[2]

V

Although Western Europe shoulders the weight of the African debt, Washington cannot avoid assuming a role in resolving it. The United States is the principal contributor to the World Bank and the IMF, and is therefore involved, albeit indirectly, in multilateral approaches to African borrowing.

American interests are also affected by the serious deterioration in U.S.-African trade. U.S. exports to African countries, which jumped 93 percent between 1978 and 1981, slid from $10.9 billion in 1981 to $10.1 billion in 1982, as economic pressures forced those countries to cut back on such imports as machinery, transportation equipment, and chemical and agricultural products. U.S.-African trade has lagged behind U.S. trade with other developing regions, as Africa's share of world imports slipped below five percent in 1983 and exports declined as well.

Access to African minerals remains important to the United States, where industrial recovery will require increasing imports of such commodities as cobalt and chromium, as well as to Western Europe, which in 1982 purchased 50 percent of developing Africa's exports. Oil imports, though not an American priority, continue to be important to America's allies in the European Economic Community. A total failure by the African countries to meet principal and interest payments on their debts could damage those European economies which maintain either large trade relations or monetary alignments with defaulting African states. International financial institutions would be similarly affected by widespread African default.

American policymakers must also recognize the possibilities created by economic distress for increased Soviet activity on the continent—another opportunity for Moscow to penetrate

[2] A U.N. source goes so far as to assert that serious adverse effects have also resulted from external food shipments, because in many countries the emergency food aid "has displaced farmers from local markets, since they are reluctant to produce more than their own requirements for a market which has [been] made unpredictable [by] massive injections of food aid." U.N. Fiscal, Monetary, Financial Policy and Institutions Section, *The Balance of Payments Problems of Developing Africa—A Reassessment*, New York: United Nations, August 1984, p. 66.

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the mineral-rich countries on which the West relies. It is doubtful, however, that Moscow could afford huge investments along the lines of its support to Egypt during the 1950s, and Soviet agriculture obviously provides no model for this most urgent of Africa's development needs.

Most African countries remain firmly in the Western camp; while several governments have adopted socialist policies, few have followed Ethiopia in linking themselves to the Soviet bloc. But cold-war competition, already prevalent in a few areas, will certainly intensify if U.S. assistance to African regimes declines. Desperation, in other words, could push these regimes to explore alliances with the Soviet Union—if only as a stratagem to extract more aid from the West.

VI

What can the United States do to relieve Africa's debt crisis—the new symbol of the continent's economic breakdown—while reinforcing Africa's ability to meet its international financial obligations?

Because Africa's debt crisis is inseparable from its failure in agriculture since 1960, it is obvious that future U.S. assistance must emphasize rapid agricultural development. To be effective, such aid cannot be limited to augmenting production of cash crops to increase exports; it must help Africans enlarge and diversify domestic farming in order to generate growth and self-sufficiency within their economies. Economic development spearheaded by increased agricultural productivity would also obviate the need for food imports, thereby preserving precious hard currency for other essential investments.

Recent attention on the drought and famine has deflected policymakers' awareness of Africa's abundance of cultivable land and water sources. It is often forgotten that the African continent is three times as large as the United States, that Zaïre alone possesses 13 percent of the world's hydroelectric potential. The tragedy lies in a record of gross administrative neglect of naturally endowed lands that had yielded abundant harvests for centuries prior to independence. But Africa has not lost the capacity for a flourishing agricultural market that could both satisfy local appetites and provide a cornucopia to the world. It is this reality that prompted the editors of *New Nigerian* to write in 1984: "Blessed with vast arable land, Nigeria should be the breadbasket of the world. But it is the hungry mouth."

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If Africa managed to expand and diversify agricultural production, public and private American capital could then be assigned to a second area of great potential: food processing. U.S. equity investment in African food processing—of vegetables, fruits, cocoa, marmalades and fish—would significantly expand foreign exchange earnings. It would also increase the amount of foodstuffs for local markets. The H.J. Heinz Company's investment in Zimbabwe's Olivine Industries, a large producer of edible oils, soaps, candles and protein meal, exemplifies the enormous possibilities both for African productivity and African-American collaboration. Heinz acquired a 51-percent interest in the operation in 1982, the country's socialist government retained the rest.

Third, Washington could reduce or eliminate trade barriers that restrict certain African products. Sugar quotas, for example, have limited imports from Ivory Coast, Malawi, Madagascar, Mauritius, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. Tariffs on textiles and apparels, averaging ten percent, are among the highest in the U.S. tariff schedule, and adversely affect exporters such as Morocco, Nigeria, Ghana and Liberia. Several countries have encountered obstacles in exporting peanuts to the United States because of America's quotas and technical standards. Without jeopardizing domestic American producers, selective trade modifications could be introduced to boost Africa's primary exports substantially.

Import substitution is a fourth area where the United States can promote African self-sufficiency. Rather than trying to build local African enterprises through the export of American equipment and supplies—such as tin cans for the development of food canning or paper for printing—the United States could provide technical and capital assistance to local producers and entrepreneurs who could then create such industries from local resources and with local manpower. This would contribute to self-reliance in such industries as beverages, leather and shoes, which now depend on large quantities of imported chemicals and spare parts.

In addition, I would recommend three separate fiscal remedies to deal directly with the African debt crisis: a debt moratorium, a debt write-off and a conversion of debts into grants. A debt moratorium would suspend obligations at current levels for a specified long-term grace period, perhaps ten years or more, while African governments accumulated foreign exchange and maximized capital reserves before resuming repay-

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ments. A moratorium does not excuse debts; it simply allows a breathing spell before the appointed day of reckoning. It would not be a unilateral action, as was Mexico's suspension of principal payments on its debts to foreign banks in August 1982. Moratorium on the African debt would require mutual agreement between African governments and the foreign governments to which much of the debt is owed. A U.S. initiative could help European governments organize a moratorium; the United States, thus, could catalyze a process that would simultaneously pare down Africa's debt obligations and arrest its current drift toward catastrophe.

Debt write-off, on the other hand, would excuse certain African debts, or portions of debts, outright. This option acknowledges the fact—often obscured by policymakers—that some African countries are already technically in default. A debt write-off of specified portions of a country's debt, if not the whole, would simply recognize the situation that already exists. Debt rescheduling is a temporary palliative that does not provide substantive remedy; it merely postpones the problem until it has been aggravated by higher interest rates. The economic devastation endemic in a few war-torn or resource-poor countries, such as Chad, means that they will probably never be able to pay their foreign debts. In such cases, a debt write-off could be justified, not only to respond to the debtor's bankruptcy, but also to protect international financial structures and practices.

Conversion of debts into grants is an alternative to debt write-off. An African nation's obligations to the United States would be, in effect, redefined as grants; but the debtor would not necessarily be excused from some kind of quid pro quo, because payment could be accepted in the currency of the country. If such an arrangement were made with Mauritius, for instance, the United States could spend its acquired rupees on consular and other U.S. personnel purchases locally. Mauritius' foreign obligations to Washington would be cleared. This would also allow a reduction in dollar inflows to Mauritius for embassy operations.

The ultimate rationale for all these recommendations is that the debt burden of African states may actually be twice as large as officially reported, because the statistics of the World Bank, the IMF, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and even the African governments usually do not include loans with maturities of less than a year. Official mili-

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tary transactions are also excluded; but military expenditures, principally on a cash basis, often inflate the overall external debt.

There are, of course, definite limits to outside efforts to assist any African country seeking a return to normal growth and external and internal equilibrium. U.S. intervention to reduce or eliminate African obligations to international financial institutions, for instance, is not to be expected, even if it were desirable. The basic improvements necessary for the African economies—particularly a pricing policy that provides adequate wage incentives for farming—are clearly the Africans' own responsibility. Such limitations, however, do not preclude any U.S. assistance.

International trade would not be the only victim of default by numerous African debtors; the more ominous danger is that an African collapse would spread to other developing regions, with calamitous results for the entire international financial system—to say nothing of the political and human consequences across a continent.

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Richard B. Parker

APPOINTMENT IN OUJDA

Until recently, the countries of North Africa have seemed in a state of political equilibrium. Morocco and Tunisia, both regarded as close friends of the United States, reinforced each other as moderate states with similar outlooks; they served as geopolitical balance across the Maghreb to the stable but ideologically more radical Algeria in between. Libya, erratic and unpredictable, was isolated and could expect to encounter the hostility of the other three if it embarked on any adventures against any one of them. That was the situation until the middle of last year.

On August 13, 1984, without notice to the outside world, the monarch of Morocco, Hassan II, and Muammar Qaddafi, the military strongman of Libya, signed an agreement of unity, joining their separate and separated states in an unlikely alliance. A conservative monarch made common cause with the most radical figure in the Arab world, a man who had been attacking him for the better part of 15 years in the crudest and most violent terms, and who was the *bête noir* of his traditional American and African friends. At a stroke, Qaddafi's isolation ended; he had acquired an impressive ally and, if the remarks of various Moroccan officials are to be taken seriously, the paper alliance is turning toward a union of some substance.

This alliance has voided a number of long-standing and comfortable assumptions about who is on whose side in North Africa. Can Tunisia, for instance, still count on Moroccan support against Libya? Algeria, engaged in border disputes with both Libya and Morocco but not concerned about their separate military capabilities, must now consider the possibility of the two combining to pose a serious threat. They have the wherewithal to do so, thanks to Qaddafi's Soviet-supplied arsenal.

The 1963 border war between Algeria and Morocco, the

Richard Parker is Editor of the *Middle East Journal*. A former Ambassador to Algeria, Lebanon and Morocco, he is the author of *North Africa: Regional Tensions and Strategic Concerns*, a Council on Foreign Relations book published by Praeger in October 1984.

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nine-year-old war in the western Sahara, Libyan attempts to start armed uprisings in Tunisia, and Qaddafi's intrusions into Chad are all indications of North African readiness to use force in pursuit of national goals. To be sure, King Hassan has given assurances that the agreement with Libya is directed against no one. But the Moroccan military has long wanted to strike at the Saharan guerrilla sanctuaries in Algeria, and Moroccan claims last January that one of their aircraft had been shot down by a missile fired from Algerian territory show that a rationale for military action can be found if needed. Article 12 of the union agreement, which provides that "any aggression against one of the two states would constitute an aggression against the other," could provide the framework for such a joint effort, and Algerian military planners must take this possibility seriously.

In short, the accord between Libya and Morocco has provoked fundamental policy reappraisals. The states of the region, and the United States as well, have had to adjust their basic assumptions about the Maghreb.

II

The United States has important interests in North Africa. The most obvious is the region's strategic location along the southern flank of NATO, controlling access to the Mediterranean and the north-south flyway to Africa, both of which are vital to the defense of Europe.

The United States has had a special military relationship with Morocco since World War II, founded on air bases and communications facilities. Today it rests on an access agreement negotiated in 1982 which would permit the United States to use one or more of its old Moroccan bases to stage troops en route to the Persian Gulf in the event of an emergency there. The United States also counts on Sixth Fleet visits to Moroccan ports and on Moroccan cooperation in intelligence matters. It will continue to need military cooperation with Morocco as long as it maintains an active military presence in the Mediterranean. The impact of the union agreement on that cooperation is therefore of great concern in Washington.

The United States also has interests in the other states of the region. Algeria is the most important economically; it is the principal U.S. trading partner, and U.S. firms hold some $2 billion worth of contracts there today. Furthermore, Algeria is a force to be reckoned with on the international scene, largely

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due to the competence and dedication of its foreign policy establishment and to its support for Third World causes and movements of national liberation.

The Reagan Administration, which had cast tentative eyes upon an improved relationship with Algeria, Morocco's longtime rival, even before Vice President George Bush visited Algiers in 1983, stepped up contacts after the union agreement, and welcomed Algerian President Chadli Benjedid for a state visit to Washington in April of this year. Almost simultaneously, the Administration decided to make Algeria eligible to purchase U.S. arms under the foreign military sales program.

Tunisia, the smallest of the North African states, has long been considered a model of political organization and evolutionary development. The success of this experiment in moderation is important to the West as a symbol of Westernization and what it can do. Alone of the North African states, Tunisia has never done anything to endanger its friendship with the United States. For it to go under or decay into radicalism would have serious consequences for Western prestige, much as the Iranian revolution did. President Habib Bourguiba, one of the most remarkable leaders of the postwar period, is in his eighties and in uncertain health. The question of the Tunisian succession has been looming for years and, as the day approaches, the possibility of interference by Qaddafi is preoccupying both Tunisian and foreign observers.

Tunisian-Libyan relations have long been uneasy, and Qaddafi's frequent changes of course provoke understandable anxiety in Tunis. A Tunisian-Libyan joint committee meeting last December issued a communiqué which sounded friendly and cooperative, but it came just after Qaddafi had made ominous remarks about "liberating" Tunisia and not recognizing the boundaries between the two countries. In an extensive interview in April he again referred to the evolution of Tunisia "after the liberation." Qaddafi has already made at least two attempts to send armed dissidents into Tunisia and there is reason to fear he will try again in an effort to exploit the succession crisis when it comes. The union agreement with Hassan may reduce the risks in doing so, for it reduces the likelihood of a Moroccan objection.

Qaddafi still has undiminished capacity for mischief, despite his reduced oil revenues. State terrorism is not all that expensive, and trouble-making among one's neighbors can be accomplished fairly cheaply if one has few scruples about how it is

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carried out. There is little the United States can do to restrain Qaddafi. The various economic measures it has taken, including the embargo on Libyan oil imports, have been ineffective because the European powers will not join in. Even though they are increasingly upset by Qaddafi's actions against Libyan dissidents residing in European territory, they have too many economic interests of their own to protect. Indeed, they are picking up the lucrative Libyan contracts that American companies have had to forego.

The U.S. government may derive visceral satisfaction from the knowledge that it is not financing Qaddafi anymore, at least not directly, and its various displays of force have perhaps made Qaddafi keep his head down from time to time. But U.S. efforts to isolate him have now been further weakened by the opening to Morocco.

III

The announcement that Hassan and Qaddafi had met in the eastern Moroccan town of Oujda and signed an agreement creating an "Arab-African union of state" came as a disagreeable surprise in many concerned capitals, including Paris and Washington. There was the usual talk of intelligence failures and some speculation about why the American ambassador to Morocco, who was in frequent contact with the king, had not been informed in advance.

From Hassan's account in a speech to his people a week later, the accord was a surprise to everyone, including himself, when he proposed the idea to a Libyan emissary on July 13.[1] Qaddafi has said as much; the official version, therefore, is that a thoroughly extemporaneous act of personal diplomacy did not allow Hassan time for advance consultation with such friends as the United States and France.

Other signs, however, indicate that this version may be disingenuous. In an interview with *The New York Times* last September, Hassan remarked candidly, "Why consult with people you know are going to say no?" Indeed, he had a month from July 13 to let his friends know what was up, but chose not to do so.

There is even some evidence that, despite his disclaimers, he had had a project of union in mind well before the July meeting.

[1] See FBIS LD212203 of August 22, 1984, for the text of the speech.

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Le Monde of September 29, 1984, cited an unnamed senior Algerian official as saying that exactly the same agreement, minus its clauses about mutual defense and a defense council, had been proposed to their foreign minister, Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, in May 1984, by the king's right-hand man, Reda Guedira. Ibrahimi had noted that the agreement had two major lacunae: it failed to take account of the friendship treaty between Algeria, Tunisia and Mauritania concluded in 1983, and it did not mention the problem of the western Sahara. The Algerians had then made a counterproposal in June, including a compromise offer on the Sahara. The Moroccan reply, two months later, was the Oujda accord with Libya, which the Algerians took as an affront. This account has been confirmed to this author by a second senior Algerian official.

It is conceivable that, unwilling to accept Algeria's terms, Hassan decided in haste to unite with Qaddafi on the rebound, but it is unlikely that he would have undertaken something that important without giving it a good deal of thought beforehand. Indeed, he had had at least a month to reflect on the Algerian response before springing his surprise on the Libyans.

The text of the agreement provides for a loose structure of coordinating bodies rather than a government of union.[2] Hassan has described it as an agreement of "cooperation and consultation." The union is to be bicephalous, with Hassan and Qaddafi serving simultaneously as chairmen and making all the decisions. Below them will be a permanent secretariat (which will alternate between the capitals); political, defense, economic and "cultural and technical action" councils; an executive committee; a joint legislature; and a court of justice. The councils, which are consultative in nature, are to study unspecified issues submitted to them by the chairmen, to propose solutions and "prepare useful projects," but they do not have the power to initiate studies or reach decisions. The executive committee is to follow up the decisions of the chairmen and ensure their implementation. These are, thus, advisory and executive, not policy, bodies.

Hassan told Flora Lewis of *The New York Times* in February that he would soon be going to Libya to sign a series of annexes

[2] Paul Balta's account in *Le Monde* of October 25, 1984, claims the agreement was drafted by two French legal experts, Georges Vedel and Jean-René Duprey. His Moroccan sources also said the bombastic preamble, which *Le Monde* had characterized as "Qaddafiesque," was in fact written by Hassan. The fact that the two Frenchmen must have been at work since at least May, if the Algerian story is true, makes the claim of spontaneity even more dubious.

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dealing with the budget of the joint secretariat, economic, training and labor accords, and the submission of disputes to the World Court. As of this writing, he has not yet made the trip, but even if he does go, it remains to be seen whether the administrative machinery will work to any great effect.

Given the wide gulf of historical, cultural, social, political and economic differences between the two countries, not to mention their geographic separation—it is 1,200 air miles from Tripoli to Rabat—there is room for considerable skepticism. Politics makes strange bedfellows in the Arab world, as elsewhere, and given the history of Qaddafi's erratic reverses, one is tempted not to take this venture seriously. But the difference in this case is that the initiative came from Hassan, not Qaddafi, and given the stakes of the North African power balance, it cannot be lightly dismissed.

Whether or not the various councils and committees ever amount to anything, the fact that Hassan has reached an understanding with Qaddafi is significant because it means the traditional lines of force have been altered. In the closed circuit of North Africa, that means there will be countermoves. Algeria, in particular, sees the union agreement as directed against it, thus requiring some reaction on its part. The vehemence of that reaction will be directly proportional to the effectiveness of the union agreement; Algeria has already responded with increased support for the guerrillas of the Polisario (Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Río de Oro) to counter Hassan's ambitions in the western Sahara. The renewed fighting in that region which began in late 1984 reflects that support.

IV

Hassan's motives in concluding the agreement may never be fully disclosed, but we can safely dismiss the notion that he was out to tame Qaddafi. He had his own, very Moroccan, fish to fry. Among these was a pressing need for some economic "oxygen." French sources say Qaddafi has already given, or promised to give, $50 million, but this is unconfirmed, and would be a drop in the bucket in any event. There may be more to come, but Libyan capabilities in this respect are limited because of sharply reduced oil revenues. More important is possible help in other respects, notably petroleum and employment. Morocco imports 160,000 barrels of oil a day, which just happens to be Libya's current marketable surplus. Large num-

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bers of Moroccans may be able to find employment in Libya.[3] There is also talk of joint economic ventures, which would be important to Moroccan economic development. The Libyans had already set up a Libyan-Moroccan bank before the Oujda accord and there may be more such activities in the works.

Hassan needs all the help of this sort he can get. A prolonged drought, the continuing expense of his western Saharan venture, the drop in phosphate prices, decreased tourist revenues and remittances because of the recession in Europe, the high price of oil which must be paid for in expensive dollars, and the problems generated by population growth have all combined to create a continuing economic crisis. By the spring of 1984, Morocco's debt-service ratio was a staggering 41 percent, and the annual balance of payments deficit was about $2 billion. In January 1985, a consultative group meeting under World Bank auspices in Paris estimated that Morocco would need $3 billion a year in foreign aid for the next three years.

Morocco's problem became particularly acute in 1983, when the oil glut led to a reduction in the generous subsidies it had been receiving from the states of the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia in particular. The amounts of such subsidies have never been made public, but they may have totaled as much as $2 billion in 1981 and have probably been cut at least in half since then. Meanwhile, the effort in the Sahara, which was thought to add close to $1 million a day to the state expenses in 1978, may today add two to three times that, once inflation and the cost of new Saharan infrastructure are factored in.

The argument is often made that the expenses there do not add much to the fixed costs of maintaining a military establishment, which is furthermore absorbing some of the unemployed and making certain positive contributions in the form of civic action projects and the training of manpower. This argument ignores the fact that the Moroccan military establishment has had to be almost doubled in size because of the Saharan problem (from 85,000 to over 150,000), that it is much more expensive to maintain troops in a state of battle readiness in a remote desert than to maintain them in peaceful garrisons at home, and that the ambitious program of civilian infrastructure projects which the government has undertaken in the Saharan

[3] There are an estimated 14,000 Moroccans in Libya today. Moroccan officials are talking in terms of 100,000 more, particularly if some of the 60,000–90,000 Tunisian workers now in Libya are sent home.

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province, as a way to win the hearts and minds of the people, has been very costly. Morocco would have difficulty enough feeding and clothing its population without the Saharan conflict. Adding the latter to its daily bill seriously augments its deficit. Neither the French nor the Americans are prepared to foot this bill, and thus Hassan must look for economic as well as political alternatives.

V

The union agreement makes no mention of the war in the Sahara, nor of Qaddafi's earlier commitment to Hassan, given in June 1983 but never made public, to stop arming the Polisario in exchange for Morocco's abstention from interference with Libyan designs in the Chad. Moroccan officials, including King Hassan himself, say that Qaddafi has kept this promise, and that the cessation of the flow of Libyan arms has been an important factor reducing the effectiveness of the Polisario.[4] Therefore, the common conception is erroneous that the Oujda agreement's principal rationale was to end Libyan aid to the Polisario. That aid, which had been substantial, had probably ceased a year earlier.

Moroccan officials maintain, however, that one benefit of the union agreement is that it implies Libyan recognition of Morocco's claim to the Sahara. If Hassan is seriously interested in the political (as opposed to military) value of that recognition, it is testimony to his growing isolation in Africa on the Saharan issue. That isolation has been aggravated, not mitigated, by the union, which looks cynical to many moderate African leaders.

This was not Hassan's first miscalculation regarding the Sahara. When he boldly announced, in the fall of 1975, that the International Court of Justice had ruled in Morocco's favor (in fact the court had found that Morocco's ties with the Spanish, or western, Sahara did not constitute sovereignty), and then sent 350,000 unarmed civilians into the territory to force Spain's hand, thus effecting an *anschluss* with this piece of desert irredenta, it was widely hailed as a master stroke. With one bold move he had resolved a vexing problem and had thumbed his nose at Algeria, which had been arguing that

[4] Polisario sources, however, maintain that Libya continues to give them *financial* help and has only cut off the supply of arms, which is not a problem for them, other sources being available. They point to various offensives in 1984–85 as evidence that Qaddafi's actions have not seriously diminished their military capabilities.

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it was an interested party and that there should be a meaningful exercise of self-determination for the people of the Sahara.

President Houari Boumedienne of Algeria was furious. He blamed the Americans for giving Hassan a green light and vowed that Morocco would pay dearly for ignoring Algeria. One of his senior advisers told a visiting American official, "We're going to bleed Hassan white." The instrument for doing this was the Polisario, which had been agitating for independence since the early 1970s. The Algerians gave it logistical support and sanctuary, and by late 1978 the movement had become a serious threat to Moroccan control of the Sahara and southern Morocco.[5]

Since then the threat has been largely contained, thanks to better organization and tactics on the part of the Moroccan army, to better equipment and training supplied by the Americans, the French and others, and in particular to the construction of the Sand Wall. A local Great Wall of China, this encloses large tracts of territory in the Sahara and severely limits the Polisario's ability to use the long-range hit-and-run tactics which had been the key to its success.

Indeed, the wall has been so effective that Western observers periodically claim the war is all but over. From time to time, however, the Polisario stages large-scale attacks against Moroccan positions, to show that it is still very much alive. It has been particularly active since October 1984, in obvious reaction to the Oujda agreement, and claims to have killed 250–350 Moroccan soldiers between October and January 1985. On January 12, the Polisario shot down a Moroccan Mirage F-1 with a missile which the Moroccans claimed came from Algerian territory. At about the same time it shot down an American-supplied OV-10 near Dakhla, on the coast.

The Polisario is far from finished, and recurrent reports of its demise have all been premature. Polisario effectives are put at only 3,500 by informed Americans in Washington, but the fact that a force that small is tying down some 90,000 Moroccan troops, sheltered behind fortifications equipped with American-supplied sensors and supported by a modern air force, says something about Saharan martial qualities. The Moroccans have been unable to maintain garrisons outside the Sand Wall, and their efforts at search-and-destroy tactics have been largely

[5] For a description of the situation at that point see the article by Congressman Stephen Solarz (D-N.Y.), "Arms for Morocco?" in *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1979/80, pp. 278–299.

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unsuccessful. As long as the Polisario has a minimum of supplies and can find sanctuary in the deserts of neighboring Algeria and Mauritania, the Moroccans will be unable to impose their will. The same can be said of the Polisario, however: it cannot impose its will on the Moroccans. The latter are going ahead with creation of a new, urban, settled Sahara in the hope that eventually it will make the Polisario obsolete.

Efforts at solving the problem have revolved around two principal approaches: a negotiated settlement involving some sort of territorial or political compromise—partition or local autonomy in the context of a federation—or a referendum on independence or union with Morocco. A series of would-be mediators has failed to promote a negotiated solution and hope has rested for some time on the referendum approach.

Hassan proposed a referendum at the Organization of African Unity meeting in Nairobi in 1981, and that organization immediately accepted it. In fact, all the parties accepted the idea in principle, but it obviously meant different things to each of them and they could not agree on implementation. Opinion is divided on what the outcome of a free referendum would be. My belief is that the majority of Saharans would choose independence, not union with Morocco.

The Algerians and the Polisario have insisted on elaborate arrangements that would prevent Morocco, as the occupying power, from predetermining the outcome of a referendum. A majority of the OAU members feel these differences should be ironed out through direct discussions between the Moroccans and the Polisario, but the Moroccans have rejected that idea publicly, believing it would confer legitimacy on the Polisario, whom they term bandits and mercenaries. (At Algeria's urging, Moroccan officials have held clandestine talks with the Polisario but, according to Hassan, the purpose was not to negotiate but only to tell the Saharans they were Moroccans and should come home.)

Disagreement within the OAU over this question came to a head on November 12, 1984. Morocco and Zaïre walked out of the organization's summit meeting at Addis Ababa, after the OAU had seated a delegation representing the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic, the political arm of the Polisario. But they were not joined by Morocco's other traditional African allies, many of whom were alienated by the union agreement with Qaddafi and some of whom share a growing African sentiment that this Arab problem should not be allowed to

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distract the organization from purely African problems. The U.N. General Assembly subsequently supported the OAU position by passing a resolution calling for direct Moroccan-Saharan talks; this gave the Saharans and their Algerian supporters an important political victory, but brought the issue no nearer to resolution.

In Moroccan eyes, the obvious key to the impasse is Algeria. If it would follow Qaddafi's example and stop helping the Polisario, the struggle would be over. The guerrillas would perhaps be able to maintain a very low level of resistance for some time, but would no longer constitute an effective fighting force. When President Boumedienne died in December 1978, the Moroccans hoped that his successor, Chadli Benjedid, would take a more relaxed view of the Sahara and that they could reach a compromise with him. This was not an unreasonable expectation. Benjedid had a reputation as a pragmatist and has lived up to it in many respects; also, the Sahara is not a popular issue in Algeria, as it is in Morocco.

Benjedid seems, however, to be genuinely constrained by ideological as well as practical considerations from making a deal at the expense of the Saharans. To do so would badly tarnish Algeria's self-image and its reputation in the Third World, and it would give a victory to Hassan. Hopes for a settlement were revived when Hassan and Benjedid met in February 1983 (also at Oujda) and set the stage for an exchange of high-level visits and for resumption of relations, which had been broken when Algeria recognized the Polisario's Saharan Republic in 1976. But relations were not resumed, since there was no fundamental agreement on the terms of a Saharan settlement.

Meanwhile, Algeria proceeded to negotiate friendship agreements with Tunisia and Mauritania, hailed as a step toward creation of the Greater Maghreb. Morocco was invited to join, but demurred because of the Sahara issue. Libya apparently was not invited because of serious border and political differences with Algeria, and because its involvement in Chad was contrary to the terms of the agreements. The ultimate consequence is the strange realignment we see today.

VI

The August 1984 agreement at Oujda can now be seen as merely a formalization of an alliance that began with a surprise

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visit to Morocco by Qaddafi in June 1983.[6] At that time Libya was the principal weapons supplier to the Polisario, and could up the ante in the Sahara very easily. Libyan abandonment of the Polisario, on the other hand, would significantly improve Hassan's chances of effecting a military solution, which had always eluded him, or at least it would make compromise more attractive to the Algerians. Or so the theory must have gone. It has not worked, in part because the Algerians and others took up the slack left by the cessation of Libyan arms supplies to the Polisario, and because Algeria won the parliamentary battles in the OAU and the United Nations.

Even if it develops no more substance, the Oujda alliance is already an important psychological fact. While both Morocco and Libya deny that their union is directed against Algeria, they know very well that Algeria, which sees itself as the most important power in North Africa, cannot take kindly to a new grouping which joins its two regional rivals and changes regional power alignments radically. According to press reports, Benjedid was invited to attend the Oujda meeting, but the Moroccans could not seriously have expected him to participate, since they had not even bothered to reply to the Algerian proposals put forward earlier in the summer. To go to Oujda under those conditions would be to ignore Hassan's slight, and that is not in the Algerian character.

With this we come to the real motivation at the bottom of the new disequilibrium: it is a question of who rules the Maghreb, and who is in and who is out.

Ever since the 1950s, the states of North Africa have been paying lip service to the concept of unity. While the Arabs as a whole speak of an Arab unity from the Atlantic to the Gulf, the North Africans speak of a Greater Maghreb, or Occident. (There is considerable disagreement among Westerners as to what constitutes the Maghreb, with most French writers excluding Libya. Some Maghrebis do the same, but unity schemes pursued by the Maghrebis themselves normally include Libya, and it makes no sense to talk of North Africa today without it.)

Over the past 30 years very little flesh has appeared on the

[6] As in 1984, the initiative came from Hassan, who suggested through Saudi intermediaries that Qaddafi and he should discuss mutual problems. According to Hassan in a November 10, 1984, interview with *Le Monde*, one result was that he told Libyan dissidents who were being trained in Morocco to leave and Qaddafi did the same with Moroccan dissidents in Libya. There have been press allegations that this transaction involved Moroccan betrayal of a prominent Libyan dissident, Omar Muhayshi, to Qaddafi. Hassan has denied this repeatedly.

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bones of this Maghreb unity. Like heaven, it remains a much-honored concept, but a lot of talk about going there won't make it happen. Rivalries and suspicions get in the way, just as they do in the eastern Arab world. Although the eastern Arabs can blame their divisions on the residue of imperialism, because of the way the British and French carved up the carcass of the Ottoman Empire to create separate states, the states of the Maghreb correspond rather well to historical divisions between a western, central and eastern Maghreb. Their rivalries and fears long antedate the coming of the French and the Italians, and they will last far into the future.

This is one reason why unity schemes are greeted with such ambivalence. Ninety-five percent of the Moroccans may vote for unity with Libya because it is a great idea in principle, there may be something in it for them, it will do the Algerians one in the eye, and the king has told them to, but they do not perceive that any of their vested interests are going to be harmed. If their vote meant that they would be accepting governors from their new partner (as was the case with the Syrians in 1958), or accepting Qaddafi's radical heresies, they would quickly retract it. They are unlikely to surrender a meaningful measure of sovereignty to any supranational concept or body.

For all their common Islamic, Arabic, Berber, Third World, Mediterranean, African characteristics, the states of the Maghreb are jealously sovereign, each guarding its own interests and prepared to concede little to its neighbor. Inevitably, Hassan and Qaddafi must have regarded the Algerian-Tunisian-Mauritanian entente of 1983 as an Algerian effort to isolate them, and in retrospect it is understandable that Hassan responded with an effort to line up Qaddafi on his side, and that Qaddafi, always seeking unity with someone, was willing to play. So now there are two ententes in North Africa, neither one having much substance.

What remains unanswered is why Hassan offered the union first to Algeria, assuming that story is true. If it was not simply a tactical maneuver, perhaps he saw it as a way to undercut the rival Algerian-Tunisian-Mauritanian entente. Then Morocco and Algeria could be the two senior partners dominating a four- or five-power combination. Perhaps he hoped to inveigle the Algerians into dropping the Polisario, or perhaps he was pursuing his idea of a federation as the umbrella which would permit a political settlement in the Sahara. It does little good

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to speculate, except to demonstrate that there is not necessarily any inconsistency in offering union to both Algeria and Libya. An agreement with the latter might be less attractive in some respects, but it has certain advantages. In particular, it does not appear to involve much in the way of commitments on Morocco's part.

What, then, was in it for Qaddafi? The most important commitment Qaddafi could have wanted, Moroccan abstention from the Chad affair, had already been given in the June 1983 agreement. He would, however, be tying down that commitment, as Hassan was tying down Qaddafi's commitment in the Sahara. He would also be striking a blow for the sacred cause of Arab unity. Qaddafi perhaps also hopes to lessen somewhat his own isolation in North Africa and the OAU. Finally, he might refurbish his image in the Western world, given Hassan's high standing there. He may even have conspired in Moroccan claims that they would be able to moderate (or *banaliser*, in the words of one Moroccan official) his quirky behavior. Qaddafi has been relatively quiet for some months now, but his failure to keep his promise to the French to evacuate Chad makes hard to understand Hassan's repeated assertions that Qaddafi is a man of his word.[7]

VII

What, then, are the implications of Oujda for U.S. interests in North Africa? Should the United States simply take the union in its stride and regard it as a minor irritation, or should it consider it a serious blow to stability? The answer depends on whether the agreement leads to an effective union. If Hassan seriously attempts to make something substantial out of it, it will eventually pose bothersome problems for the United States and the other Western powers. In addition to affecting the equilibrium of the region, it will raise questions about the reliability of Moroccan safeguards on U.S. military equipment, and about the viability of treaty arrangements for access to Moroccan bases by U.S. forces in transit.

The Moroccans have given assurances that there is no need to worry, that they are not changing their attitude toward their

[7] Officials in Washington, and Hassan's own statements, confirm French press reports which indicate that, popular misconceptions to the contrary notwithstanding, the Chad evacuation agreement was negotiated directly between the French and Libyans over a considerable period of time, starting well before Oujda, without the benefit of Moroccan intermediaries.

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old friends, but they have severely shaken American confidence. Hassan's public remarks to the effect that the Americans have overcome their anger show that he has not fully understood the extent and nature of U.S. irritation. His relations with Washington have been affected more than he seems to realize. Aid programs have not been terminated, but there is little inclination to expand them, as they should be if Morocco's economic problems are to be dealt with effectively.

Although the Moroccans have long shown a willingness to kick over the traces, as when the late Mohamed V, Hassan's father, began flirting with the Soviets in 1960, Morocco is essentially a status-quo power. Like the United States, its perceived interests lie with stability rather than change. That does not prevent Hassan from undertaking his own radical measures, as in marching on the Sahara, but it does mean that, unless provoked, he will normally support evolutionary versus revolutionary approaches. Almost exactly the opposite can be said of Qaddafi, whose natural predilection is for radical change.

The goals of both these leaders may converge temporarily, but their basic incompatibility will eventually surface over some issue or another. Therefore the union is unlikely to last. The United States should remain alert to the possibility that the union will develop in unfortunate ways, but it should avoid overreacting or doing anything to provoke an unwelcome reaction.

The most important lesson to be drawn from the recent experience in the Maghreb is the importance of not labeling foreign rulers pro-American, as we have Hassan in recent years, and then assuming that they will behave accordingly. In the Third World in particular, no foreign leader can afford to be labeled pro-American if that means he will be serving America's interests rather than those of his own people. Americans, however, like to personalize relations with foreign states, to place foreign leaders in convenient, over-simplified categories. Like Plato's dog, they like what they know.

Among the unfortunate results which follow is that the "pro-American" label gives rise to unrealistic expectations on both sides. The local leader expects more support and understanding than he will get, and the Americans expect him to make decisions which may be contrary to his country's national interests or to his domestic political interests, and to avoid actions which would displease his American friends. The Amer-

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ican embrace is often the kiss of death for the local leader. We have seen it happen in Iran, Lebanon, Egypt and Sudan, among other places, and we will see it happen again in other states of the Middle East.

The label "pro-American" should be banished from our lexicon. We should seek friendly relations based on mutual respect with all states of the world, but we should avoid over-identification with any of them. Over-identification has set in when we can no longer discuss the foreign leader's shortcomings frankly, even among ourselves, and when we begin to think his battles are ours—and vice versa. That happened in both Iran and Egypt. It has also happened in Morocco.

During the past four years we have become over-identified with Hassan, and we were shocked by the union agreement as a result. If we had been more moderate in our affection for him, we would have been spared an unpleasant surprise. Alarm bells should have been ringing from the time of his June 1983 agreement with Qaddafi, but they were not. We took Hassan for granted. He undoubtedly sensed this; his second accord with Qaddafi may have been intended to demonstrate his independence of the United States.

At this point the United States still needs Morocco and cannot afford to alienate it. As long as the United States can maintain reasonable relations with Morocco, based on a hard-headed appraisal of national interests and not on illusions about shared values and identity of goals, it should be able to live with the union agreement, particularly if it does not turn into a working union which compromises Morocco's ability to honor commitments to the United States. Hassan has his own agenda and must be free to play the North African power game according to Moroccan national interests as he sees them. An essentially cynical arrangement with Qaddafi need not affect his willingness to cooperate with the United States on other matters, and if it has dispelled some of the illusions which have clouded Washington's perceptions over the past four years, that is a salutary result.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Edited by Lucy Edwards Despard

General: Political and Legal

John C. Campbell

CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT, AND FOREIGN POLICY. Edited by Steven P. Soper. Chicago: American Bar Association, Standing Committee on Law and National Security, 1985, 204 pp. $7.50 (paper).

Proceedings of a May 1984 conference on a subject of unending debate since the drafting of the Constitution. Here a star-studded cast of members of Congress, executive branch officials and international lawyers considers the problem in the perspective of history, of law and of current policy. They look especially at the heritage of Vietnam, the desirability and constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution, and the recent activism on the part of Congress. They reach no agreed conclusions; on the contrary, they register sharp disagreements which help to clarify the issues, and the exercise as a whole should be a real contribution to future handling of these questions by the legislature, the executive and the courts.

LAW AND FORCE IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. By Edwin C. Hoyt. Washington: University Press of America, 1985, 270 pp. $24.75 (paper, $12.50).

Professor Hoyt takes a single theme and sticks to it: the relevance of international law, as it applies to the use of force, in American foreign policy since World War II. He starts with the commitment to what he calls "U.N. principles" limiting the use of force, principles which the U.S. itself espoused and supported. He then examines the record—Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, India-Pakistan, Iran, Africa, Latin America—pointing out where policy did or did not violate these principles and where it bent international law, honestly or cynically, to suit political purpose. Hoyt is quite consistent all the way through, and also quite severe in his criticism of the many instances he finds of the violation of law and of principle.

NATION AGAINST NATION: WHAT HAPPENED TO THE U.N. DREAM AND WHAT THE U.S. CAN DO ABOUT IT. By Thomas M. Franck. New York: Oxford, 1985, 334 pp. $19.95.

An informed, professional, realistic examination of the United Nations in action over its 40-year existence. The author, a professor of law who served the organization at one time, looks primarily at what were supposed to be its main functions: resolving disputes and keeping the peace. The record is disappointing. American attitudes and reactions have been overblown, from exaggerated hopes in the beginning to exaggerated disillusionment now. The book shows admirably how the various organs of the U.N. have functioned, or failed to function, and is especially good on how the institution of the secretary general has developed in the light of changing conditions and the proclivities of the successive incumbents.

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INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE. Edited by Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press/Washington: Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, 1985, 274 pp. $24.00 (paper).

The more the scholars attempt to divine theories, rules and practices of international mediation, the more complicated the subject becomes. But the endeavor is certainly worthwhile, and this series of studies represents a long step forward. The individual case histories (mostly on disputes in Asia and Africa mediated by outside states, but not including the Arab-Israeli conflict on which Saadia Touval has already published a full-length book) are written by authors with detailed knowledge of the cases and are supplemented by chapters on institutional mediation on the part of the O.A.S., the O.A.U., and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

ANTI-AMERICANISM IN THE THIRD WORLD. Edited by Alvin Z. Rubinstein and Donald E. Smith. New York: Praeger, 1985, 282 pp. $37.95.

Anti-Americanism has long been evident in the Third World, but it is nearly impossible to define it with any precision, establish its causes, understand its implications and find means of doing something about it. This volume, a "first cut" in the words of the editors, covers the topic by country and by area and at the U.N., in specialized contributions of a generally high quality. They paint a broad picture which impresses with its demonstration of the depth of the differences between the U.S. and the Third World—in cultural and social values, historical experience, economic practice and political psychology, to say nothing of clashing national interests. These differences will not be eliminated by any feasible policy changes or U.S. information programs. They do require greater comprehension and more "cuts" after this one.

General: Military, Technological and Scientific

Andrew J. Pierre

BLACK BOX: KAL 007 AND THE SUPERPOWERS. By Alexander Dallin. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985, 130 pp. $14.95.

This is a superb analysis of the 007 incident, a model of careful study of available information, properly placed in a broad international political context. It is evidence of the gifts a seasoned scholar can bring—and amazingly quickly—to dealing with contemporary events, in contrast to the usual, more journalistic, approach. Dallin's reconstruction of the event is fascinating. He narrows the range of possibilities, but finds no smoking gun, and no hypothesis is fully convincing to him as to why KAL 007 strayed so far off course. He is on firmer ground in drawing conclusions about superpower behavior in an international crisis. Both Moscow and Washington gave priority to their *domestic* audiences, the Soviets trying to persuade their population and allies of the wisdom of their action, the Americans scoring points and using the crisis for political gain. Neither was very sensitive to the other's perceptions and political needs. And both allowed the incident to further erode an already deteriorated superpower relationship, just at a time when it was beginning to improve.

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BEYOND THE HOTLINE: CRISIS CONTROL TO PREVENT NUCLEAR WAR. By William L. Ury. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985, 187 pp. $14.95.

This is a quick-read version of a 1984 report to the U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament Agency from the Nuclear Negotiation Project at Harvard Law School. It calls for moving beyond the present "hotline" between Moscow and Washington to a crisis control center jointly staffed by U.S. and Soviet military and diplomatic officers. Their task would be to forestall crises and work together to end, quickly and safely, any that do occur. Senators Nunn and Warner, and the late Senator Jackson, have sponsored such a proposal in Congress. Regular cabinet-level discussions, with the participation of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and his Soviet counterpart, are also suggested. There is a great deal of merit to these proposals.

THE AGE OF VULNERABILITY: THREATS TO THE NUCLEAR STALEMATE. By Michael Nacht. Washington: Brookings, 1985, 209 pp. $26.95 (paper, $9.95).

This thoughtful volume, essayish in nature, identifies and discusses seven "conditions" of the nuclear era. One is national character: the Russian character being marked by pervasive insecurity; the American by a sort of duality, seeking to be second to none in military power and at the same time the principal promoter of world peace. Other "conditions" are U.S. nuclear doctrine, increased missile accuracy and heightened vulnerability, nuclear proliferation, and arms control. The approach is intelligent and knowledgeable, and separates the wheat from the chaff. Yet this slim volume, while of value to general readers, will leave the specialists somewhat unsatisfied, perhaps because of an over-ambitious reach.

AMERICAN ARMS SUPERMARKET. By Michael T. Klare. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985, 312 pp. $24.50 (paper, $10.95).

The author, who has been writing articles on arms sales for a decade, has culled his facts and insights into this volume. The emphasis is on U.S. policy over the past four administrations, rather than on the global dimensions. There is little that is new here and some of Klare's past criticisms appear a bit tempered, even though he retains his skeptical attitude toward arms transfers as an instrument of policy. This is a well-organized and impressive work on a complex phenomenon.

NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS AS WEAPONS FOR THE ENEMY: AN UNRECOGNIZED MILITARY PERIL. By Bennett Ramberg. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985, 193 pp. $8.95 (paper).

The author is probably correct in asserting that the risk created by the possibility of nuclear power reactors being bombed by hostile forces has not been adequately recognized. Israel destroyed an uncompleted nuclear reactor near Baghdad in 1981 and Iraqi aircraft attacked a partly constructed nuclear power plant in 1984. Ramberg explains how the bombing, with conventional explosives, of a major nuclear power station or waste-storage reservation could contaminate thousands of square miles. He identifies places around the globe where this could occur, and suggests ways to diminish the vulnerability of such facilities through physical safeguards and legal restraints.

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U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE: THE POLITICAL PROCESS. Edited by Ernest Graves and Steven A. Hildreth. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1985, 192 pp. $24.00.

This is a professional, instructive treatment of a complex subject which is often only discussed polemically. Recognizing that military assistance programs for foreign countries are very much a political phenomenon, the authors place the American experience in the proper context: first, the relationship between major international developments over the past 35 years and changes in the security assistance programs during that period; second, the perspectives in the Congress, media and interest groups. The study, sponsored by the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies, notes that the U.S. government has always seen military assistance as an instrument of foreign policy, but observes that its constituency is small and the public views on it are more divergent than ever. This is an important analysis, one of whose authors, Lt. General Ernest Graves, USA, retired, was director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency from 1978 to 1981.

ARMED PEACE: THE SEARCH FOR WORLD SECURITY. Edited by Josephine O'Connor Howe. New York: St. Martin's, 1985, 191 pp. $25.00. A Council on Arms Control Book.

In 1981 the Council on Arms Control was established, bringing together a group of British supporters of arms control. This volume attests to the council's wide-ranging interests. Taking the 1982 Palme Commission Report as a starting point, the authors examine everything from strategic arms control to arms sales to peacekeeping. The analysis on each topic is not extensive but contributes to a common theme: the need—and real opportunities—for renewed arms control. David Owen provides a provocative introduction.

THE PUBLIC AND ATLANTIC DEFENSE. Edited by Gregory Flynn and Hans Rattinger. Totowa (N.J.): Rowman & Allanheld (for the Atlantic Institute for International Affairs), 1985, 395 pp. $45.00.

The core of this book consists of case studies on public attitudes toward defense in seven NATO countries. The general conclusion is moderately encouraging, not in keeping with more alarmist views of erosion in public support for the Atlantic alliance. The subject is important, and this is a valuable book for those who are prepared to really study it. But its potential for reaching a wider audience would be greater if it were shorter and more concise.

DEFENSE PLANNING IN LESS-INDUSTRIALIZED STATES: THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA. Edited by Stephanie G. Neuman. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1984, 336 pp. $35.50.

Dealing as it does with an underdeveloped area of international security studies, this book is to be welcomed. The most interesting reading is in the individual country chapters on Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel, Turkey, Pakistan and India, written by knowledgeable experts with accompanying commentaries by others.

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General: Economic and Social

William Diebold, Jr.

THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE. By Michael J. Piore and Charles F. Sabel. New York: Basic Books, 1984, 355 pp. $21.95.

If mass production is to continue to be the dominant mode of industry, world markets will have to be stabilized and integrated, and shares in expanded capacity rationed, according to this book. Alternatively, the emphasis can shift to "flexible specialization" in which firms use general-purpose tools to produce a variety of special-purpose articles. Is this a real choice? Must every country make it? In explaining why they pose the issue the authors, who teach at MIT, deploy a remarkable range of historical and contemporary evidence drawn from many countries. They undertake rather too much, and are not always convincing. But they usually draw back from carrying arguments too far and have produced a most challenging and interesting book.

CORPORATISM AND CHANGE: AUSTRIA, SWITZERLAND, AND THE POLITICS OF INDUSTRY. By Peter J. Katzenstein. Ithaca (N.Y.): Cornell University Press, 1984, 331 pp. $35.00.

By world standards, Austria and Switzerland do well economically, although Vienna leans to socialism and equality while Berne emphasizes liberal capitalism and efficiency. The common element, Professor Katzenstein of Cornell argues, is "democratic corporatism" made up of the acceptance of social partnership, the centralization of interest groups, and a continuous process of bargaining and compromise over public and private objectives. He shows how this process has permitted the orderly and quite reasonable handling of difficult industrial changes in the production of watches in Switzerland, steel in Austria and textiles in both countries. This is an excellent work and quite persuasive. Whether large countries can find equally good ways of making "political stability and economic flexibility . . . mutually contingent" is another matter, as the author recognizes.

ENERGY, MINERALS, AND WESTERN SECURITY. By Hanns W. Maull. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1985, 413 pp. $35.00.

How secure are the mineral supplies of the industrial world? The alarm or quiet assurance which alternate in the answers periodically given to this question often lack an adequate basis. This excellent book provides a systematic analysis of threats and possible responses. The author, a German political scientist, believes that the industrial nations can cope with some pretty hard knocks, but makes judicious suggestions for a number of policies that would reduce the danger and improve the responses.

THE EUROPEAN ENERGY CHALLENGE EAST AND WEST. By George W. Hoffman, with Leslie Dienes. Durham (N.C.): Duke University Press, 1985, 207 pp. $34.75.

This exceptionally thorough study provides a balanced analysis of most aspects of energy use in Europe west of the Soviet Union. Giving special attention to security of supply, Hoffman, of the University of Texas, urges more attention to domestic sources and increased cooperation among the Western countries.

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EXPORTS OF MANUFACTURES FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. By William R. Cline. Washington: Brookings, 1984, 229 pp. $26.95 (paper, $9.95).
THE GLOBAL FACTORY: FOREIGN ASSEMBLY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE. By Joseph Grunwald and Kenneth Flamm. Washington: Brookings, 1985, 259 pp. $29.95 (paper, $10.95).

On the basis of a first-rate analysis of trade up to the early 1980s, Cline calculates a "protection function" for industrial countries that suggests that they can continue to expand imports of manufactures from developing countries at a substantial rate. Grunwald and Flamm examine one of the channels of that trade: the movement of goods back and forth to make use of cheap labor in the production process in developing countries. They suggest policies to moderate the impact on labor in the industrial countries. Mexico, Colombia, Haiti and the semiconductor industry come in for special attention.

THE U.S.-U.S.S.R. GRAIN AGREEMENT. By Roger B. Porter. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984, 160 pp. $27.95.

The 1975 grain agreement with the Soviet Union was an innovation in American foreign policy and in the relations between the two superpowers. Neither of these things was as much in the minds of the officials who worked out the deal as was a set of current pressures and preoccupations, according to this very good inside account. The author, who was then in the Ford White House, suggests that even the influence of the farm organizations was negligible.

WORLD ECONOMIC GROWTH. Edited by Arnold C. Harberger. San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies Press, 508 pp. $22.95 (paper, $9.95).

Five developed and seven developing—but sometimes backsliding—countries are examined by separate authors who look at the links between different sets of policies and "episodes" of growth or stagnation or decline. Trade liberalization, fiscal and monetary moderation, attention to human capital and limits on government intervention are generally approved, but there are important variations in the experience of different countries. This is a valuable addition to the debate about growth and development.

WORLD-TRADED SERVICES: THE CHALLENGE FOR THE EIGHTIES. By Raymond J. Krommenacker. Dedham (Mass.): Artech House, 1984, 221 pp.
SERVICE INDUSTRIES AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: CASE STUDIES IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER. By Ronald K. Shelp, John C. Stephenson, Nancy Sherwood Truitt and Bernard Wasow. New York: Praeger, 1984, 182 pp.

Krommenacker makes a strong case for the application to services of the same reasoning that applies to international trade and puts forward concrete proposals for the kinds of agreements that could be negotiated under GATT. He also records the activities of other organizations more carefully than other analysts. The volume by Ronald Shelp et al. provides useful, specific descriptions of how technology is transferred in insurance, mass merchandising, and engineering and construction, as illustrated by the American International Group, Sears and Bechtel. Not surprisingly, the

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main process is that people in developing countries learn how to carry on these businesses.

ECONOMICS: WHAT WENT WRONG AND WHY AND SOME THINGS TO DO ABOUT IT. By George P. Brockway. New York: Bessie/Harper, 1985, 224 pp. $18.50.

What begins as a witty excursion through the history of economic thought turns into a not very convincing case for import protection and the use of price controls to stem inflation. On the way, there are interesting suggestions for vesting the ownership of corporations in those who currently operate them and a broader so-called Labor Theory of Right (since it is "only by labor that we produce goods and come to possess them").

The United States

Gaddis Smith

COUNSELS OF WAR. By Gregg Herken. New York: Knopf, 1985, 409 pp. $18.95.

Since 1945 the nature of nuclear war has, providentially, only been imagined, not demonstrated. Thus, planners and theoreticians—a new profession dedicated to "thinking about the unthinkable"—have replaced fighting soldiers as the shapers of American strategy. This fine book traces the swirling theories of deterrence, war-fighting capacity, limited war and the nature of the Soviet Union from 1945 to the present. It relates ideas to the specific personalities who advanced them—Bernard Brodie, William Borden, Robert Oppenheimer, Albert Wohlstetter and many others.

AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN IRAN: THE CONDUCT OF A CRISIS. By Warren Christopher and others. Edited by Paul H. Kreisberg. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985, 443 pp. $25.00. A Council on Foreign Relations Book.

The core chapters in this important volume are by officials in the State Department (Warren Christopher, Harold H. Saunders, Roberts B. Owen), the National Security Council (Gary Sick) and the Treasury Department (Robert Carswell and Richard Davis) at the time of the crisis. John E. Hoffman, Jr., describes the role of the major American banks holding Iranian assets. Oscar Schachter and former Senator Abraham Ribicoff offer commentary. The authors draw on their own hour-by-hour participation in order to present the enormous complexity of the crisis. The material on the legal, political, and economic difficulties of bargaining over the frozen Iranian assets is especially informative and potentially instructive should a similar crisis develop in the future.

THE LIMITS OF VICTORY: THE RATIFICATION OF THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES. By George D. Moffett III. Ithaca (N.Y.): Cornell University Press, 1985, 264 pp. $24.95.

The negotiation in 1977 and ratification in 1978 of the treaties providing for the full transfer of the canal to Panama was a major achievement of the Carter Administration. Even those who ardently opposed the treaties at the time would not now want them undone. But, as this excellent study by a former White House aide (1979–81) demonstrates, President Carter's

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political power was diminished, not enhanced, by the success. Although Herculean efforts produced just enough Senate votes for ratification, the majority of the American people remained opposed. Carter's achievement probably prevented a serious and even bloody conflict, but it contributed to the perception that he was weak and indecisive.

THE PERSONAL PRESIDENT: POWER INVESTED, PROMISE UNFULFILLED. By Theodore J. Lowi. Ithaca (N.Y.): Cornell University Press, 1985, 224 pp. $19.95.

The author describes and deplores the way modern presidents, abetted by a willing public, have come to identify themselves with the state. They are elected on the basis of impossible promises, are driven to deceitful lengths to maintain the appearance of success, but are doomed to failure. Lowi predicts hard times for Mr. Reagan during the remainder of his second term.

AMERICA OVERCOMMITTED: UNITED STATES NATIONAL INTERESTS IN THE 1980s. By Donald E. Nuechterlein. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1985, 238 pp. $23.00 (paper, $10.00).

A thoughtful tour of the globe in which the author divides countries and regions into four categories in terms of American interests: survival, vital, major and peripheral. The interests themselves are categorized as: defense of homeland, economic well-being, a favorable world order and promotion of values. He calls for a sensible ordering of priorities and for balancing ends and means. A useful guide for thinking about national security.

SHERMAN'S MARCH AND VIETNAM. By James Reston, Jr. New York: Macmillan, 1985, 323 pp. $14.95.

An eloquent and unconventional book—part journalism, part history—and throughout a lament against war waged without discrimination or proportionality, a phenomenon which ties Sherman in Georgia to free-fire zones in Vietnam. This is an indictment of leaders and of society as a whole, not of the soldiers of either war.

THE TROUBLE WITH AMERICA. By Michel Crozier. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985, 156 pp. $16.95.

A French sociologist, who knows the United States well, perceives a paralyzing loss of vitality and an increasing withdrawal by individuals into private selfishness. He attributes a large part of the problem to the way Americans have allowed lawyers and courts, following abstract and unrealistic concepts of due process, to make fundamental decisions with scant regard for social reality.

GRAVE NEW WORLD. By Michael Ledeen. New York: Oxford, 1985, 256 pp. $17.95.

A tirade against American leaders, including the press, for failing to confront the Soviet Union aggressively. The present moment is described as particularly dangerous because the Soviet Union may be on the brink of an internal convulsion with desperate international consequences. One of Ledeen's suggestions is that experienced European leaders be brought to the United States and "placed in positions of authority" over foreign policy.

THEY DARE TO SPEAK OUT: PEOPLE AND INSTITUTIONS CON-

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FRONT ISRAEL'S LOBBY. By Paul Findley. Westport (Conn.): Lawrence Hill, 1985, 324 pp. $16.95.

One sad consequence of the division between Arab and Jew in the Middle East is that advocates of differing U.S. policies are unable to accept that their opponents may be speaking and acting in good faith. This polemic by a former congressman documents the volubility and effectiveness of the supporters of Israel, but then accuses them of stifling others who have anything critical to say.

THE PIED PIPER: ALLARD K. LOWENSTEIN AND THE LIBERAL DREAM. By Richard Cummings. New York: Grove Press, 1985, 569 pp. $19.95.

A lengthy biography of an extraordinary political activist and speaker. For three decades, until he was murdered by a deranged former friend in 1980, Lowenstein was a tireless leader, especially of the young, in liberal causes. But Cummings brings out his occasional lack of candor and allegations about his sexual orientation and CIA connections.

THE LIBERAL MIND IN A CONSERVATIVE AGE: AMERICAN INTELLECTUALS IN THE 1940s AND 1950s. By Richard H. Pells. New York: Harper, 1985, 468 pp. $18.95.

A perceptive study focusing primarily on the way anti-communism shaped the assumptions of liberal intellectuals in the decade after World War II. The "American intellectuals" studied are almost exclusively writers living in New York and publishing in such journals as *The New Republic, Commentary,* and *Partisan Review.*

USIA: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN THE COMPUTER AGE. By Allen C. Hansen. New York: Praeger, 1984, 250 pp.

The author, who worked in the USIA for 30 years, offends no one and avoids sensitive questions. Nonetheless, this is a useful assemblage of information on the USIA and its mission.

AN UNCOMMON MAN: THE TRIUMPH OF HERBERT HOOVER. By Richard Norton Smith. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984, 448 pp. $22.95.

This outstanding biography captures the wry sense of humor and ironic self-awareness which carried Herbert Hoover through the ordeal of the presidency during the Depression, on to three more decades of hard work and public service, and to eventual acclaim as "counselor to the Republic." The chapter on the relationship between Hoover and President Truman is especially interesting.

THE PRESIDENCY OF HERBERT C. HOOVER. By Martin L. Fausold. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1985, 304 pp. $22.50.

Fausold gives full credit to Hoover's intelligence, energy and self-discipline while concluding that his reputation as a failure is not wholly undeserved. Although no one could have prevented or prevailed over the Depression, Hoover's rigid concept of "ordered freedom" kept him from reacting to the crisis more imaginatively.

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The Western Hemisphere

Robert D. Crassweller

THE CANADIANS. By Andrew H. Malcolm. New York: Times Books, 1985, 385 pp. $17.95.

An affectionate and perceptive essay for Americans. The discussion of geography, with emphasis on the Arctic, is especially good. The treatment of Quebec, however, is somewhat superficial. Malcolm, an American of Canadian descent, was for four years correspondent in Toronto for *The New York Times.* G.S.

THE LAST TWO YEARS OF SALVADOR ALLENDE. By Nathaniel Davis. Ithaca (N.Y.): Cornell University Press, 1985, 480 pp. $24.95.

Writing with a conspicuous lack of partisan bias and personal grudge, the former ambassador to Chile presents a vivid and detailed picture of the Allende regime and its dramatic fall. The writing achieves a synthesis of authoritative analysis and the readability of a good detective story. Among the conclusions: the balance of probability clearly supports suicide as the cause of Allende's death, not murder.

THE RISE AND FALL OF CHILEAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY. By Michael Fleet. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985, 292 pp. $35.00 (paper, $14.50).

A balanced and thoughtful review of the Christian Democratic Party in Chile, its history, its performance in and out of office, its relationship to similar parties elsewhere, and its prospects. The author thinks the party has lost credibility with its constituency and will soon have to participate in a left-center or in a right-center coalition, since in its present form it is "not likely to endure beyond the early stages of the transition to civilian rule."

LATIN AMERICAN DEMOCRACIES: COLOMBIA, COSTA RICA, VENEZUELA. By John A. Peeler. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985, 193 pp. $24.00.

The comparative success of Costa Rica, Colombia and Venezuela in achieving orderly democratic polities raises interesting and significant questions, well treated here. Explanations of course depend on specific political conditions as well as on economic and social factors, but the author assigns primary credit to the "spirit of accommodation" between key political sectors, to pacts of accommodation between rival elites.

LATIN AMERICA, WESTERN EUROPE, AND THE U.S.: REEVALUATING THE ATLANTIC TRIANGLE. Edited by Wolf Grabendorff and Riordan Roett. New York: Praeger, 1985, 220 pp. $37.95.

Fourteen essays analyze the changing relations and patterns of interdependence between the European and the Latin American components of a New Atlantic Triangle that would include the United States. The Latin American emphasis is on Brazil. The authors are well-known scholars from all three regions, and their efforts in the areas of economics, security, politics and energy mesh well. An overview and a conclusion add much to the unusual degree of focus and direction.

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CUBA, CASTRO AND THE CARIBBEAN: THE CUBAN REVOLUTION AND THE CRISIS IN WESTERN CONSCIENCE. By Carlos Alberto Montaner. New Brunswick (N.J.): Transaction Books, 1985, 114 pp. $19.95.

The author, a Cuban writer and journalist, is also a distinctive individualist who has broken with Castro. Permitting his inquiring mind to roam freely, he writes in a philosophical vein of Caribbean problems, sparing no one. He advocates a U.S. alliance with democratic political groups, bolstering them against communism, militarism and authoritarianism. His remarks on the "Antilles man" and what he calls "Antilleanness" are noteworthy.

THIRD WORLD INSTABILITY: CENTRAL AMERICA AS A EUROPEAN-AMERICAN ISSUE. Edited by Andrew J. Pierre. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1985, 156 pp. $5.95 (paper).

These five essays by Fernando Morán, Irving Kristol, Michael D. Barnes, Alois Mertes and Daniel Oduber comprise the third volume produced by the Project on European-American Relations at the Council on Foreign Relations; they bring a degree of elegance to the discussion of issues that intimately involve Central America in the global and domestic concerns of all parties.

THE MAKING OF A GOVERNMENT: POLITICAL LEADERS IN MODERN MEXICO. By Roderic A. Camp. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1985, 237 pp. $23.50.

Interpreting Mexican public life in part through the personal qualities of the top political leaders, the author explores the backgrounds, families, friends, schools, studies and values of numerous prominent office holders between 1946 and 1970. Interviews and documentary sources were employed, and the conclusions bear upon the future as well as the present.

POLITICS, POLICIES, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA. Edited by Robert Wesson. Stanford (Calif.): Hoover Press, 1984, 262 pp. $24.95 (paper, $13.95).

The many linkages between political institutions on the one hand and economic development on the other form the theme of the ten essays here, each devoted to a separate country. Seven South American countries and Mexico, Costa Rica and Jamaica are included. The authors are expert and the quality is high.

GRENADA. By Hugh O'Shaughnessy. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1983, 288 pp. $14.95.

A noted British journalist provides an eyewitness account, vivid and detailed, of the recent U.S. invasion of Grenada. There is blame for all and credit for none, the author believing that the invasion was illegal, that it was unnecessary, and that it has impaired long-term political and economic development.

THE ARGENTINE LABOR MOVEMENT, 1930–1945: A STUDY IN THE ORIGINS OF PERONISM. By David Tamarin. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1985, 273 pp. $27.50.

The literature on Peronism continues to proliferate. This is a competent inquiry into the Argentine labor movement during the 13 years that preceded Perón's advent to power, and his relationship to it thereafter

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when it served as the "vertebral column" of his drive to achieve a strong and independent state. The author sees Perón not as the father of the modern labor movement in Argentina but as "its midwife and tutor."

LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS Y TRUJILLO: COLECCION DE DOCUMENTOS DEL DEPARTAMENTO DE ESTADO Y DE LA FUERZAS ARMADAS NORTAMERICANAS. ANO 1947. Edited by Bernardo Vega. Santo Domingo: Fundación Cultural Dominicana, 1984, 2 vols.

This is the third publication in an annual series, beginning as of 1945, that breaks new ground. Much more than a compilation and translation of extensive U.S. diplomatic and military documents defining U.S.-Dominican relations, it contains analytical commentary in depth, chronologies of events, geographical materials, and illustrations. A gold mine for researchers, and well presented.

Western Europe

Fritz Stern

PIERRE MENDES FRANCE. By Jean Lacouture. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1985, 486 pp. $39.50 (paper, $19.50).

A fine biography of the one French leader in the postwar period who had a personal authority that approached de Gaulle's. A riveting story of a young star, a brilliant mind, a courageous patriot, a prisoner of Vichy who escaped and came to serve de Gaulle and the Free French. A minister in a prewar cabinet of Léon Blum, he was a minister for de Gaulle as well, but broke with him and opposed him in 1958 and 1968. In his seven months as premier in 1954–55, he resolved issues, including the Indochina war, that predecessors had dodged. A wise, melancholy leader, a legend, he was admired and detested, but even his critics spoke of "his noble destiny"—a destiny that was never quite fulfilled. France's leading biographer-journalist does well with a complicated life, full of hope and failure.

ÖFFNUNG NACH OSTEN. By Hans Georg Lehmann. Bonn: Verlag Neue Gesellschaft, 1984, 256 pp. DM. 24.

A study of Helmut Schmidt's own Ostpolitik, first enunciated in June 1966 when he was deputy chairman of the SPD, and based on his view that a changed political situation in the world gave the Federal Republic an opportunity to pursue a more activist and independent policy in the East. Immediately thereafter, and at his own initiative and expense, Schmidt visited Czechoslovakia, Poland and the U.S.S.R., in order to reconnoiter Eastern attitudes. Here a German historian carefully describes these early trips to the East. He acknowledges Brandt's historic achievement in negotiating the Eastern treaties, but sees Schmidt as an early proponent of Brandt's policy and distinguishes between Egon Bahr's national policy and Schmidt's sense of Ostpolitik as an end in itself. This is in part a piece of intraparty history, in part a study of the making of a statesman.

KNOWING ONE'S ENEMIES: INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT BEFORE THE TWO WORLD WARS. Edited by Ernest R. May. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985, 561 pp. $29.50.

Sixteen leading scholars review the intelligence operations of the major

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European powers before the two world wars. Invaluable for detailed studies of how various countries assessed the intentions and capabilities of potential enemies and how government leaders used the material supplied to them. Not surprisingly, intelligence-gathering was often better than the decisions that were taken on the basis of this intelligence. In the upper reaches of government and military command, "a Maginot Line of the mind, profound, powerful, static," seems to have been erected, and not only in pre-1939 France. A distinguished contribution.

THE WAR DIARIES: NOVEMBER 1939-MARCH 1940. By Jean-Paul Sartre. New York: Pantheon, 1985, 366 pp. $17.95.

In a prodigious outpouring of words, Jean-Paul Sartre filled some 14 notebooks during the few months he spent (before he was captured by the Germans) as a French army conscript on the Alsatian border during the "phony war." Only these five have come to light. In them Sartre roughed out the preliminary themes for his philosophical masterwork *Being and Nothingness*, described wartime life when there is no fighting (tedious), and studied with some alarm and fascination his own mental processes. His playful and teasing way with ideas, and his insistence on his own "frivolousness," give these writings a sort of elfin charm. And because of who he was later to become—postwar Europe's *maître à penser*—they are also of considerable historical interest. L.D.

THE TURNING POINT: ROOSEVELT, STALIN, CHURCHILL AND CHIANG KAI-SHEK, 1943. By Keith Sainsbury. New York: Oxford, 1985, 350 pp. $24.95.

A thorough, scholarly review of the Big Three meeting at Teheran in November-December 1943, and of the meetings preceding and immediately following. A British historian makes the persuasive argument that these conferences showed F.D.R. shifting his principal interest from Great Britain to the U.S.S.R., trying hard to obtain Soviet trust and cooperation, and in doing so allowing opportunities to slip which made Soviet rule in Poland and domination of Eastern Europe highly probable. The book reaffirms an old version of the United States as suspicious of British imperialism and insouciant about Soviet aims. Conventional in approach, incisive in interpretation—an important contribution to the study of the origins of the cold war.

STAFFORD CRIPPS' MISSION TO MOSCOW, 1940–42. By Gabriel Gorodetsky. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985, 361 pp. $44.50.

A fascinating monograph, based in part on new evidence from official and private papers, dealing with Stafford Cripps, the radical dissenter in British politics and a longtime proponent of close Anglo-Soviet relations. Sent to Moscow before the German invasion, at a time when Britain feared still deeper German-Soviet collaboration and when the Soviets suspected the British of probing for a separate peace with the Germans, Cripps faced a frustrating assignment. When the Germans invaded Russia, Cripps, often acting in defiance of his government, sought far greater help to the desperate Russians. Cripps found himself embattled with Churchill, who saw in him a principal rival and warned him in November 1941 against returning to London and "engaging in a most unequal struggle which could

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only injure the interests to which you are attached." A critical view of Churchill and of Anglo-Soviet relations.

NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN. VOL. I: PIONEERING AND REFORM, 1869–1929. By David Dilks. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985, 645 pp. $29.95.

An English historian, armed with excellent sources, takes on a formidable task: to reconstruct Chamberlain's career fairly and in its entirety, in the context of Chamberlain's Unitarian family and of British politics, and thus complicate the memory that feckless appeasement has left behind. Chamberlain is shown as an able administrator, as director-general of national service in World War I, as lord mayor of Birmingham, and as minister of health in the 1920s. The record is revealing, as is the early, never easy relationship with Churchill, whom he admired and found utterly uncongenial, "mercurial." Neville labored under the shadow of his father, Joseph, and his stepbrother, Austen; labored honorably. At one point he spoke of "one of the most moving aspects of the war [being] that those who owed so little to their country, whose life had been one long struggle against adverse conditions, went forth to fight for her as eagerly . . . as those on whom she lavished every favor." The hard-bitten Birmingham businessman, after meeting with the coal-mine owners in 1925, noted: "They are *not* a prepossessing crowd . . . they are about the stupidest and most narrow-minded employers I know." Dilks has written a leisurely "life and times" of an exceedingly sober, dutiful, marginally gifted public servant.

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

John C. Campbell

BREAKING WITH MOSCOW. By Arkady N. Shevchenko. New York: Knopf, 1985, 378 pp. $18.95.

Shevchenko's was one of the most important, and certainly the most publicized, defections of a Soviet official to the West in recent years. This is his own story, as he wants the world to know it, told, to all appearances, in honesty and candor. Parts of it are high drama—the reaching of his fateful decision, his role as informant to the U.S. while still working for the Soviet government (though his job was undersecretary general of the U.N.), and his final escape and public break with Moscow—and adventure in the world of moles and double agents and ever-present danger. The bulk of the book, on "the education of a Soviet diplomat," sketches Shevchenko's own career in the Soviet foreign service and contains numerous interesting comments on personalities and practices within the Soviet elite.

SOVIET POLITICS IN THE 1980s. Edited by Helmut Sonnenfeldt. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 247 pp. $22.50.

The range of these papers goes well beyond "Soviet politics." They cover all the main items on the Soviet agenda, including political succession, the domestic economy, defense spending, foreign policy, relations with the West and U.S. responses. It is impossible to characterize the volume as a whole, so varied are its contributors and contributions. Some will be quite familiar to specialists—Murray Feshbach on demography, Herbert Levine on economics, Dimitri Simes on East-West relations, and Richard Pipes on

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U.S. policy, among others. In all, these are solid, thoughtful essays deserving of a close reading.

THIS WAR CALLED PEACE. By Brian Crozier, Drew Middleton, and Jeremy Murray-Brown. New York: Universe, 1985, 315 pp. $17.95.

Three prominent journalists, in the belief that the West has been bamboozled by illusions of peaceful coexistence and détente ever since Yalta and needs further schooling in the nature of the Soviet regime, have provided a rapid-fire history of four decades of Soviet policy and East-West relations. Most of the narrative is well-founded in fact, but there is little weighing of the evidence on debatable points (and no citations). The emphasis is on the message: that the communists continue to employ any outrage, cruelty or falsehood to gain their ends, and that the West (in particular, the liberals and the news media) continues to be too gullible to realize it.

BEHIND THE LINES: THE PRIVATE WAR AGAINST SOVIET CENSORSHIP. By Donald R. Shanor. New York: St. Martin's, 1985, 172 pp. $13.95.

A veteran newspaperman who knows the Soviet scene treats the subject of information and communication from several angles. On the management of information as an instrument of power and control, he gives a standard account. On the efforts of Western media to reach the Soviet public, he writes with welcome candor. He is most interesting, if more speculative, when he writes about the "underground telegraph" by which Soviet citizens inform themselves and each other of facts they do not get from the official media. One well-argued conclusion, portentous for the future, is that in time the technological revolution in communications will make it impossible for the Soviet government to keep the Soviet population insulated from the rest of the world.

RELIGION AND NATIONALISM IN SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN POLITICS. Edited by Pedro Ramet. Durham (N.C.): Duke University Press, 1985, 282 pp. $35.00.

Nationalism and religion in this region are interlocked: sometimes in harmony, sometimes in mutual hostility, always a problem, separately or together, for the communist regimes which seek to instill their own higher loyalty in the people. The patterns are infinitely complex from country to country. Here the authors, each a specialist in his own field, take rather different approaches, and the coverage, especially of the Soviet Union, is spotty. But the editor has tried, with moderate success, to pull things together, and the book as a whole excels in its balanced treatment of both background and current policies.

COMMUNISM IN EASTERN EUROPE. 2nd ed. Edited by Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984, 400 pp. $25.00 (paper, $8.95).

There is always room for a new, authoritative and up-to-date survey of the politics and economics of Eastern Europe, so quick is the pace of change. This revised version of an earlier volume (reviewed in *Foreign Affairs*, October 1979), with a slightly changed cast of contributors, is therefore welcome. Poland, the center of attraction in recent years, is well covered

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by Andrzej Korbonski, and Jiri Valenta provides a new chapter on Soviet policy.

PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN EASTERN EUROPE: THE NON-AGRICULTURAL PRIVATE SECTOR IN POLAND AND THE GDR, 1945–83. By Anders Aslund. New York: St. Martin's, 1985, 294 pp. $29.95.

The private sector in East European economies has been progressively reduced by successive "socialist offensives" but, contrary to the doctrine and original intent of the rulers, has not disappeared and plays a necessary role in balancing the market. Aslund, a Swedish economist now in the diplomatic service, by strictly limiting his enquiry to two countries, by excluding agriculture and the underground economy, and by using both statistics and interviews, is able to describe in detail the changing interaction of official theory, actual policy and the cyclical working of economic forces. An original and valuable study.

THE GREAT POWERS AND POLAND, 1919–1945: FROM VERSAILLES TO YALTA. By Jan Karski. Lanham (Md.): University Press of America, 1985, 714 pp. $39.75 (paper, $28.50).

Jan Karski was the wartime emissary of the Polish underground which first reported to President Roosevelt on the massacre of the Jews in Poland. Since 1952 he has been at the Foreign Service School at Georgetown, where he is a professor of government. His book, produced after many years of research, is a truly remarkable work. It not only provides the first comprehensive diplomatic history of Poland and the Great Powers, but it is well written, enriched by informative anecdotes and new material from recently opened archives. Zbigniew Brzezinski

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE CZECHOSLOVAK ARMY, 1948–1983. By Condoleezza Rice. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985, 303 pp. $37.50.

This analysis of the role of the military in the liberalization movement of 1968 adds to our understanding of those events and of the intensity of subsequent efforts, both by Prague and of Moscow, to restore the necessary "moral-political authority." Although the Czechoslovak experience has been in many ways unique, this work has relevance for other East European countries where, as in Czechoslovakia, the U.S.S.R. exerts direct influence on the armed forces and claims their loyalty to "proletarian internationalism."

THE KREMLIN AND THE PRAGUE SPRING. By Karen Dawisha. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985, 426 pp. $34.50.

The material now available on the Prague Spring makes possible a very plausible account, despite the secrecy enveloping the policymaking process and the hermetic seal on Soviet records, of what went on in the Kremlin, and also of the role of East European leaders such as Ulbricht and Kádár; and on the Czechoslovak side the story has been told and retold. Karen Dawisha puts it all together with exemplary research and great skill. She adds some observations of a theoretical nature which should be of interest to those concerned with models and the topology of crises.

THE RESTORATION OF ORDER: THE NORMALIZATION OF CZE-

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CHOSLOVAKIA, 1969–1976. By Milan Simecka. London: Verso, 1985, 167 pp. (New York: Schocken Books, distributor, $22.50; paper, $6.95).

Milan Simecka's description of the fate of the Czechoslovak people after the Prague Spring rings tragically true. He explains why the "normalization" continues, with the "passive loyalty" of the great majority of the citizens, in human terms: fear, greed, selfishness, despair, resignation, adaptation to the facts of power. The author draws on his own experience as a victim of the process, but his book is much more than a personal story; it grasps the psychology of a people trapped by history.

RISE AND FALL. By Milovan Djilas. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985, 432 pp. $24.95.

In this fourth volume of memoirs Djilas devotes himself to the critical decade following World War II, then briefly to the subsequent years when he was out of power and in and out of prison. He dwells on Yugoslavia's transformation from loyal ally to bitter opponent of the Soviet Union, and on his own transformation from authoritative voice of the revolution to discarded and persecuted heretic. Both transitions were more gradual and cumulative than has generally been realized. Djilas has told much of the story in his earlier books, but this one is complementary and full of his sharp views and impressions of the leading personalities of the time.

GOLI OTOK: THE ISLAND OF DEATH. By Venko Markovski. Boulder (Colo.): Eastern European Monographs, 1984, 229 pp. (New York: Columbia University Press, distributor, $28.00).

Goli Otok is an Adriatic island where many "Cominformists" were incarcerated after Tito's break with Stalin. Markovski is a Macedonian poet who turned against Tito, served a five-year sentence on the island, was released in 1961, and now lives in Bulgaria. There is little reason to doubt his descriptions, written at the time, of the tortures and horrors to which prisoners were subjected. The political commentary is pure Stalinist propaganda, vintage 1949.

NATIONALISM AND FEDERALISM IN YUGOSLAVIA, 1963–1983. By Pedro Ramet. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985, 299 pp. $27.50.

Yugoslavia combines a one-party system and limited individual freedom with a federal structure which is based on and encourages ethnic differences and must somehow control their centrifugal dynamics. Ramet's explanation of how it works is that the system operates through a flexible balance of power among the constituent republics similar to the international system in Europe prior to 1914. For students of Yugoslavia the great merit of the book is the way in which he follows the threads of nationalism, party theory, economic policy and power struggles through the succession of crises that have afflicted the country since the early 1960s. As for Ramet's theory, it is ingenious and worth further testing. Ramet does not claim that it solves Yugoslavia's nationality problem or that there is any solution. Europe's balance-of-power system was also sometimes described as "the international anarchy."

THE FIRST WAR BETWEEN SOCIALIST STATES: THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION OF 1956 AND ITS IMPACT. Edited by Bela K.

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Kiraly, Barbara Lotze and Nandor F. Dreisziger. Brooklyn: Brooklyn College Press, 1984, 608 pp. (New York: Columbia University Press, distributor).

This volume, in which over 40 authors are represented, contains many things: reflections on the Hungarian revolt written at the time and later; discussion on what happened and failed to happen; the impact on Hungary, on the Soviet bloc, and on global politics; an examination of the role of poets and others of the intelligentsia; the rethinking of Marxism in and out of Hungary; and an extensive bibliography. It brings together a variety of views and interpretations, and shows how and why the events of 1956 continue to loom large as a historic watershed.

BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE WEST: HUNGARY AND THE ILLUSIONS OF PEACEMAKING, 1945–1947. By Stephan D. Kertesz. Notre Dame (Ind.): Notre Dame Press, 1984, 320 pp. $20.00.

A former Hungarian diplomat, now an American professor, combines personal recollection with historical research and a sure sense of political reality to give us a revealing account of the fate of Hungary, a nation with very little control over its own destiny, drawn into world war by Germany and emerging from it under the domination of Russia. The story, especially the way in which the victorious powers dealt with each other in trying to deal with prostrated Hungary, is worth telling and is well told.

COLD WAR IN THE BALKANS: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE EMERGENCE OF COMMUNIST BULGARIA, 1943–1947. By Michael M. Boll. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1984, 250 pp. $25.00.

Here for the first time we have a detailed reconstruction of Bulgaria's exit from the war, the clash of American and Soviet policies there during the armistice period, and the ultimate and probably preordained victory of Soviet power and Bulgarian communism. American policy, with all the relevant documents now available, gets the fair hearing it has rarely received. Soviet policy remains more obscure, but this is a measured appraisal, and the extensive use of Soviet and Bulgarian material is most helpful.

The Middle East

John C. Campbell

THE OTHER ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: MAKING AMERICA'S MIDDLE EAST POLICY FROM TRUMAN TO REAGAN. By Steven L. Spiegel. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985, 522 pp. $24.95.

This is a running narrative of four decades of politics and diplomacy, with its focus on Washington, and the ideas, personalities and political pressures that have come together to produce policy decisions. Professor Spiegel stresses the philosophies and methods of the successive presidents and their top advisers as the dominant element, as he illustrates how each administration dealt with the Arab-Israeli conflict in the light of global, regional and local concerns. He discounts (too readily, some might say) the influence of domestic lobbies, and plays down the elements of continuity in policy from one administration to the next. He finds the record of every administration replete with miscalculations and mistakes. He is therefore

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provocative, but with a right to be so since he has studied the record so thoroughly.

MIDDLE EAST CRISIS: U.S. DECISION-MAKING IN 1958, 1970, AND 1973. By Alan Dowty. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985, 416 pp. $42.50.

Following the same path of intensive research on American policy decisions evident in the work of William Quandt, Steven Spiegel (above) and others, Alan Dowty concentrates on three separate episodes, one in the Eisenhower-Dulles period and two in that of Nixon and Kissinger. Not content with providing step-by-step accounts of the course of these particular crises, the author looks into the generic problem of governmental conduct in situations of crisis, testing his conclusions about each crisis, and on patterns common to all three, against a formidable array of hypotheses on "coping mechanisms," dimensions of choice and so on. That part of the enterprise is complex, at times overly mechanical, but generally stimulating and useful for understanding both past and future crises; it is not merely airy theorizing, as Dowty stays in close touch with the solid body of fact brought out in his narrative.

THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION AND THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION: THE FIRST THOUSAND DAYS. By Juliana S. Peck. Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1984, 138 pp. $7.00.

A full account of U.S. Middle East policy in the first Reagan term is not possible without going into the backstage discussions and interagency wrangling that constitute the policymaking process in Washington, but Juliana Peck does fairly well in the more limited task she set herself: to tell the story, from official statements and the columns of *The New York Times*, of policy declared and policy in action. The book will not find universal acceptance for objectivity—as no book on this subject will—but the interpretations and conclusions are sober and reasoned, not propagandistic.

BEN-GURION AND THE PALESTINIAN ARABS: FROM PEACE TO WAR. By Shabtai Teveth. New York: Oxford, 1985, 234 pp. $17.95.

Using the Zionist leader's diaries and letters as a supplement and correction to what he said publicly at various times, Ben-Gurion's biographer tells a fascinating story of his changing thoughts and proposals on relations with the Arabs, his plans for dialogue, cooperation and possible federation, and his talks with Musa Alami and other Arabs, from the time of his arrival in Palestine to the White Paper of 1939. Much of it has an unreal quality, in the light of the realities of the time and of what has happened since. Indeed, as the author concludes, Ben-Gurion's moves in dealing with the Arabs were above all tactical; he never wavered from the priority given to Jewish immigration, strength and statehood.

RADICAL ISLAM: MEDIEVAL THEOLOGY AND MODERN POLITICS. By Emmanuel Sivan. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985, 218 pp. $18.50.

An Israeli scholar's disquisition on Islamic resurgence in Egypt and Syria, which is not imported from Iran but rooted in orthodox Sunni tradition. He shows how the movement against secularism, Westernization, materialism and corruption has developed as a result of disillusion with other

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ideologies (liberalism, Nasserism, Marxism). Drawing mainly on the writings of Sayyid Qutb and his followers, the book highlights the potential political role of the radical wing of the movement, strongly based in the universities, which has embraced terror and violent revolution. There is explosive material under the surface calm in Egypt and Syria today.

A CLARIFICATION OF QUESTIONS. By Ayatollah Sayyed Ruhollah Mousavi Khomeini. Translated by J. Borujerdi. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1984, 432 pp. $32.00.

Ayatollah Khomeini's authoritative answers to some three thousand questions governing the conduct of believers in the Shi'ite faith of Iran. They cover everything from purity and prayer to commercial practices. These rules may be of greater interest to theology students than to those of international relations, but they do have relevance for the latter in such matters as relations between Muslims and non-Muslims and in the fact that religion and politics in present-day Iran are inseparable.

SHAH OF SHAHS. By Ryszard Kapuscinski. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985, 160 pp. $12.95.

Presented as scenes in a drama of struggle between the Iranian people and the Shah, with accompanying comment on the state of mind of both and on the nature of revolutions, the book is hardly a full and reliable account of what happened, but it is well written and interesting reading.

THE PERSIAN GULF UNVEILED. By John Bulloch. New York: Congdon & Weed, 1985, 224 pp. $16.95.

The Gulf has already been unveiled by a number of writers, but this report by an informed British journalist is nonetheless welcome, for it combines historical background with firsthand observation over many years and it is written with a light touch. The coverage is limited to the smaller Gulf states: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. The big brothers—Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran—are recognized as by no means without influence, but for the purposes of this book are part of the world outside.

OPEC AND THE THIRD WORLD: THE POLITICS OF AID. By Shireen Hunter. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985, 320 pp. $27.50.

This book has two great merits. It brings together for the first time, from widely scattered sources, all the statistics on OPEC members' aid to other countries. Second, it discusses with cool detachment why and how that aid was dispensed. The author also examines the question of how much that aid was motivated by solidarity with the Third World vis-à-vis the First and by common interest in the creation of a New International Economic Order. The answer is "not much," owing to more urgent national and regional (mainly Arab) political priorities, differences within OPEC, and the overriding importance of relations with the industrial West.

Asia and the Pacific

Donald S. Zagoria

U.S.-JAPAN STRATEGIC RECIPROCITY. By Edward A. Olsen. Stanford: Hoover Press, 1985, 194 pp. $24.95.

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"What Japan appears to be doing about defense and what it is [actually] doing are not necessarily the same," writes Olsen. "Tokyo is masterful at using tactics designed to postpone distasteful and costly defense decisions long enough so that the United States becomes frustrated, or distracted by other concerns, and lets Japan slip away with a minimal response." Although many American specialists on Japan would probably agree, the question is what to do about it. Olsen's major suggestion is to rewrite the Mutual Security Treaty to make it more equitable. But this will not change the domestic situation in Japan, where there is no consensus for a military buildup. Wouldn't the U.S. be wiser to try to get Japan to step up its already growing economic contributions to key countries such as Turkey, Egypt, South Korea, Pakistan, etc.? This is a role Japan finds more satisfactory and one which is vital to the promotion of international stability.

THE TAIWAN ISSUE IN SINO-AMERICAN STRATEGIC RELATIONS. By Martin L. Lasater. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1984, 283 pp. $18.00 (paper).

The first half of this volume is a well-balanced account of China's power potential, Sino-Soviet relations and Sino-American relations. Its main conclusion is that U.S. security in Asia should rest more on American strength and the support of its traditional regional allies than on optimistic projections of China as an ally against the Soviet Union. The second half is an account of recent developments in Taiwan. The author concludes with a warning against any compromise of U.S. principles in the case of Taiwan. "If in the future Beijing offers conditions of reunification which the people of Taiwan can accept, so be it. U.S. interests are best served by a peaceful reunification. . . . In the meantime, the current dual-track policy of the United States should be maintained."

THE SINO-VIETNAMESE CONFLICT. By Eugene K. Lawson. New York: Praeger, 1984, 319 pp.

The conflict between China and Vietnam has completely transformed the international relations of East Asia. This carefully researched volume traces the origins of the conflict to the strategic reevaluation in Beijing in 1968–69, which led to the Sino-U.S. rapprochement of the early 1970s. This had a devastating impact on Vietnam. Following the Vietnamese victory in 1975, other elements of conflict between Hanoi and Beijing appeared: the dispute over the Paracel and Spratly Islands; the Vietnamese confiscation of ethnic Chinese property and subsequent expulsion of ethnic Chinese; Hanoi's decision to join Comecon in June 1978; the Hanoi-Moscow military alliance in November 1978; and the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in December 1978. The value of this book is that it demonstrates beyond doubt that the Sino-Vietnamese conflict had its origins in the years of the Vietnam War from 1964–1975, and especially in the U.S.-Sino rapprochement. The primary issue was which was the main threat—the U.S. or the U.S.S.R.

A MIRROR FOR SOCIALISM: SOVIET CRITICISMS OF CHINA. By Gilbert Rozman. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985, 292 pp. $26.50.

This important book can be read on several levels. As a result of the Sino-Soviet split, there has developed within the Soviet academies a litera-

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ture on "what went wrong with socialism." Ostensibly talking about what went wrong with Mao Zedong's China, Soviet reformers could describe and analyze fundamental defects in the Soviet system itself. Thus, their writings can be read as an agenda for some future Deng Xiaoping in the Soviet Union. What do the reformers want? Much the same thing that has been going on in China under Deng. But alongside the reformers there is another, more powerful, school holding "orthodox" views on China and, implicitly, on the Soviet Union itself. This group fears the spread of "petty bourgeois influences" as soon as tight controls are relaxed. Thus, the book is both encouraging and depressing. Encouraging because, contrary to the view of some Westerners that Soviet totalitarianism is unchanging and irreversible, Rozman demonstrates that there are some Soviet voices urging far-reaching reform of the Chinese type. It is depressing, because such voices seem not to be very powerful.

CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE IN SINGAPORE AND MALAYSIA, 1945–1983. By Richard Clutterbuck. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1985, 412 pp. $24.00.

In the 1950s and 1960s, both Malaysia and Singapore were faced with serious communist-led insurgency movements. Between 1963 and 1983, there was the Malaysian confrontation with Indonesia; the collapse of the Malaysia-Singapore merger; race riots; a resurgence of the communist guerrilla organization in Malaysia; and then the collapse of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea. Yet both Malaysia and Singapore have emerged in the 1980s as two of the most prosperous and stable countries in Southeast Asia, if not in the whole Third World. This very thorough volume, by a retired British army general, offers a number of reasons. In both countries history threw up leaders to match the hour: Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore and Tunku Abdul Rahman in Malaysia. Both leaders established political parties that became rooted solidly enough to remain in power without a break for the subsequent 20 years. In both countries stable democratic structures, experienced security forces and highly efficient intelligence services emerged strengthened by the ordeal of attempted revolutions. For many of these things, Britain can fairly claim some credit. It had consciously built up cadres of able politicians and administrators, and shrewdly accepted that their popular support and thence the stability of their countries would depend upon their being seen to struggle for their independence and to win. For government officials pondering where things have gone wrong in the Philippines, or for political scientists interested in "political development," there is a good deal to chew on in this impressive book.

Africa

Jennifer Seymour Whitaker

PRETORIA'S PRAETORIANS: CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA. By Philip H. Frankel. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985, 215 pp. $44.50.

A lecturer at South Africa's University of Witswatersrand takes a long look at changes in civil-military relations in South Africa since the accession to power of former Defense Minister P.W. Botha and the assertion of a "Total Strategy" to counter a "Total [communist] Onslaught." In the most

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interesting section of the book, Frankel hypothesizes that as the army (by demographic necessity) becomes increasingly black, it may become the most thoroughly integrated institution in the country. He does not, however, see the military as potential reformers, and despite their growing power to influence decision-making, he argues that within the present context they will be bound by the power of other elites.

THE TRUE CONFESSIONS OF AN ALBINO TERRORIST. By Breyten Breytenbach. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1985, 396 pp. $19.95.
WAITING: THE WHITES OF SOUTH AFRICA. By Vincent Crapanzano. New York: Random House, 1985, 358 pp. $19.95.

In his searing account of a seven-year imprisonment, the Afrikaner poet Breytenbach impales his inquisitors and jailers, finding the essence of apartheid (indeed of all forcible domination) in their tireless quest for the weakness that will feed their strength. Crapanzano, an American anthropologist, wanders on the mild side, with a lengthy excursion through a small South African country town that is more a microcosm of a very particular group of South African whites than an exemplification of the white condition in that country today.

FREEDOM RISING. By James North. New York: Macmillan, 1985, 352 pp. $19.95.

An American just out of college, North plunges into a netherworld of dissent and resistance seldom inhabited by either South African or foreign whites. In his recounting of a four-year picaresque journey through South Africa and Zimbabwe, he introduces a sense of black, brown and white dissidents whose stories and observations bring to life the reality of the continuing struggle against the system.

ARMS AND THE AFRICAN: MILITARY INFLUENCES ON AFRICA'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. Edited by William J. Foltz and Henry S. Bienen. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985, 221 pp. $22.50. A Council on Foreign Relations Book.

Six American experts who have served in academic, diplomatic and intelligence positions join in this compact, readable study sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations. Written from what could be called a realist-liberal point of view, the book places the growing militarization of Africa in international perspective, with special attention to the U.S., U.S.S.R., France and South Africa. Concluding that the military "seems here to stay as a permanent factor in the politics of Africa," the authors emphasize the local roots of many conflicts which undue external involvement could help escalate into major confrontation. Claude E. Welch, Jr.

EUROPE, AFRICA AND LOMÉ III. Edited by Robert Boardman, Timothy M. Shaw and Panayotis Soldatos. Washington: University Press of America/Dalhousie: Dalhousie University, 1985, 168 pp. $22.75 (paper, $11.00).

As this bleak and realistic assessment of the European Community's pioneering contract with the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries sums it up, Lomé has been better than nothing, but just barely. While Community exports to the ACP countries have risen, the ACP's share of Europe's trade with the Third World has declined since the first treaty in 1975. Moreover,

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the "equal partnership" concept has steadily given way to the present European quest for greatly increased conditionality in all resource transfers. Still, the contributors concur, Lomé has provided a reliable form of assistance, and its contractual form is a precedent that should not be abandoned.

AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT CRISIS AND RELATED INTERNATIONAL ISSUES. By Philip Ndegwa. Nairobi and London: Heinemann, 1985, 153 pp.

The governor of the Central Bank of Kenya writes realistically of Africa's need to solve its own problems—and give population control high priority. He also argues strongly that development must flow from an ideology of nationalism within African countries and culminate in continental economic cooperation building on sub-regional groupings. While he is undoubtedly right about the necessity for regional cooperation in Africa's quest for self-reliance, economic Pan-Africanism appears a very distant prospect.

FATHERS WORK FOR THEIR SONS. By Sara S. Berry. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985, 225 pp.

This study of how people make a living and provide for the future in two Yoruba communities brilliantly shows how plausible economic strategies in the prevailing context work to constrain rather than expand productivity. Because the state is the primary fount of resources, would-be accumulators invest most of their energy and wherewithal in building networks of influence providing access to the state rather than in productive enterprise. Similarly, prosperity in any business depends largely on social relationships whose cultivation siphons off resources from the expansion of productive capacity. Berry concludes bleakly that "competition produces uncertainty, tension and turmoil" rather than efficiency and growth.

THE POLITICS OF AGRICULTURE IN TROPICAL AFRICA. Edited by Jonathan Barker. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1984, 320 pp. $29.95.

These essays—detailed case analyses of agriculture in Upper Volta, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Sudan, Zambia, Zaïre and Mozambique—reflect the prevailing confusion among the mainly socialist-oriented authors about how to deal with the present crisis. Largely avoiding dependency theory (except in discussing causes), they focus on the failures of large capital-intensive schemes in a variety of African political milieus, thus implicitly joining the broad Western consensus that small-farm development is the priority in Africa.

AFRICAN WOMEN SOUTH OF THE SAHARA. By Margaret Jean Hay and Sharon Stichter. New York: Longman, 1984, 225 pp.

This engrossing survey portrays women in Africa today as emotionally independent and economically self-reliant actors whose control of available material assets, however, is steadily eroding. Traditionally the main producers of food and providers of children's subsistence, women have seen their ability to perform these functions circumscribed by colonial and independent government policies aimed at male farmers. The current African food crisis will very likely exacerbate social strains, either by increasing women's economic stake or by pushing them further to the margins even in the subsistence farming areas.

A PEACE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: THE LANCASTER HOUSE CON-

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FERENCE IN RHODESIA, 1979. By Jeffrey Davidow. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1984, 143 pp.

In this definitive account of the negotiations leading to the end of the Rhodesian civil war, the first U.S. envoy to Rhodesia after our withdrawal in 1970 explains in colorful detail how Lord Carrington pulled it off. In Davidow's view, the consistent British control over the agenda and pace of the talks—as well as a clearly available fallback position in a settlement acceptable to Muzorewa even if rejected by the Patriotic Front—made a daunting task possible and then plausible. After years of dithering, the British resolved their last African colonial tangle with skill and style.

ETHIOPIA: POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIETY. By Peter Schwab. Boulder (Colo.): Lynne Rienner, 1985, 134 pp. $18.50 (paper, $10.00).

This sympathetic account of Ethiopia's revolution describes the impact of Marxism on Ethiopia's political and economic life through the end of 1984. In the author's view, the Ethiopian government has moved through a phase of violent conflict and consolidation to one of widespread popular support. Schwab's perspective would work to better advantage for the reader if it yielded concrete information about what is actually happening on the ground in Ethiopia: what he serves up here, instead, remains largely at the level of theory and generalization.

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Edited by Janet Rigney

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

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

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